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Rationally inattentive decision-making (RIDM) extends general problem of
Bayesian decision-making under uncertainty to the case when the decision-
maker (DM) has several options for obtaining extra information about the
environment, before making the decision. The environment can quantita-
tively be described with variables referred to as state. The decision is pre-
sumably made to minimize a cost function, which depends on the unknown
state and final action taken by the DM. The crucial assumption is that the
DM has to first rationally select what information to process among the op-
tions provided to him and what information to put aside. In other words,
he has to rationally decide what information to pay attention to, and what
information to be inattentive to. He then takes the optimal action based
on all the information in hand. The term RIDM was coined by economist
Christopher Sims to justify sluggish macroeconomic adjustments. This no-
tion of decision-making under uncertainty includes sequential setup, and in
its broad sense relates several classic concepts such as decoding, estimation,
optimization and control.
In general, sequential Bayesian decision-making under uncertainty is a
framework widely used to address numerous real-world situations. It com-
prises a decision-maker or a controller who successively interacts with the en-
vironment or a plant. Such an interaction is typically characterized by three
basic elements: first, how the decision-maker perceives the state, which is not
necessarily assumed to be perfectly known; second, how the decision-maker
acts based on this perception; third, how the state of the system changes
subject to the action over the successive stages of interaction. Among these,
the latest element is a characteristic of the system and is always given.
Typically, the works on optimization, dynamic programming and estima-
tion focus mainly on how to take action and treat the perception element
as given. On the other hand, information theory is concerned with how to
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transmit the information in the most efficient way for the decision-maker
(or decoder) to take the optimal decision. The general framework we pro-
vide here relates to several situations where perception and taking action get
into a reciprocal interaction. In such situations, how to perceive the state is
also treated as a decision variable. It must be decided upon from a set of
perception mechanisms and then employed towards minimizing the cost.
Practically, such situations are encountered in the study of networked con-
trol systems, artificially intelligent and automated systems, brain and cog-
nitive sciences and behavioral economics. The common feature in all these
circumstances is the presence of some sort of constraint that hinders the
perfect perception of the state and leaves a handful of competing ways for
collecting imperfect information about the state.
To model and tackle this generalized sequential Bayesian decision-making
under uncertainty, we consider the joint probability measure of all the system
variables over the sequence of the stages. All basic elements involved can then
be analogously modeled as conditional probability kernels over such variables.
This includes the perception mechanism that is modeled as a probability
kernel known as observation kernel. For the constraint that hinders perfect
perception, we assume bounded Shannon mutual information between the
observation and state, which introduces a convex set of observation kernels
that transfer the same amount of information.
After introducing and explaining the basic framework, we formulate and
tackle three fundamental problems as follows: rationally inattentive Markov
decision process over a finite horizon, rationally inattentive ergodic control
of Markov chain over infinite horizon and sequential empirical coordination
with a bundle of random processes over a finite horizon. We model each
system through considering the joint probability of all of its variables. We
then provide a systematic way to reduce the space of policies to appropriate
sets over which our problems take convenient forms of convex optimizations.
We then show that by defining appropriate distortion measure, these con-
vex optimization problems can be linked to the distortion-rate problem in
information theory. The results should be of interest to both economics and
engineering communities.
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The term rationally inattentive decision-making was originally coined by
Christopher Sims in economics [1, 2]. At first, it was intended to contribute
to the literature of theoretical macroeconomics. The first formulation pro-
vided by Sims was based on a heuristic that economic decision-makers may
not be able to observe the exact value of economic variables when making an
action intended to minimize a cost function that depends on these variables
as well as the action taken. Therefore, their decisions or actions provide
limited information about these variables. In order to quantify this limited
information content, he utilizes the concept of Shannon mutual information
between these variables and the action. The setup could be extended to
sequential framework, where a series of economic variables and actions are
involved. In this situation, the economic variables may or may not be af-
fected by the decision-maker’s action. It turns out that, as explained in the
sequel, this setup goes beyond decision-making in economics and arises in
various real-world situations.
Originally inspired by his work, in this thesis we formulate a general prob-
lem of Bayesian decision-making under uncertainty with an additional deci-
sion variable, which governs how to reduce uncertainty or collect information
given an assortment of options.
This chapter consists of three sections. In Section 1.1, we briefly introduce
the fundamental concepts that underlie our problem. In Section 1.2, we
briefly review the practical situations where this setup arises and mention
some previous works in each area. Like any other decision-making problem,
this problem has a wide range of applications in science and engineering.
Finally, in Section 1.3, we review the specific contributions of this thesis
within the framework mentioned in the last two parts.
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1.1 Preliminaries and Concepts
Information, by its conceptual nature, is misleadingly simple. A unified
notion and quantitative measure of information, general enough to capture
what all different communities such as statistics, information theory, signal
processing and decision theory refer to as information, has been declared
infeasible by reductionists (Ref. [3], Chapter 4). This notion is too general
and flexible to admit a unified framework.
We consider quantitative variables whose values are not known. How-
ever, there is knowledge of the level of certainty or degree of belief relating
to the potential outcome of these variables, quantified through a probabil-
ity distribution. Then, information is what causes a change in this level of
knowledge, reflected in the change in probability distribution. In a Bayesian
framework, the distributions before and after receiving the information are
respectively referred to as the prior and the posterior. We consider the situ-
ations where this change is constituted through the Bayes rule. This means
that we characterize what we mean by information together with the notion
of Bayesian updating. Bayes rule is far more than a classic trivial assump-
tion, and there are some axiomatic justifications for it. Furthermore, there
are other knowledge updates, other than Bayesian updating, which have also
been axiomatically justified. The interested reader may refer to Kreps [4] for
a review of early works of De Finetti, Ramsey and Savage. For later works,
the reader can refer to Shmaya and Yariv [5] and Molavi et al. [6].1 Alto-
gether, uncertainty, information, and learning are interpreted hand in hand,
independent of what this information is going to be used for.
Decision-making can be simply defined as the process of selecting an
option among several alternatives based on given criteria. In this broad
sense, decision-making can be thought of as bringing a broad set of concepts,
such as estimation, decoding, and control under one umbrella. Further, the
notion of decision-making implicitly defines decision in association with a
goal or target, according to which the available options can be compared.
Under some mild conditions, this target can be represented with an analytic
cost function to be minimized.
In decision-making under uncertainty (or risk), choices made by a decision-
maker lead to probabilistic outcomes rather than certain perfectly predictable
1Chapter 4 of Ref. [7] provides a good overview as well.
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ones. Fixing the probability distribution of the outcomes, the von Neumann-
Morgenstern theorem provides four axiomatic conditions of rational behavior,
under which the decision-maker’s subjective cost associated with an action is
the statistical expectation of outcomes of that action taken with respect to
the fixed probability weight. We consider the simple case when all the uncer-
tainty is captured through random variables known as state, and the criteria
according to which decision-maker selects an option to be represented with a
cost function which depends on the state and the action. By von Neumann
- Morgenstern axioms, the decision-maker behaves as if he is minimizing the
expected value of the cost function, defined over the action space.
Beyond this point, Bayesian decision-making refers to the process of ex-
pected cost minimization where the decision-maker has access to another
variable, which is statistically related to the original state. Following the
terminology of learning, it sounds like decision-making with respect to the
posterior rather than the prior. There are axiomatic foundations behind
Bayesian decision-making, as it can happen with simpler assumptions. The
interested reader may refer to early work of Savage and other relevant liter-
ature listed in Kreps [4] and Mas-Colell et al. [8].2
The notion of relevant information arises in decision-making, where
learning is intended to be followed by decision-making. Intuitively, the more
the information helps in minimizing the cost, the more relevant it is. Rele-
vant information can be considered actionable information. Judgment about
whether some information is relevant or not becomes important when it
comes to deciding among various options of information to process. This
distinguishes active information collection—information collection for the
sake of taking an appropriate action based on it—from oblivious informa-
tion collection—collecting information just to learn the underlying state of
the world. Intuitively, the decision-maker utilizes all available information he
has to make the best decision. When there are several options of information
to process, there is another dimension, along with which a decision must be
made, and it is related to the choice of the information based on which the
decision must be made.
In the next section, we will elaborate more on the distinction between
information and relevant information. For now, we refer to the well-known
2Chapter 3 of Ortega [7] provides a good overview as well.
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work of Blackwell et al. [9]. The paper considers a Bayesian learner. When it
comes to comparing information with an absolute metric, not all information
structures can be compared. In other words, a general comparison between
any two information structures is impossible. When there is an objective,
which is the case considered in Cabrales et al. [10] that takes the standard
utility functions in asset pricing, all information structures can be ordered
by the Bayesian decision-maker.
Options of information to process may arise when there is some limited
information collection resource, which can be utilized in different ways. Sev-
eral factors may cause a cost associated with information. There might be
an explicit cost associated with obtaining extra information, exogenous in-
formation processing constraint, or some privacy concern which makes the
extra information costly. We will see some examples in the next section.
1.2 Practical Situations
In this section, we provide an overview, backed by references, about broad
practical areas of research that can be related to the problem we have intro-
duced here.
1.2.1 Communication and Control
Information theory: What we refer to as information theory has grown out
of Shannon’s pioneering work on the mathematical theory of communication
(MTC) [11]. Communication is the act of transferring data from one point to
other through a physical channel in the form of a signal. The data (thus the
value of signal) is unknown to the sender (referred to as source) and receiver
ex-ante. When the variable is revealed, only the sender observes it perfectly,
and receiver only observes the output of the signal sent. There is an agreed-
upon distortion criterion, with respect to which the quantities observed at
the source and decoded at destination are compared in expectation.
At its origin, MTC gives a quantitative framework for analysis of informa-
tion transmission as described before. Its approach to the problem is through
answering two fundamental questions: the ultimate level of data compression
4
and the ultimate rate of data transmission. The main contribution is to ab-
stract away from the physical properties of the source and channel, and from
their mathematical details, except for two quantities, referred to as source
entropy and channel capacity [12–14].
In terms of basic concepts of Bayesian decision theory, since both sender
and receiver agree upon the cost criteria, they can be considered as one
agent when it comes to decision-making. The concern of information theory
is the design of an observation kernel, intended to transmit the realized value
of a source, ex-ante known only up to a prior distribution. The process is
referred to as encoding. The action takes place at the destination and is
referred to as decoding. The cost function here is known as fidelity criteria
of reconstruction or distortion. The limited information collection resource,
in this case, is constrained by the fixed communication channel, which can
be utilized in several ways, and should be used optimally for the sake of
minimizing the distortion criteria by the encoder.
One of the most widely used channels in communication is a noiseless
digital channel, which naturally restricts us to information structures that
partition the source domain into a fixed number of regions and reveal which
partition region contains the true value of the state.3 Having source coding
and channel coding as the most basic concepts, traditional information the-
ory considers a collection of sources (or states, in terms of Bayesian decision-
making) together. In many situations, these different sources are referred
to as blocks, and traditional information theory is considered to be non-
causal. For some recent applications, such as video streaming, several works
re-consider channel and source coding together, and consider specific forms of
information collection, which include feedback (see Ref. [16] or Ref. [17] and
references therein). We refrain from explaining more on this broad topic,
and just emphasize that information theory can be cast in the framework
of Bayesian decision-making with options of information to process, where
source and channel encoders do the information collection part, and the de-
coder takes the final decision. For the case when the prior (or distribution of
state or source) is that of a random process, and the information is conveyed
through a channel to be re-constructed at the destination, Teneketzis [18]
provides a lower bound to the optimal distortion achieved. Further, [18] con-
3See Ref. [15] for optimum partitioning when the prior is a Gaussian and cost function
is quadratic.
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nects Bayesian filtering and estimation to causal information theory. The
same link is established in [19, 20]. Among classic works, real-time informa-
tion transfer under communication constraints has been studied in [21–23].
Similarly, Borkar et al. [24] consider the problem of vector quantization for
Markov sources with the average reconstruction cost criterion. We will revisit
the same concept of causal information theory in the context of networked
control systems in the sequel.
Control theory: In its origin, control theory was developed mostly for
deterministic systems. Later, though, it was extended to include situations
when decisions must be made in an uncertain environment. Interested read-
ers may refer to many classic texts on control of stochastic systems [25–27].
We just mention that, in the classic literature on control of stochastic sys-
tems, the situation is about a decision-maker or a controller who successively
interacts with the environment or a plant. Such an interaction is typically
characterized by three basic elements: first, how the decision-maker perceives
the state, which is not necessarily assumed to be perfectly known; second,
how the decision-maker acts based on this perception; third, how the state of
the system changes subject to the action over the successive stages of interac-
tion. Works on control theory, optimal control, and estimation focus mainly
on how to take actions, and treats the perception element as given. The
closest model in the literature to our setup is a partially observable Markov
decision process, where the extra information about the uncertain state is
provided via an observation kernel (Ref. [28] includes a good literature re-
view and explanation of the problem).
Networked Control Systems: Nowadays, along with the advance of
various communication infrastructures, such as the Internet and wireless net-
works, several systems have emerged whose components communicate in real
time through information channels, and then decide upon control actions.
These channels are limited in terms of the amount of information they can
reliably transmit. This means that the state of the system, the situation in
which the system lies, cannot be perfectly observed. For the design of such
systems, it makes intuitive sense to utilize these limited information trans-
mission resources in the most efficient way. As mentioned in Section 1.1,
efficiency here naturally arises when information transmission is considered
together with the action taken and the resulting performance. So, the criteria
6
are related to the performance of control policies that govern the implemen-
tation of actions on the basis of the compressed representation of the state
of the plant. In this way, in terms of the basic notions of Bayesian decision-
making, it contrasts with classic information theory, where the performance
is measured with respect to the fidelity criteria or distortion between the
true realized value of the source and the reconstructed source. The sender
communicates the part of the information, such that the expected cost is
minimized at the end. The main question in such systems is how informa-
tion transmission interacts with control. The extensive body of research on
this subject is collectively referred to as networked control theory. In terms
of the basic notions of Bayesian decision-making, encoding can be thought of
as deciding how to collect information, and decoding and control, which take
place together, can be thought of as decision-making. Further, in contrast
to traditional information theory, these systems are causal and closed-loop.
Once a decision is made at each stage through available information, the
state (or source) at the next stage is generated through the state transition
kernel of the system.
These models combine information theory and control theory. On one
hand, noisy information must be utilized for achieving satisfactory perfor-
mance by the controller. On the other, design of the encoder (or how to
collect information) requires control-theoretic analysis, since the information
that is passed to the controller is provided by the encoder, after passing the
channel. Therefore, communication and control cannot be decoupled, and
must be considered together. A unifying perspective for information theory
and control (or real-time information theory) is elaborated on in [29,30].
There is an abundant body of applications for networked control systems,
mostly about controlling remote plants. One example is the case of auto-
mated irrigation systems, developed to optimize water usage for agricultural
crops. These systems typically consist of a distributed network of sensors
that measure the moisture and temperature of the soil. These sensors trans-
fer their information through a wireless network to the central controller
which handles imperfect sensor information received through the wireless
network and triggers irrigation actuators. The cost function can be defined
through factors such as how efficiently the irrigation has actually taken place.
To the best of our knowledge, Ref. [31] is the first work that tries to tackle
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the problem by providing some results on the structure of optimal encoder for
a given channel. Later, [32] and then [33,34] consider a multivariate additive
Gaussian linear system, for which the encoder, decoder, and controller are
designed to minimize a finite-horizon additive performance criterion over
various channels. Ref. [35] considers ergodic control for the case of the general
cost function over an infinite horizon.
Yuksel and Linder [36] consider a general problem of selecting optimal
observation channels in static and dynamic stochastic control problems, but
focus mainly on abstract structural results pertaining to the existence of
optimal channels and continuity of the optimal cost in various topologies
over the space of observation channels.
In two relevant works, Bansal and Başar [37,38] study the problem of min-
imizing the step-wise quadratic cost, where the dynamics of the system are
linear in the control, and observation is a function of the state contaminated
with additive noise. The decision-maker (referred to as DM) must jointly
optimize a linear observation channel and a control law to minimize the ex-
pected cost. Having fixed a channel for conveying the information about the
state, [34] reviews several concepts and specially re-defines main information-
theoretic concepts, such as channel capacity and rate of a code, within such
causal framework.
Although we are focusing on the optimization problem in this work, con-
trol theory deals with observability and controllability. Also, Refs. [39–44]
consider a controlled stochastic system that must be stabilized by the con-
troller that uses imperfect information conveyed through a communication
channel.
1.2.2 Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with or without extra infor-
mation, has also been the subject of interest in robotics and the study of
sensorimotor systems in neuroscience. Such systems typically interact with
an unknown environment, about which they collect information through sen-
sors. The output of these sensors is then utilized for movement or taking ac-
tion, intended for specific goals. Living creatures also survive with cognition
(perception) and intelligent behavior (action).
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These systems couple sensing, computation, and actuation in a non-trivial
way, especially from the point of view of design minimality. Ref. [45] is among
the first works in robotics which take this approach. For a specific goal to be
met, we do not need the robot to fully comprehend and understand the envi-
ronment. Given the cost associated with processing the sensory information,
it makes sense for the robot to receive and act on the minimal information
relevant to the task it is about to perform.
The same concept is used in [46, 47] when discussing how to choose an
appropriate sensor for a robot. In practical situations, robotics and artificial
intelligence are bound up closely with computer vision. A typical situation
arises when a robot wants to navigate through an unknown environment.
However, as Ref. [46] puts it eloquently, “historically, there is a cultural
divide between sensor designers and the users”. Performance and accuracy of
data collected by sensors have a trade-off with their processing cost, making
it economically impossible to employ ideal or high-performance sensors in
certain situations. One might consider “the perfect image sensor” as that
having “infinite resolution, dynamic range, and frame rate, together with
zero pixel size and power consumption”. However, the output from this ideal
sensor would also be very expensive to process. In this way, the definition of
the perfect sensor depends on the situation in which it is being used. The
perfect sensor provides the most information in the data that is related to
the task meant to be accomplished, without irrelevant information which
increases the bandwidth. For example, when trying to detect an object to
avoid colliding into it, using a perfect sensor to figure the exact colour and
shape of the object might be redundant.
Ideas similar to ours can also be found in [48–50].
1.2.3 Economic Theory
Behavioral economics postulates that real-world decision-makers have lim-
ited processing capability, less than what is needed to act according to var-
ious basic axiomatic models briefly mentioned in Section 1.1. This includes
ordinary decision-making, decision-making under uncertainty, and decision-
making with side information [51–54]. Most of the well-known models in be-
havioral economics, such as prospect theory [55] and Allais paradox [56], are
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about how expected utility theory is violated in decision-making under un-
certainty. However, as far as our work is concerned, we are close to that part
of behavioral economics that investigates how real decision-makers act when
facing too much information to process. Several models have been developed
in economics to postulate how decision-makers act in this situation [57, 58].
Models of inattentiveness [59], sparsity-based decision-making [60], and ra-
tional inattention [1, 2] are among those.
The rationale behind all such models is as follows: When making decisions
under uncertainty (risk), the decision-maker tries to inspect the exact value
of the underlying uncertain state of the world to choose his action optimally.
When the decision-maker faces cognitive information processing constraints,
so that the amount of information he can collect is limited, he devotes his
constrained cognitive resources to obtaining the information that is most
relevant to his objective.
The closest model to ours is rational inattention, first introduced by Christo-
pher Sims in the study of macroeconomic adjustment processes. The main
feature of macroeconomic consumption models is an agent who decides about
his level of consumption based on his wealth and value of the assets. The for-
mer is a decision variable while the latter two are considered the states that
bear uncertainty. The reason, as Sims postulates, is that the decision-maker
cannot exactly track their values because of limited cognitive resources. As
elaborated before, this form of constraint leaves room for information choice,
as these constraints have to be optimally utilized. Sims uses constrained
Shannon mutual information between the states and the decision. Later
though, the rationally inattentive decision-making model itself became of
interest. Woodford [61] provides detailed explanation of the effects of ratio-
nal inattention in behavioral decision-making. Furthermore, [62,63] focus on
the general rational inattention problem in a single period itself and provide
structural results about its solution.
The notion of rational inattention is later extended to different areas of
economics. There are several real-world situations in which this setup arises.
As an example, consider the case when an investor wants to form a portfo-
lio of risky assets whose returns in the next period follow a certain ex-ante
known prior. This source of uncertainty can be considered as the state, and
how much to invest in each asset as the decision (or action). Investors who
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are more antipathetic to risk are mostly concerned whether their portfolio,
on average, will have negative or positive return. In contrast, risky investors
may mostly consider how heavy are the tails of probability of returns for their
portfolio—that is, the chances for considerable rewards and losses. Accord-
ingly, different investors tend to view the conditions from different perspec-
tives. They would rather devote their limited cognitive resources to resolving
different uncertainties, per their specific objective [64,65].
Refs. [66,67] have implemented rationally inattentive decision-making mod-
els within the framework of a market, where real commodities are traded.
They study how consumer’s limited cognitive resources beside having sellers
who are aware of this limit affect pricing and quality of the commodities in
the market. For a group that coordinates to pursue a unique goal, [68, 69]
utilize rational inattention models in information exchange to demonstrate
why such a group needs a leader.
In asset pricing, some classical puzzles such as equity premium puzzle and
home bias puzzle have been addressed by employing rationally inattentive
decision-making models [70–74].
1.3 Overview and Contributions
In this section, we briefly review the content of this thesis and its contribu-
tions. In Chapter 2, we introduce and develop the basic platform and tools
needed to provide a unified representation for all stochastic systems. Using
these tools, we may uniquely formulate and tackle various situations that
involve Bayesian learning, decision-making under uncertainty, and Bayesian
decision-making. We introduce the elements needed for fully probabilistic
modeling, which is going to be our main tool in this thesis. In Chapter 3,
we introduce the basic tools needed for formulating the problem of rationally
inattentive decision-making, the problem of Bayesian decision-making under
uncertainty extended to the case when the DM has several options for ob-
taining extra information about the environment before making the decision.
Tools such as the Kullback-Leibler divergence and mutual information and
their interpretations within the framework of Bayesian decision-making will
be introduced. These tools will be used to introduce constraints for the per-
ception of decision-maker. We formulate the problem within the framework
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introduced in Chapter 2. Later and in the next three chapters, we will in-
troduce and tackle three problems in the framework of rationally inattentive
decision-making.
In Chapter 4, we continue developing and tackling the theory of rationally
inattentive decision-making within a dynamic setup for controlling Markov
chain. At each stage, the decision-maker is allowed to choose an observation
kernel that provides a limited amount of information, on top of what can
be implied from the past observations about the current state. Later and at
each stage, recalling all the observations collected, the decision-maker takes
an action. The goal here is to minimize an additive cost over all the stages.
In Chapter 5, the same setup as in Chapter 4 is considered, but the inten-
tion is ergodic control of the Markov chain over infinite horizon. It aims to
minimize the time average of the cost incurred in the almost sure sense. In
contrast to Chapter 4, we constrain decision and observation kernels to be
Markov.
In Chapter 6, we consider a sequential setup in which a large body of
decision-makers, each with its own individual cost function, is involved. Each
decision-maker’s cost function depends on an idiosyncratic uncertain state
that evolves according to a general random process over time, as well as
the action taken by that decision-maker given all his information. The in-
formation is provided by a better-informed benevolent common information
sender, who communicates the information to the whole body of decision-
makers at the same time. The intention is to minimize the per-agent average
cost incurred by decision-makers in the worst case.





In this chapter, we introduce and develop the basic platform and tools needed
to provide a unified representation for stochastic systems, through which
to formulate and tackle various situations that involve Bayesian learning,
decision-making under uncertainty, and Bayesian decision-making. This ap-
proach allows us to abstract away from how various sub-disciplines formulate
stochastic systems and decision-making for their concerns and purposes, and
come up with a single lens through which to consider the problem.
Within the context of information theory and control, a similar approach is
adopted in Tatikonda [34] and Touchette and Lloyd [75,76], which build upon
the approaches of Witsenhausen [77] and Roland Dobrushin [78, 79]. The
same approach has been taken by Karny [80]. Furthermore, this approach
has long been a favorite tool in communities of machine learning and statistics
(see Jensen [81] and Bishop [82]).
Referred to hereafter as probabilistic modelling, this approach considers the
collection of all random variables involved in a system and identifies the joint
probability distribution according to which these variables are distributed.
The resulting joint probability measure is referred to as a probabilistic model.
The vaguely used term system here may refer to a classic system prevalent
in information theory, stochastic control, robust control, Bayesian optimiza-
tion and experimental design, decision-making in behavioral economics, or
artificial intelligence and cognitive systems.
In many of the situations we are dealing with, the system (thus the prob-
abilistic model) is not uniquely characterized. Essentially, there is a class of
conceivable probabilistic models that can describe the behavior of the sys-
tem. In such a situation, the set of all such probabilistic models is referred
to as a probabilistic model set. This situation may arise when the system is
partly characterized, or characterized up to a set of conceivable scenarios.
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Furthermore, it can arise when there are some elements of the system that
must be chosen by a decision-maker from an assortment of options. In the
latter case, the probabilistic model set is also called probabilistic decision set.
In this regard, decision-making takes the form of identifying the conceivable
decision set from which the decision-maker must choose a design under cost
constraints. Another way to reflect on probabilistic decision set is to think
of it as resulting from restricting the initial set of all joint probability mea-
sures on variables of the system through imposing properties and exogenous
constraints of the system. Such constraints range from causality and order
of variables to structure of the system and how decisions are made.
The great merit of fully probabilistic modeling lies in enabling us to treat
all variables and elements of the system on the same basis and in a coherent
fashion. Furthermore, it allows us to introduce exogenous constraints on the
system and decision variables (such as causality and order of the variables
over the time horizon, different assumptions on how decision-makers act,
and many other constraints) in the form of partial specifications of this joint
probability measure in a consistent way. We develop the basic framework in
Section 2.2, and what decision-making looks like in this framework in Section
2.3. In Section 2.4, we explain what the specific term of Bayesian learning
refers to, and what elements it has in the context of decision-making under
uncertainty.
2.1 Preliminary Notions and Relevant Notations
In this section, we introduce the basic mathematical and conceptual nota-
tions used later in framing the problem. Since we consider the system as a
collection of random variables, we start with some basics from probability
theory.
We fix the underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P), over which our random
variables are defined, where F is the Borel σ-field of Ω. All spaces are
assumed to be standard Borel (i.e., isomorphic to a Borel subset of a complete
separable metric space); any such space will be equipped with its Borel σ-field
B(·). Random variables are denoted with upper-case letters such as Y , while
lower-case letters such as y are used to denote their realized values. The state
space for these variables is denoted with Y, and the space of all probability
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measures defined on (Y,B(Y)) will be denoted by P(Y); the spaces of all
measurable functions and all bounded continuous functions Y → R will be
denoted by M(Y) and by Cb(Y), respectively.
Given the space of random variables, we can proceed by defining some
operations on them. We use the standard linear-functional notation for ex-
pectations: Given an Y-valued random object Y with Law(Y ) = PY ∈ P(Y)
and f ∈ L1(Y) ⊂M(Y),
〈PY , f〉 ,
∫
Y
f(y)PY (dy) = E[f(Y )], (2.1)
which can equivalently be denoted with EPY [f(Y )].
When more than one random variable is defined on the same probability
space, a joint probability measure PY1,Y2 can be defined on the product space
(Y1×Y2,B(Y1)⊗B(Y2)), and the space of all such measures can be denoted
with P(Y1 × Y2). The distribution according to which any of the random
variables Y1, Y2 is distributed is referred to as marginal distribution. For
example, PY1 ∈ P(Y1) is defined as
PY1(A) , PY1,Y2(A,Y2) =
∫
Y2
PY1,Y2(A, dy2) ∀A ∈ B(Y1). (2.2)
On many occasions, we are interested in characterizing the inter-relation
between the random variables, induced by the joint probability distribution
PY1,Y2 . For this, the concept of Markov (or stochastic) kernel can be utilized.
A Markov kernel with input space Y1 and output space Y2 is a mapping
PY2|Y1(·|·) : B(Y2)× Y1 → [0, 1], such that:
• For every y1 ∈ Y1, we have PY2|Y1(·|y1) ∈ P(Y2).
• For every B ∈ B(Y2), y1 7→ PY2|Y1(B|y1) is an element of M(Y1).
We denote the space of all such kernels by M(Y2|Y1).
Given the joint probability PY1,Y2 , Markov kernel PY2|Y1 is induced in such
a way that, for its action on the rectangles A × B, A ∈ B(Y1), B ∈ B(Y2),
we have
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For general Borel spaces, this joint probability measure can also be decom-
posed as PY2 ⊗ PY1|Y2 . Theorems 19 and 20 in Appendix A summarize the
interrelation between joint probability measure and stochastic kernel decom-
position for a set of random variables.
Remark 1. In Eq. (2.3), for countable spaces Y1 and Y2, the operator ⊗
represents simple multiplication of two probability measures.
Based on the definition of stochastic kernels, we can see that any PY2|Y1 ∈
M(Y2|Y1) acts on f ∈ L1(Y2) from the left and on PY1 ∈ P(Y1) from the
right, which in terms of the notations in Eq. (2.1) can be expressed as








Note that PY2|Y1f ∈ M(Y1) for any f ∈ L1(Y2), and PY1PY2|Y1 ∈ P(Y2) for
any PY1 ∈ P(Y1).
Remark 2. According to the notation in (2.3), we have
PY1PY2|Y1(B) = (PY1 ⊗ PY2|Y1)(Y1 ×B).
For the case when we have two random variables Y1 ∈ Y1 and Y2 ∈ Y2,
the notion of independence arises as a property of the joint probability. We
define Y1 and Y2 as two independent variables if
PY1,Y2 = PY1 ⊗ PY2 , (2.6)
where PYi indicates marginal distribution as defined in (2.2).
Remark 3. Comparing with (2.3), PY2 ∈ P(Y2) arises as a special case of a
Markov kernel for which B × Y1 → B, ∀B ∈ B(Y2).
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2.2 Probabilistic System Models
As mentioned before, this section builds upon identifying and representing
a stochastic system consisting of inter-related variables with the joint prob-
ability measure, according to which these variables are distributed, referred
to as probabilistic model. For this, we utilize and extend the basic notions
introduced in Section 2.1.
Let the collection of random variables Yk ∈ Y2 (k ∈ [K]) defined on
the same underlying space (Ω,F ,P) be represented with Y[K].1 Each of the
random variables Yj in Y[K] is going to be assigned to a relevant variable of
the system at a specific time. Most of the time, the concept of the system is
intertwined with the concept of time, over which the system variables evolve.
The indices in our collection may be used to represent the notion of time, or to
distinguish different variables at a specific time. For now, though, we abstract
away from the notion behind the indices and consider a joint probability
distribution over such a collection denoted with PY[K] ∈ P(
∏K
k=1 Yk). In a
similar fashion as what we had for two random variables in (2.3), we capture
the inter-relation between these variables through the concept of Markov (or
stochastic) kernels.
Let the indices of some permutation of this set of K random variables be
represented with {i1, . . . , iK}. Theorems 19 and 20 in Appendix A explain
how the joint probability PY[K] may be used to represent the interrelation
between Y[k]’s in different ways.
PY[K] = PYi1 ⊗ PYi2 |Yi1 ⊗ . . .⊗ PYiK |Yi1 ,...,YiK−1 . (2.7)
Theorems 19 and 20 in Appendix A allows us to characterize a probabilistic
model interchangeably through two possible representations: either through
directly characterizing the joint probability measure PY[K] , or through char-
acterizing the underlying elements of the system in a probabilistic way and
using Eq. (2.7). The same is true when identifying a probabilistic model set.
Letting a joint probability measure defined over a collection of random vari-
ables be represented with a collection of stochastic kernels explicitly conveys
the important notion of conditional independence, as defined below. This
property codifies an important inter-relation between different variables of
1We also use [K] to denote {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
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the system. Our use of this notion is limited, but it can be further extended
towards the concept of Bayesian networks in [83].
Definition 1. Yi1 , Yi2 ∈ Y[K] have the conditional Markov property given the
rest of variables Y{i1,i2}c = Y[K]\{i1,i2}, if they are conditionally independent
given the rest of the variables:
PYi1 ,Yi2 |Y{i1,i2}c = PYi1 |Y{i1,i2}c ⊗ PYi2 |Y{i1,i2}c .
2 (2.8)
If Yi1 , Yi2 ∈ Y[K] have the conditional Markov property, we say that Yi1 , Yi2 , Y{i1,i2}c
form a Markov chain, a property conventionally represented by
Yi1 − Y{i1,i2}c − Yi2 .
Lemma 1, which is a replication of Lemma 2.2.1 from [34], shows how
conditional Markov property, which might be hard to figure out from the
joint probability, can be readily implied from kernel representation, as in
(2.7):
Lemma 1. Under measure PY[K] and ∀ik ∈ [K], the following forms a Markov
chain:
Yik − {Yi : i ∈ Jik} − {Yi : i ∈ [ik − 1]\Jik},
if there exists a decomposition as in (2.7), where Jik is such that
PY[K](dYik |y[ik−1]) = PY[K](dYik |ỹ[ik−1]), ∀y[ik−1], ỹ[ik−1] where yi = ỹi ∀i ∈ Jik .
Proof. See Tatikonda [34], Lemma 2.2.1.
For the sake of convenience, we can reformulate Eq. (2.7) and come up
with some new notions, which finally leads to Definition 3, according to which
all probabilistic model sets can be identified in a coherent way and through
some standard steps.
Let us split the collection of K random variables into two subsets. Suppose
I = {i1, . . . , il, . . . , iL} ⊂ [K], L < K, and Ic = [K]\I = {j1 . . . , jl, . . . jK−L} ⊂
[K], denote the indices of two complementary subsets of Y[K]. Eq. (2.7) can
be re-arranged and split into two partitions: one including multiplication of
2Notice that this is very similar to the notion of independence, but, rather than on the
whole (Ω,F ,P), it is defined on the refinement of σ-algebra induced by fixing Y{i1,i2}c .
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kernels that represent the distribution of YI ’s, and the other one including
multiplication of kernels that represent the distribution of YIc ’s. This way,
Eq. (2.7) can be re-written as
PY[K] =
−→
P YI |YIc ⊗
−→
P YIc |YI , (2.9)
where
−→







PYil |Y[il−1]∩I ,Y[il−1]∩Ic ∈M(Y[L]|Y[K−L]), (2.10b)
and similarly
−→







PYij |Y[ij−1]∩Ic ,Y[ij−1]∩I ∈M(Y[K−L]|Y[L]). (2.11b)
We split the subset of variables on which each of the kernels in (2.10a)
depend, into those belonging to I and those belonging to Ic in (2.10b).3
This spells out how variables of the form Y[il−1]∩I are marginalized out in the
multiplication. As a result, we are left with a M(YI |YIc) object, which is
formally defined below:
Definition 2. Let Y1, . . . ,YK be a collection of Borel spaces. Fix any set
I = {i1, . . . , iL} ⊂ [K] (L < K), and let Ic denote the complementary set
[K] \ I. Let YI ,
⊗
i∈I
Yi. A directed stochastic kernel between YIc and YI is
an element of M(YI |YIc) that has the form
−→




for a given collection of Markov kernels Pl ∈ M(Yil |Y[il−1]), (l = 1, . . . , L)
referred to as factors, each of which denotes the regular conditional probability
3Same for (2.11a) and (2.11b).
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distribution of Yil given Y[il−1]. We will denote the space of all such kernels
by
−→M(YI |YIc).
As mentioned above, probabilistic modeling is the act of identifying the prob-
abilistic model set, the set of all joint probability distributions that might
describe the system. Such a set initially includes the set of all joint prob-
ability measures over the set of variables included in the system. Specific
characteristics and constraints of a system naturally restrict the set of all
joint probability distributions to form the probabilistic model set. One stan-
dard way to come up with a uniquely characterized probabilistic model set
is to consider a specific kernel decomposition as in (2.7) and impose the sys-
tem constraints on its constituents. We first provide the Definition 3 which is
similar to Definition 2.2.1 of Tatikonda [34] and clarify it with some examples
later.
Definition 3. Denoted with M, a probabilistic model set is a subset of all
joint probability measures P(Y[K]) and can be uniquely defined by a triple:
causal ordering, system specification, and information pattern and constraints.
1. Causal ordering. This is the specification of time-ordering on the vari-
ables Y1, ..., YK. We consider the decomposition (2.7) in such a way
that the variables’ indices are forward in time. For characterizing the
constituent kernels, we partition the variables into two disjoint subsets:
• The system set I = {i1, ..., iK} with 1 ≤ i1 <, ..., < iL ≤ K,
• The decision set J = {j1, ..., jK−L} = [K]\I with 1 ≤ j1 <, ..., <
jK−L ≤ K.
2. System specification. This is characterizing the set of factors imposed
by the system, which are of the form {Q(dYil |y[il−1])}Ll=1 according to
which the variables in I are realized. For all il ∈ I, the measure PY[K]
must satisfy
P(dYil |Y[il−1] = y[il−1]) = Q(dYil |y[il−1]) P(y[il−1])− a.s.
3. Information pattern and constraints: For each jl ∈ J , the information
pattern of the decision-maker is Jjl ⊂ [jl−1], which means that the deci-
sion kernel must be chosen among the kernels of the formM(dYjl |y[jl−1]),
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that is, only a function of ji ∈ Jjl. Furthermore, there might be some
other exogenous constraints on the decision kernels.
The main point of Definition 3 is to consider the specific kernel decom-
position in (2.7) that respects causal ordering of variables, and to restrict
the set of all joint probability measures through characterizing the system
kernels as well as the information pattern for decision kernels. Equivalently,
the joint probability measure partly specified in part (2) is completed in part
(3) based on the information pattern given there. Referring back to Lemma
1, Definition 3 establishes a conditional Markov property for each variable in
the decision set as
Yjl − {Yji : ji ∈ Jjl} − {Yji : ji ∈ [ji − 1]\Jji}.
Note that, besides causal decomposition as in (2.7), there are other decom-
positions through which the model can be identified. An important one is a
posterior-based decomposition that will be briefly addressed later in Section
2.4, which has some advantages over characterizing causal kernels when it
comes to decision-making.
Definition 2 and Eqs. (2.9) - (2.11) can, on the other hand, be used to
characterize the system in a more convenient way. We can first partition the
variables. Then, we can assign each partition to a subset of system or deci-
sion variables and identify the directed stochastic kernel from one partition
to the other by identifying its factors as in (2.10), together constituting (2.9).
Probabilistic modeling enables us to analogously describe several seemingly
different classic notions. Examples of probabilistic kernels in a control system
may include controlled plant, controller, sensor, or actuator. In a commu-
nication system, this may represent channel, encoders, or decoders. In the
following, we mention some important examples which can be modeled via
the tools introduced here.
Example 1. Probabilistic model set for estimating the state through
stochastic filtering over a horizon T involves X-valued unobservable states
X[T ], Z-valued partial observations Z[T ], X-valued estimations X̂[T ]. Proba-
bilistic model set is a subset of P ∈ P(X[T ]×Z[T ]×X[T ]) that can be identified
through the steps in Definition 3 as below:
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1. Order of variables:
X1, Z1, X̂1, . . . , XT , ZT , X̂T ,
4
where the system set includes the variables Xt and Zt, and decision set
includes X̂t.
2. System specification:
P(dXt|X[t−1], Z[t−1], X̂[t−1]) = µt(dXt|Xt−1) ∀t ∈ [T ],
P(dZt|X[t], Z[t−1], X̂[t−1]) = Wt(Zt|X[t], Z[t−1]) ∀t ∈ [T ].
where µ ∈ P(X[T ]) denotes the underlying random process that gov-
erns how the state evolves over time, according to which {Xt}Tt=1 is a
Markov process. Moreover, W denotes how the observation at each
time Zt is collected from all the states to the present X[t], given all the
observations collected so far Z[t−1].
3. Information pattern and constraints:
P(dX̂t|X[t], Z[t], X̂[t−1]) = Φt(X̂t|Z[t]).
Referring to Definition 2, we have
−→

















As mentioned, these three directed kernels constitute the joint probability
over the triple (X[T ], Z[T ], X̂[T ]) in a similar fashion as (2.9).
4These variables are realized on the canonical path space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = X[T ] ×
Z[T ] × U[T ], and F is the Borel σ-field of Ω, and for every t ≥ 1,
Xt(ω) = x(t), Zt(ω) = z(t), Ut(ω) = u(t),
with ω = (x, z, u) = ((x(1), x(2), . . . , ), (z(1), z(2), . . .), (u(1), u(2), . . .)).
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Furthermore, following Definition 1 and the given system characteristics and
decision information patterns, we have
Xt −Xt−1 − (X[t−2], Z[t−1], X̂[t−1]) (2.15)
Zt − (X[t], Z[t−1])− X̂[t−1]
X̂t − Z[t] −X[t−1], X̂[t−1].
It can be noticed at this point that the probabilistic model set initially
includes the set of all conceivable joint probability measures P(X[T ] × Z[T ] ×
X[T ]), according to which the system variables could be distributed. Later,
this set can be restricted through Definition 3, by system characteristics and
decision information patterns, to those joint probability measures, such that
conditional independence of the form (2.15) holds. If we think of this in terms
of graphical models [82], the initial graphical model is an undirected complete
graph, which is formed by assigning each node to one of the variables in the
system. Probabilistic model set then can be formed by removing the edges
between those variables which have conditional Markov property as in (2.15).
The way Definition 2 suggests doing this, as mentioned, is to consider the
decomposition that respects causality over time, whose kernels are typically
given in a straightforward form.
Example 2. Probabilistic model set for partially observable Markov deci-
sion process (POMDP) over a horizon T involves X-valued unobservable state
of the system being controlled X[T ], Z-valued observations at the sensor Z[T ],
U-valued control U[T ]. It can be identified through the steps in Definition 3
as below:
1. Order of variables:
X1, Z1, U1, . . . , XT , ZT , UT , (2.16)
where the system set includes Xt and Zt, and decision set includes Ut.
2. System specification:
P(dXt|X[t−1], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = Qt(dXt|Xt−1, Ut−1) ∀t ∈ [T ],
P(dZt|X[t], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = Wt(dZt|Xt) ∀t ∈ [T ].
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3. Information pattern and constraints:
P(dUt|X[t], Z[t], U[t−1]) = Φt(dUt|Z[t], U[t−1]),
which means each member of the probabilistic model set is a joint probability
measure, P(X[T ] × Z[T ] × U[T ]), such that
Xt − (Xt−1, Ut−1)− (X[t−2], Z[t−1], U[t−2]),
Zt −Xt − (X[t−1], Z[t−1], U[t−1]),
Ut − (Z[t], U[t−1])−X[t].
Notice we have controlled plant which forms a controllable Markov chain,
observations which are noisy measurements of current state, and actions
taken based on the past actions and all the observations collected. Typical
MDPs are recovered if Wt is induced by a Dirac measure, Wt(Zt ∈ ·|Xt) =
1Xt(·). The control is open-loop if we further assume Ut − U[t−1] −X[t].
Example 3. Message transmission over a communication channel in-
volves random message X ∈ X, which has to be transmitted over the horizon
T , to have X̂ ∈ X reconstructed at the destination. At each time step, a
channel input Wt is fed into the channel, and Zt is received at the other end.
Probabilistic model set can be identified through the steps in Definition 3 as
follows:
1. Order of variables:
X,W1, Z1, . . . ,WT , ZT , X̂,
where the system set includes X and variables in form of Zt, and deci-
sion set includes the variables in form of Zt and X̂.
2. System specification includes specifying P(dX) and
P(dZt|X,W[t], Z[t−1]) = Q(dZt|W[t], Z[t−1]) ∀t ∈ [T ],
which means X − (W[t], Z[t−1]) − Zt, or in other words, the channel
output is determined by the history of channel inputs and channel
outputs, but not the original message.
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3. For information pattern and constraints, we have
P(dX̂|X,W[T ], Z[T ]) = D(dX̂|Z[T ]),
which means the decoder’s output is only determined by channel out-
puts. However, the encoder’s information pattern depends on whether
the channel is used with or without feedback from the channel output
at each time to the encoder input at the next time:
• with feedback:
P(dWt|X,W[t−1], Z[t−1]) = Et(dWt|X,W[t−1], Z[t−1]) ∀t ∈ [T ],
• without feedback:
P(dWt|X,W[t−1], Z[t−1]) = Et(dWt|X,W[t−1]) ∀t ∈ [T ].
Such probabilistic modeling can go beyond single-agent decision-making
or sender-receiver communication setups, and include distributed and team
decision-making problems, as well as strategic games. In these setups, there
are several decision-makers involved, each deciding about a specific kernel,
together constituting the whole probabilistic model. However, this is beyond
the scope of our thesis.
2.3 Decision-Making in Probabilistic Models
As mentioned in Section 2.2, probabilistic model set contains a subset of
all joint probability distributions according to which the variables in the
system might be distributed. Such a subset was identified in Definition 3
through characterizing its causal factors and their multiplication as in Eq.
(2.9). Accordingly, decision-making in probabilistic modeling is to pick a
probabilistic model from the probabilistic model set, or equivalently to pick
a decision kernel that conforms to the information pattern and constraints,
as determined in Definition 3.
The main element in decision-making is the criterion, according to which
the decision-maker can order his options in probabilistic model set and choose
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one. In our work, this criterion is provided through specifying a cost function
and considering the Bayes risk, the expected value of that cost function with
respect to our probabilistic model. More precisely, assume that the cost
function is c ∈M(Y[K]). In terms of the notations introduced in Section 2.1,






Subject to PY[K] ∈M, (2.18b)





As mentioned in Section 2.2, probabilistic model set M ⊂ P(Y[K]) in
(2.18a) emerges through restricting the set of all joint probability measures
defined over the set of variables involved in the system, by characterizing the
factors imposed by the system kernels, as well as the information pattern
and constraints. When it comes to decision-making, the initial probabilistic
model set can be further restricted, while we attain the same optimal value in
(2.18). This restriction is based on some notion of minimality or sufficiency.
We restrict to the smallest set of joint probability measures in (2.18b) over
which (2.18a) can be solved, leading to the same value as when it is sought
over the original set. This restriction would not have been possible without
introducing a cost function. The merit of such reduction lies in simpler stan-
dard formulation that the decision-making problem takes over this reduced
subset, while still attaining the same optimal value. We clarify this point by
examples below.
Example 1 continued. Suppose the goal is to minimize the squared
error, which is c =
∑T
t=1(X̂t − Xt)2. Probabilistic model set is identified
through considering Qt and Wt to be induced by Gauss-Markov kernels.
Denoting probabilistic model set with the specified information pattern and
constraint withM, let M̃1 and M̃2 denote the probabilistic model sets that
are identified as before, except for decision information pattern and constraint
respectively to be
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P(dX̂t|X[t], Z[t], X̂[t−1]) = Φt(dX̂t|Z[t])
P(dX̂t|X[t], Z[t], X̂[t−1]) = Φt(dX̂t|Zt, X̂t−1).


























Proof. The proof can be found in derivation of Kalman filtering [84].
Example 2 continued. Probabilistic model set for Markov decision
processes as a special case of POMDP was introduced. For the cost func-
tion, we consider the problem over infinite horizon with additive discounted
cost [85]. We first consider the cost function over a horizon T . We have
c(X[T ],U[T ]) =
∑T
t=1 β
tct(Xt, Ut), and let T → ∞ describe the infinite hori-
zon later. Order of variables is
X1, U1, X2, U2, . . . ,
and for the information pattern and constraints, we have
P(dUt|X[t], U[t−1]) = Φt(dUt|X[t], U[t−1]),
almost surely, where Φ is decided upon by the decision-maker. Denoting this
probabilistic model set with M, let M̃ be identified as before, except for
decision information pattern and constraint to be
P(dUt|X[t], U[t−1]) = Φt(dUt|Xt),
which technically means we restrict to randomized Markov policies. Clearly,



















Proof. See [85], Proposition 1.1.1.
Besides these problems, which typically belong to the control community,
setups arising in communication, such as infinite block-length source coding,
causal joint source and channel coding, and many more, can similarly be
cast in the framework of decision-making in probabilistic models. The same
goes for control of a system over a digital channel, and the widely used
cycle of environment-perception-action in brain sciences. The topic of this
thesis, which is rationally inattentive Markov decision processes, follows the
same thread. However, introducing the decision constraints in these problems
requires some concepts which will be introduced in Section 3.1. Before that,
we comment on a parallel interpretation and a more conceptual approach to
the problem of Bayesian decision-making in probabilistic models.
2.4 Bayesian Learning, Posterior Characterization, and
Bayesian Decision-Making
So far in this chapter, decision-making has been characterized through spec-
ifying a cost function as well as a probabilistic model set in the spirit of
Definition 3. On its own terms, Definition 3 characterizes the probabilistic
model set through joint probability decomposition in the form of Eq. (2.9)
that respects causality.
Consider a simple situation of what is referred to as Bayesian decision-
making, where, according to Definition 3, the probabilistic system model can
be identified with:
1. Order of variables, state, observation and action of X,Z, U .
2. X,Z are system variables, and for system specification we have P(dX) =
µ ∈ P(X), referred to as prior, and P(dZ|X) = W ∈ M(Z|X) referred
to as observation (or information structure).5
3. U is decision variable, and information pattern and constraint imposes
P(dU |Z) = Φ ∈M(U|Z), referred to as decision policy.
5Observation structure might not be directly given, but constructed through intercon-
necting other kernels. In Example 3 above, observation kernel is the result of connecting
channel encoder, communication channel, and channel decoder.
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PX ⊗ PZ|X ⊗ PU |Z , c
〉
. (2.19)








As is evident, the decision-maker intends to minimize the expected cost,
which depends on the state X and action taken U . However, he does not
have access to the exact value of X but receives a signal Z through the
observation kernel W . Variants and extensions of this situation in sequential
and static setups arise in statistics, communication and information theory6
and decision and control.7 Some sufficient conditions gurantee the existence
of a solution for (2.20) using the Weierstrass theorem [86]. If for each x ∈ X,
c(x;u) is uniformly lower semicontinuous in each u ∈ U, the objective funtion
in (2.20) becomes lower semicontinuous in u ∈ U. If U is also compact, then
the existence of minimum over U is guaranteed. Moreover, if instead of being
compact, U is a complete vector space, for each x ∈ X, c is coerceive in u and
there exists some u0 for which objective function (2.20) becomes finite, then
the existence of the minimizer can be guaranteed.
For the optimal policy, we have
Φ∗(dU |Z) = 1ψ∗(Z)(dU),
where
ψ̄∗(PX ,PZ|X) = arg min
ψ:Z→U
〈
PX ⊗ PZ|X , c(X,ψ(Z))
〉
.
If we re-arrange the joint probability decomposition in Eq. (2.19), we can




PZ ⊗ PX|Z ⊗ PU |Z , c
〉
, (2.21)




to derive posterior from the prior and observation kernel. In a simple case
where X and Z are both finite spaces, for observation realization z ∈ Z and
for each A ⊂ X , Bayes rule states that
PX|Z(A|Z = z) =
∑
X∈A PZ|X(Z = z|X)PX(X)∑
X∈X PZ|X(Z = z|X)PX(X)
(2.22)
There is a conceptual interpretation for the posterior. In this represen-
tation, the realized observation z ∈ Z provides us with further information,
through which the degree of belief about conceivable value taken by the state
X updates the prior PX ∈ P(X) to the posterior P(·|Z = z) ∈ P(X).
The main merit of the representation in Eq. (2.21) compared to that of
Definition 3 becomes evident when it comes to decision-making. Technically,
posterior distribution, referred to as belief state, is the sufficient statistic for
optimal action in static and sequential decision-making problems [87]. This
means that the posterior distribution pins down the optimal action that must
be taken by decision-maker.




τ(ν)⊗ ν ⊗ 1ψ(ν)(u), c
〉
, (2.23)







P(z|x)PX(x) ∈ P(P(X)). (2.24)
This means that ν’s are those state distributions which can be induced
through prior µ and observation kernel W for a specific observation real-
ization through the Bayes rule (2.22). Eq. (2.24) identifies the weights ac-
cording to which these state distributions are distributed. For each ν ∈ P(X),
ψ : ν → U is referred to as optimal decision functional, and can be uniquely
defined as a function of the state distribution, independent of the observation
structure.
From (2.24), one can see that expectation of posteriors is equal to the prior
for any observation structure, which technically means that the sequence of
Bayesian state distributions in Bayesian learning forms a martingale. In fact,
this is a bidirectional statement. Having the prior fixed, suppose we have a
set of state distributions P ⊂ P(X) together with a distribution τ(ν) defined
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over them, such that they average out to the prior. Then there exists an
observation structure W ∈M(Z|X) that induces such posteriors through the
Bayes rule (2.22) [5,9,88–90]. This hints to the second way for characterizing
the probabilistic model set for a Bayesian decision-making, besides the one
through Definition 3 as follows:8
1. Order of variables, state, belief state, action: X, ν, U .
2. X and ν are system variables, and for system specification we have
P(dX) = µ ∈ P(X) referred to as prior, and P(ν|X) = τ ∈M(P(X)|X)
which is posterior distribution, such that E[ν] = µ.
3. U is decision variable and for information pattern and constraint we
have the kernel induced by ψ : ν → U.
Since c ∈M(X×U) does not depend on Z, and from Eq. (2.23), the optimal
policy becomes
ψ∗(ν) = arg min
u∈U
〈ν, c〉.
Extensions of this approach in sequential setup and in communication or
control problems, where the state distribution is also described by exact or
approximate Bayesian filter, can be found in [85] and [24].
Finally, in order to find Value of Information in Bayesian decision-making,
we first need to find the optimal value attained corresponding to each induced
posterior. This value must be averaged over signal realization or posterior
weights. Value of Information is defined as the decrease in this average
optimal value compared to the case when there is no observation kernel:9
min
PU
〈PX ⊗ PU , c〉 −min
PU|Z
〈













8The seemingly careless use of notations applies only to finite spaces and needs more
rigour for general Borel spaces.
9Or when P(dU |Z) is constant for all values of Z ∈ Z.
31
Example 4. This example considers a probabilistic system which consists
of a simple bivariate joint Gaussian setup. This setup can be found in a
standard textbook [91], and all the proofs can be found there as well. We
consider the problem of estimation with respect to a quadratic cost.
According to the first characterization of Bayesian decision-making, the
probabilistic system consists of two random variables: state X ∼ N(0, σ2X)
and observation kernel that is induced by additive Gaussian kernel Z =
X + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
















the cost function is c(X,U) = (X − U)2, and for the optimal action with
E [(X − U)2|Z] we have







which is a measurable function on Z = X.
In Bayesian decision-making, each observation kernel assigns pre-specified
weights to each observation (and to each conceivable posterior), correspond-
ing to each value that the state takes. This means that each observation
kernel induces a weight on conceivable actions through optimal action pol-
icy, corresponding to each value that the state takes. The observation kernel
which directly connects the underlying state to the relevant weight of each
action is known as straightforward observation kernel [90,92]. The main prop-
erty of straightforward observation kernels is that the information provided
by them cannot be utilized to come up with an optimal policy that leads to






































while without having access to information signal we have
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Interestingly, the value of information is the same for all signal realizations.





In this chapter, we introduce the basic tools needed for formulating the prob-
lem of rationally inattentive decision-making (RIDM hereafter). We formu-
late the problem through the general steps explained in Section 2.3, which
is identifying the probabilistic model set that may describe the system. As
mentioned, the essence of introducing options of information structure to
choose from is to provide a constraint that hinders the perfect perception of
the state, leaving competing ways for collecting information about the state.
For this, we first introduce the Kullback-Leibler divergence which can be
used to measure the distance between two probability measures defined on
the same space, and the concept of mutual information in Section 3.1. Later,
in Section 3.2, we bring up a very simple example in the context of Bayesian
decision-making that coveys the main idea of RIDM. It can be looked upon
as a specific example and extension of Bayesian decision-making of Section
2.4. We introduce the general static problem of RIDM in Section 3.3 and talk
about its interpretation. Later, in Section 3.3.2, we show how the problem
of static RIDM can be connected to the well-known distortion-rate problem
in source coding. We formulate and solve a special case of this problem in
Section 3.3.3, which again can be compared to Section 2.4. We then extend
the problem to a setup where DM has access to the side information as well.
3.1 Kullback-Leibler Divergence and Mutual
Information
Kullback-Leibler divergence is a concept used for assigning a notion of dis-
tance to two P(Y)-valued probability measures. Besides its nice analytical
properties, it arises in several operational setups in information theory and
statistics.
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Definition 4. Given any two probability measures PY , P̃Y ∈ P(Y), the Kullback-
Leibler divergence (or information divergence, relative entropy) between two
measures is defined as









, if PY ≺ P̃Y ,
+∞, otherwise,
where ≺ denotes absolute continuity of measures, and dPY
dP̃Y
is the Radon–
Nikodym derivative of PY w.r.t. P̃Y .
Remark 4. Notice that Kullback-Leibler divergence is always nonnegative,
and is equal to zero if and only if PY ≡ P̃Y . Furthermore, it is not a metric
because it is not symmetric; DKL(PY ‖P̃Y ) 6= DKL(P̃Y ‖(PY ), and does not
satisfy triangle inequality.
Suppose we have a collection of random variables Y[K], and two joint prob-
ability measures PY[K] , P̃Y[K] ∈ P(Y[K]). Let the indices of a permutation of
this set of K random variables be represented with {i1, . . . , iK}. We re-write
(2.7) as
PY[K] = PYi1 ⊗ PYi2 |Yi1 ⊗ . . .⊗ PYiK |Yi1 ,...,YiK−1 . (3.1)






























= DKL(PYi1‖P̃Yi1 ) +
〈




PYi1 ,Yi2 , DKL(PYi3 |yi1 ,yi2‖P̃Yi3 |yi1 ,yi2 )
〉











Equation (3.2) is referred to as the chain rule for Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Given a set of random variables, the Kullback-Leibler divergence between
any two probability measures defined on them can be calculated as follows:
it is equal to the divergence between marginal distributions on one variable,
added stepwise with the expected marginal divergences on conditional dis-
tributions given the past variables of other variables. Given the fact that, in
probabilistic modelling, each system is represented with a joint probability
measure over the variables involved, Kullback-Leibler divergence provides a
way to compare probabilistic models by comparing their components.
Definition 4 provides a quantity for comparing two probability measures.
This paves the way for us to define another measure for quantifying and ex-
amining how much information a random variable provides about the other
one. As mentioned before, the information one has about a random vari-
able is codified in the probability distribution of that random variable. This
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distribution entails the degree of belief according to which the random vari-
able takes any of its conceivable values. As explained in Section 2.4, given
two associated random variables, knowing the realized value for one of them
changes the probability distribution of the other one to a new probability
distribution. The first and second probability distributions are respectively
referred to as the prior and the posterior. Given this, it makes intuitive
sense that the more information a random variable1 provides about the sec-
ond one, the more it causes change in the posterior distribution of it after
being revealed.
Example 5. For a trivial yet pedagogical example, suppose we have a
random variable Y ∈ Y uniformly distributed over [−1, 1]. There are two
other random variables. The first one takes two values {0, 1} respectively, if
Y takes value in [−1, 0] and [0, 1]. The other one takes four values {0, 1, 2, 3}








, 1]. It makes
intuitive sense that the second variable provides more information about Y .
In fact, after we observe the realized value of this random variable, our first
conjecture about how Y is distributed changes more.
We provide the definition below and explain how it helps us in quantifying
and measuring the new information.
Definition 5. Let (Y1, Y2) ∈ Y1×Y2 be a random couple. Given (PY1 ,PY2|Y1) ∈
P(Y1)×M(Y2|Y1), the Shannon mutual information is defined as
I(Y1;Y2) ,DKL(PY1 ⊗ PY2|Y1‖PY1 ⊗ PY1PY2|Y1). (3.3)
Equivalently, mutual information can be written as DKL(PY1,Y2‖PY1 ⊗ PY2).2
By Definition 5, the mutual information between two variables is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between their joint probability distribution (when
considered together) and their marginal probability distributions (which is
when each distribution is considered separately). Mutual information, as ap-
pears in (3.3), can also be represented with I(PY1 ,PY2|Y1) or IPY1⊗PY2|Y1 (Y1;Y2)
to denote the underlying probability measure.3
In the context of Bayesian learning in Section 2.4, a geometric interpre-
tation for mutual information can be provided by rearranging (3.3). Notice
1Signal is a more common term in this setup.
2See Appendix A.
3In this work, we use natural logarithms, so mutual information is measured in nats.
37
































which provides another geometric interpretation for mutual information be-
tween two random variables. Consider the the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between marginal (or prior) distribution of one of the variables with its poste-
rior, upon revealing the other one. Mutual information is attained by taking
the average of this value over the marginal distribution of the latter vari-
able. So it makes sense to consider mutual information to be a metric for
the information shared by these two random variables.
Remark 5. (Y1, Y2) ∈ (Y1 × Y2) are independent iff we have I(Y1;Y2) = 0.
Lemma 2. I(PY1 ,PY2|Y1) is concave in PY1, and convex in PY2|Y1, according
to which it admits the following variational representation:
I(PY1 ,PY2|Y1) = inf
ν∈P(Y2)
DKL(PY1 ⊗ PY2|Y1‖PY1 ⊗ ν), (3.5)
where the infimum is achieved by ν = PY1PY2|Y1.
Besides the geometric interpretation in the framework of Bayesian learning,
mutual information can be interpreted through the notions of entropy and
conditional entropy. They provide a systematic way to measure the degree
of randomness in a random variable. To avoid complications, we restrict
ourselves to finite space Y1. Let Y1 ∈ Y1 = {y1, y2, . . .} be an arbitrary




PY1(Y1 = yk) logPY1(Y1 = yk). (3.6)
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The entropy is a concave functional of PY , so we will also denote it by H(PY1).
The quantity H(Y1) can be interpreted as the level of uncertainty about
random variable Y1 based on Y
′
1s statistical properties.
Given a second random variable Y2 ∈ Y2, the conditional entropy of Y1




H(PY1|Y2(·|y2)) dPY2 , (3.7)
where PY1|Y2 is the conditional probability law of Y1 given Y2. Essentially, this
means that the conditional entropy of Y1 given Y2 is the entropy of Y1 given
a specific realization of random variable Y2, averaged over all realizations.
Definitions (3.6) and (3.7) can be contrasted with definitions of mutual
information at (3.3) and Kullback-Leibler divergence at Definition 4, through
which mutual information between Y1 and Y2 can equivalently be defined as
I(Y1;Y2) = H(Y1)−H(Y1|Y2).
This equation provides an interpretation of the mutual information as a mea-
sure for the average reduction in the amount of uncertainty about Y1, in the
sense that was explained in the definition of entropy, upon observing Y2.
Remark 6. It immediately follows that if Y2 is a deterministic function of
Y1, then H(Y2|Y1) = 0, and therefore I(Y1;Y2) = H(Y2).
In Section 2.2, a probabilistic model set was characterized by identifying
system and decision variables and their constituting causal kernels as in Def-
inition 3. Further, the directed stochastic kernel defined in Definition 2 was
introduced to characterize the probability distribution of a set of variables
given another set. In the same vein, we seek to extend the notion of mutual in-
formation to a setup which includes a collection of random variables. Suppose
we have a collection of random variables {Y1, Y2, . . . YK} ∈ {Y1,Y2, . . .YK},
defined on the same underlying space (Ω,F ,P), which is represented with
Y[K]. Likewise, we consider any permutation of this set of K random vari-
ables represented with {i1, . . . , iK}. Let us employ Definition 5 to find the
mutual information between one of the variables such as Yi1 with the rest









































































PYi2 ,..,Yik−1 ⊗ PYi1 ;Yik |Yi2 ,..,Yik−1 , log
d(PYi1 ;Yik |Yi2 ,..,Yik−1 )
d
(







PYi2 ,...,Yik−1 , DKL
(







PYi1 ;Yik |Yi2 ,...,Yik−1‖PYi1 |Yi2 ,...,Yik−1 ⊗ PYik |Yi2 ,...,Yik−1 |PYi2 ,...,Yik−1
)
where (a) results from multiplying both numerator and denominator by a
factor of
⊗K
k=3 PYi1 |Yi2 ,...,Yik−1 , and equality (b) from a simple rearrangement.
Equation (3.8) motivates us to define a new term:
Definition 6. Let Y1,Y2,Y3 be a triple of Borel spaces over which the random
variables Y1, Y2, Y3 with joint law PY[3] are defined. The conditional mutual








if PY1;Y2|Y3 ≺ PY1|Y3 ⊗ PY2|Y3|PY3 PY3-a.s. and ∞ otherwise.
Intuitively, conditional mutual information between Y1 and Y2 given Y3
quantifies the expected value of the mutual information between Y1 and Y2,
given the value of Y3 fixed, averaged by PY3 . More rigorously, it is the av-
erage change in the joint distribution of Y1, Y2 compared to their marginal
distributions over the sigma-algebra generated by Y3. It provides a metric for
the information shared by these two random variables, when we control for
the shared information through having the realized value of Y3 fixed. Given





I(Yi1 ;Yik |Yi2 , . . . , Yik−1). (3.10)
In words, each Yik , k ≥ 2, provides some new information about Yi1 be-
yond what has been conveyed before through Yi2 , . . . , Yik−1 . Total mutual
information between Yi1 and the rest of the variables is the algebraic sum of
marginal information provided by each variable. This property is referred to
as the chain rule for mutual information.
Comparably, through the concepts of entropy and conditional entropy in-
troduced in (3.6) and (3.7), conditional mutual information can be re-written
as
I(Y1;Y2|Y3) = H(Y1|Y2, Y3)−H(Y1|Y2).
This means that the conditional mutual information I(Y1;Y2|Y3) quantifies
the amount of uncertainty reduction about Y1 upon fixing Y2, when Y3 has
already been fixed and utilized to infer about both Y1.
A relation similar to that between independence and mutual information
when we have two random variables holds here with three random variables.
Remark 7. Y1 and Y2 are independent given Y{i1,i2}′ , say Yi1−Y{i1,i2}′ −Yi24,
4See Definition 1 for conditional Markov property.
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iff I(Yi1 ;Yi2|Y{i1,i2}′ ) = 0.
Furthermore, given this notion of conditional Markov property, it is straight-
forward to prove an important relation known as the data processing inequal-
ity :
Lemma 4. For Y[K] ∈ Y[K], if Yi1 − Y{i1,i2}c − Yi2 then we have
I(Yi1 ;Yi2) ≤ I(Yi1 ;Y{i1,i2}c). (3.11)
In words, if, given Y{i1,i2}c , there is no more joint uncertainty in (Yi1 ;Yi2),
then the information shared between Yi1 and Yi2 is less than the information
shared between Yi1 and Y{i1,i2}′ .
Data processing inequality, together with Lemma 1, implies that if we
have a probabilistic model, which can be identified by the order of variables
(Y1, Y2, Y3), in such a way that PY3|Y1,Y2 = Φ ∈M(Y3|Y2), then we have
I(Y1;Y3) ≤ I(Y1;Y2).
However, in the specific case when Y3 is constructed from Y2 through a one-
to-one mapping, the inequality turns into an equality. More generally, we
have the following Lemma:
Lemma 5. Let (Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) be such that we have Y2 = F (Y1) and Y4 =
G(Y3) as invertible maps. Then
I(Y1;Y3) = I(Y2;Y4).
Proof. See [93], Appendix.
Further, suppose we split the collection of K random variables into two
subsets. Suppose I = {i1, . . . , il, . . . , iL} ⊂ [K], L < K, and Ic = [K]\I =
{j1 . . . , jl, . . . jK−L} ⊂ [K], denote the indices of two complementary subsets
of Y[K].
Once again, we employ the Definition 5 to find the mutual information
between these two sets of variables, employing Definition 2:5
5We also employ the theorems in Appendix A.
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I(YI , YIc) (3.12)





















P YI |YIc ⊗
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where (a) follows from Eq. (2.9). The final two terms are similar, so we








































































For (a) to be derived, we take the set I and construct directed kernels of
the form in (a) by multiplying the kernels between each two subsequent I.
Referring back to Definition 6, the last term is the conditional mutual
information between Yil and Y[il−1]∩Ic given Y[il−1]∩I . We have the following
definition.
Definition 7. Consider Y[K] ∈ Y[K] to be a collection of K random variables,
with I, Ic ⊂ [K] to be indices of two complementary subsets of it. Directed
mutual information from YI to YIc is defined as
I(YI → YIc) =
∑
il∈Ic
I(Yil ;Y[il−1]∩I |Y[il−1]∩Ic). (3.14)
Now we have the following lemma known as conservation of information:
Lemma 6. Given two sets of random variables YI and YIc, we have
I(YI ;YIc) = I(YI → YIc) + I(YIc → YI). (3.15)
Proof. See Eq.’s (3.12) and (3.13).
Conceptually, directed mutual information from a set to another is the
algebraic sum of stepwise new information provided by each variable of one
set about the cumulative set of the variables in the second set, beyond what
is contained in, or can be inferred from, the first set’s past variables. This
notion has a wide application in causal information theory, as first introduced
by Massey [94].6
Example 6. Consider message transmission over a communication chan-
nel over the time horizon of T . Mutual information between W[T ] and Z[T ]
becomes
I(W[T ];Z[T ]) = I(W[T ] → Z[T ]) + I(Z[T ] → W[T ]),
where in case the channel is used without feedback




which implies I(W[T ];Z[T ]) = I(W[T ] → Z[T ]) and in case it is used with
feedback, I(W[T ];Z[T ]) ≥ I(W[T ] → Z[T ]).
6See also [95] and [96].
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3.2 Selective Attention in Bayesian Decision-Making
In this section, we formulate a simple example of Bayesian decision-making
upon the concepts introduced in Section 2.4. This example is motivated by
Simsek [97], where the Bayesian decision-makers are decision-makers in a
loan market. Beyond making decisions based upon a given prior and ob-
servation structure, we assume that there are two different ways to collect
information. We consider two decision-makers with different cost functions
and show how the relevant cost function of each decision-maker affects the
structure it chooses for information collection. This example includes the
essence of RIDM and paves our way towards setting up a general model of
RIDM.
Unobservable state of the system, denoted with X, represents the atmo-
sphere of the real estate market in the next period. It may take three states;
namely X = {Low(L), Normal(N), Good(H)}, in which the asset’s future
price will respectively be lower, the same, and higher compared to the cur-
rent period’s price.
The value of the state is not known at the current period, but only up








. In order to cast the problem in the framework of Bayesian
learning, suppose we have an information structure, referred to as signal
S1, in the form of a M(Z|X) conditional probability kernel where Z =
{Low(L), Normal(N), Good(H)}. There is an observation kernel that can









Each row of this matrix corresponds to the weight according to which the
signal takes each value, if the true underlying state takes any of the amounts
of, respectively, L, N and H. Depending on the observation realized, prior
might be updated to three possible posteriors through the Bayes rule (2.22),
each with a probability weight:
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As mentioned, these posteriors provide new degrees of belief about conceiv-
able value of the state which is taken by X, and they average to the same
















































This provides a second way to characterize the process of Bayesian learning,
besides what we did with identifying the prior and observation structure.
The second way, as explained in Section 2.4, is through itemizing the prior
PX and conceivable posteriors listed in (3.16), together with their respective










When it comes to Bayesian decision-making, we need to characterize the
action space and a cost function c ∈M(X×U). The action space in this ex-
ample is U = {Invest(Y ), No invest(N)}. The cost function for the investor
can be represented with a 2×3 matrix, whose columns and rows respectively







Optimal decision policy can be computed by minimizing the Bayes risk as
a function of the state distribution, the prior or each of the posteriors, or as
a function of observation kernel and observation realized:
7To motivate the cost function, we need to specify the cost the decision-maker (investor
here) incurs for each (X,U) pair. In the second period and in case U = Y , the state of
the market might turn out to be Low X = {L}, Normal X = {N}, or Good X = {H}. In
each of these cases, respectively, the investor respectively defaults and incurs a negligible
cost of 0.5 for his effort, repays his loan and makes normal profit of 0.5, repays his loan
and makes extra profit of 2; respectively. In case U = N , the cost function is identically
zero no matter what the state turns out to be.
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ψ̄B(W1, L) = ψB(ν1) = arg min
u∈U
{0, 3/20} = N,
ψ̄B(W1, N) = ψB(ν2) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−16/18} = Y,
ψ̄B(W1, H) = ψB(ν3) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−27/22} = Y.
For this example, suppose that the true underlying state of the world is
M . The probability of different observation realizations {L,M,H} under
the observation kernel W1 is [.1 .5 .4], and the respective resulting optimal
actions are {N, Y, Y }. The same procedure can be done in cases where the
true underlying state of the world is L or H. This leads into the concept of
straightforward kernel that was informally introduced in Section 2.4, which
is a 3× 2 matrix, each row of which corresponds to the true underlying state
of the world and each column to the probability weight by which each of the









One can verify that the Bayes risk under the probabilistic model formed by
straightforward kernel is the same as the one attained by W1.


















For extending the problem to the case where selective attention is allowed,
consider a case when another observation kernel (equivalently information
structure) W2 ∈ M(Z|X) is also available. The decision-maker first decides
through which information structure to learn about the underlying state of
the world among possible options. Later, he makes his decision based on
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the extra information obtained through the chosen information structure.
The criterion based on which the decision-maker favors one observation ker-
nel over another is provided by the cost function and how each observation
structure reduces the average optimal cost of the decision-maker. Informa-









The conceivable posteriors after the observation is realized are:







































Like before, optimal decision policy can be computed by minimizing the
Bayes risk as follows:
ψ̄B(W2, L) = ψB(ν̃1) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−2/3} = Y,
ψ̄B(W2, N) = ψB(ν̃2) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−6/18} = Y,
ψ̄B(W2, H) = ψB(ν̃3) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−32/20} = Y.







When choosing between the observation structures,
W ∗B = arg min
W
{VB(W1), VB(W2)} = W1.
Now consider a second decision-maker (referred to as lender), for whom we
are going to motivate and introduce a different cost function from that of the
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borrower. We want to explore how this difference in cost functions leads to
choosing different observation kernels. In fact, for the lender, the decision to
invest means to give a loan to the borrower based on his provided collateral.
The lender’s cost can be represented a 2×3 matrix, whose columns and rows







For the lender, we compute the optimal decision policy by minimizing the
Bayes risk, corresponding to the prior and given observation kernels W1 and
W2, which relatively leads into posteriors in (3.16) and (3.18). We have




} = N, (3.19)
and
ψ̄L(W1, L) = ψB(ν1) = arg min
u∈U
{0, 15/22} = N,
ψ̄L(W1, N) = ψB(ν2) = arg min
u∈U
{0, 4/18} = N,
ψ̄L(W1, H) = ψB(ν3) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−5/20} = Y.





8The lender’s cost can be motivated as follows: In the second period and in case
U = Y , the state of the market might turn out Low X = {L}, Normal X = {N} and
Good X = {H}. The respective scenarios are going to be as follows: the borrower is going
to default, thus the lender incurs a significant cost of 2, the borrower repays his loan thus
lender makes normal profit of 0.5 under the both latter states. In case U = N , the cost
function is identically zero no matter what the state turns out to be.
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ψ̄L(W2, L) = ψB(ν̃1) = arg min
u∈U
{0, 30/20} = N,
ψ̄L(W2, N) = ψB(ν̃2) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−4/18} = Y,
ψ̄L(W2, H) = ψB(ν̃3) = arg min
u∈U
{0,−6/22} = Y.
And the average value of observation kernel W2 for the lender
VL(W2) = 50/300.
Therefore, when choosing between the observation structures,
W ∗L = arg min
W
{VL(W1), VL(W2)} = W2.
This example shows how, given the same option of two different obser-
vation kernels W1,W2, the borrower prefers to receive information through
W1, while the lender prefers W2. This reveals the fact that, given a set of
observation kernels, different Bayesian decision-makers with different objec-
tives may choose different information structures. In general, the value of
an observation kernel turns out to depend on the decision-maker’s prior and
cost function.
The concept of rationally inattentive decision-making can be motivated by
extending this example using the concept of mutual information in Definition
5. In this example, mutual information between the state X and observation
Z, when the system’s probabilistic model is constructed by PX and either of
the observation kernels W1 or W2, is identically equal to 0.1431. The main
idea behind rationally inattentive decision-making is to introduce a convex
set of kernels among which the optimal kernel can be sought. In the above
example, this can happen when the borrower can choose his observation
kernel among all kernels that induce mutual information of 0.1431 between
the state X and observation Z, which naturally includes W1 and W2.
Before continuing to Section 3.3, where RIDM is formally introduced, we
remind ourselves of the steps which need to be taken for the optimal ob-
servation kernel to be picked. First, for each observation kernel, one has
to find the posterior corresponding to each observation realization. Second,
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the optimal action (and therefore the expected optimum achievable value)
for the observation kernel should be found. The optimal observation kernel
must be picked based on these attainable expected optimum values. As the
number of observation kernels grows, the problem of picking the best kernel
becomes difficult to tackle. The reason is that one will need to repeat this
procedure for each of the candidate observation kernels. However, as we will
see, the concept of straightforward kernel (as well as having the convex set of
observation kernels introduced by the concept of mutual information) drasti-
cally simplifies our problem by allowing us to use some convex optimization
techniques.
3.3 Static Model of Rationally Inattentive
Decision-Making
In this section, we start formulating the simplest setup of RIDM within
the framework of probabilistic modelling introduced in Section 2.2. We use
the tools in Section 3.1 to formulate the relevant information collection con-
straint. Furthermore, we provide geometric interpretation for static RIDM in
the framework of Bayesian learning and Bayesian decision-making (Section
2.4).
Later in Section 3.3.2, we show how this problem is equivalent to a funda-
mental problem of lossy source coding in information theory, the distortion
rate problem. On its own terms, this provides a general Bayesian interpre-
tation for the distortion-rate problem. Later, in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4,
we provide specific examples of static RIDM, where the decision-maker has
quadratic cost and Gaussian prior. We assume that he has access to Gaus-
sian additive noise side information in Section 3.3.4. These two examples
can be considered as extensions of the similar example in Section 2.4, and
can be contrasted with it to see how general RIDM in Section 3.3.1 extends
the simple Bayesian decision-making problem.
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3.3.1 Static Model Formulation
In accordance with what we had for decision-making in probabilistic models
in (2.18), given the state, observation, and action spaces of X,Z, and U, and
cost function c ∈M(X×U), the probabilistic model setM can be identified
through the steps outlined in Definition 3 as:
1. Order of variables:
X,Z, U,
where system set includes X and decision set includes observation Z
and action U .
2. System specification becomes specifying P(dx) = µ ∈ P(X).
3. Information pattern and constraint:
P(dz|X) = W (dz|X),
P(du|Z,X) = Φ(du|Z).
Furthermore, there is a constraint on observation kernel W , according
to which we have Iµ,W (X;Z) ≤ R.
In order to provide a more convenient way to represent the problem and in
line with Eq. (2.18), first let the observation space Z be fixed and define
I(Z, R) = {W ∈M(Z|X) : Iµ,W (X;Z) ≤ R} (3.20)
as the set of Z-valued observation kernels that provide R nats of new infor-
mation about the state X. Convexity of I(Z, R) immediately follows from





〈µ⊗W ⊗ Φ, c〉 (3.21)
subject to W ∈ I(Z, R).









subject to W ∈ I(Z, R).
As a specific case of Bayesian decision-making with information selection,
RIDM can be compared to the specific example in Section 3.2. The essence of
both problems is to provide some form of freedom in choosing the observation
kernel W ∈ M(Z|X), as well as the optimal decision kernel. In both setups,





µ(dx)W (dz|x)Φ(du|z)c(x, u). (3.22)
As mentioned, the main feature of RIDM is how the set of available obser-
vation kernels is characterized, which is through the concept of mutual in-
formation. In this convex set of information constrained observation kernels,
none of the kernels is absolutely superior to any other in terms of providing
more information.10 As a result, the decision-maker chooses the observation
kernel that provides the most relevant information for his cost function.
When it comes to solving this simple case of RIDM, one may notice that,
although I(Z, R) is a convex set, the functional (3.22) is concave, since it
is given by a point-wise infimum of affine functionals. Hence, the problem
of jointly optimizing (W,Φ) for a fixed observation space Z is nonconvex
even in the simplest single-stage setting. This lack of convexity is common
in control problems with “nonclassical” information structures [98].
In Section 2.4, we explained that, besides being identified with the prior
µ ∈ P(X) and information structure W ∈ M(Z|X), a Bayesian learning
setup can uniquely be identified through identifying the prior µ ∈ P(X),
identifying a set of posteriors ν ∈ P(X) along with a probability distribution
τ ∈ P(P(X)) over them. Probability distribution τ must be identified in
such a way that the expected value of posteriors averaged with respect to it
becomes equal to the prior µ. Given the geometric interpretation of mutual
information in (3.4), the geometric interpretation for RIDM becomes to find
10See, for example, Blackwell et al. [9].
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a set of posteriors as well as a probability distribution over them in such a
way that
1. Expected value of posteriors averaged with respect to τ becomes the
prior µ,
2. Kullback-Leibler divergence between posteriors and prior, averaged
with respect to τ , becomes less than R.
This approach has partly been adopted in Caplin et al. [99].
3.3.2 Connection to Rate Distortion
RIDM in the static case is a non-convex problem over the convex set of
I(Z, R). In Section 3.2, we explained the impediments to choosing an optimal
observation kernel, from a non-convex set. The difficulty was mainly due to
the fact that DM needs to go through finding optimal attainable value by
finding posteriors, then compare the resulting expected values to pick the
best observation kernel.
In this section, we show how the problem of RIDM can be connected to
the distortion-rate problem in information theory, which is a convex prob-
lem (see Cover and Thomas [12] and Berger [14]). The relationship be-
tween Bayesian decision-making and distortion-rate problems has already
been studied, and the connection between them have been noticed by early
works of Stratonovic [100] and Kanaya and Nakagawa [101]. Our approach
provides a more systematic and rigorous way, which enables us to extend
the connection beyond the simple static case later. Furthermore, it provides
an interpretation for the distortion-rate problem in the context of Bayesian
learning.
The connection looks intuitive at first, as distortion-rate is concerned with
the fundamental limits of compressed representations of random sources sub-
ject to reconstruction fidelity criterion. However, it must be pointed out that,
fundamentally, it is used for finding the trade-off between the rate of com-
pression and the average distortion with respect to this fidelity criterion. In
this case, it turns out that the induced kernel, which is found by convex op-
timization methods, is the optimal observation kernel that can be employed
with a specific decision policy induced by identity function to solve RIDM.
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In Eq. (3.21), suppose, for each W ∈ I(Z, R) ⊂ M(Z|X), the optimum is
attained by Φ ∈ M(U|Z). The kernel Φ is induced by a one-to-one function
ψ : Z → U, say Φ(du|z) = 1ψ(Z)(du). We now construct W ∈ M(U|X) in
such a way that W = Φ ⊗W , which can be considered as a new U-valued
observation kernel. Together with id = 1Z(du), (W, id) attain the same value
as (W,Φ). Furthermore, by Lemma 5, IW,Φ(X,U) = IW,id(X,U). This, along
with the fact that (W, id) are only a subset of all possible observation-policy
kernels, implies that the solution to static RIDM can be sought over the
space of information-constrained U-valued observation kernels and identity
policies.11 After providing the general formula, we provide some examples
to clarify the concept. We will rigorously prove this result for a general
sequential setup in Chapter 4.
Restricting to identity policy in (3.21) (without losing optimality), the
problem of finding optimal observation kernel of RIDM in Eq. (3.21) can be
re-written as
Dµ(R; c) , inf 〈µ⊗W, c〉, (3.23)
subject to W ∈ I(U, R).
The optimization problem (3.23) is convex, and its value is called the Shannon
distortion-rate function (DRF) of µ [12,14]. Notice that for any kernel W  ∈
M(U|X) for which the function x 7→ W (B|x) is constant (µ-a.e. for any
B ∈ B(U)), we have I(µ,W ) = 0. Therefore, besides convexity, I(U, R) is
non-empty.
In order to study the existence and the structure of a decision policy that
achieves the infimum in (3.23), it is convenient to introduce the Lagrangian
relaxation
Lµ(W, ν, s) , sDKL(µ⊗W‖µ⊗ ν) + 〈µ⊗W, c〉, s ≥ 0, ν ∈ P(U).





Lµ(W, ν, s) ≤ sR +Dµ(R; c).
11The implication in this case can be written as minu E [c(X,U) |Z] = Z.
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We have the following key result [102]:
Proposition 1. The DRF Dµ(R; c) is convex and nonincreasing in R. More-
over, assume the following:
(D.1) The cost function c is lower semicontinuous, satisfies
inf
u∈U
c(x, u) > −∞, ∀x ∈ X
and is also coercive: there exist two sequences of compact sets Xn ↑ X





c(x, u) = +∞.
(D.2) There exists some u0 ∈ U such that 〈µ, c(·, u0)〉 <∞.
Define the critical rate
R0 , inf
{






(it may take the value +∞). Then, for any R < R0 there exists a Markov
kernel W ∗ ∈ M(U|X) satisfying I(µ,W ∗) = R and 〈µ ⊗W ∗, c〉 = Dµ(R; c).
Moreover, the Radon–Nikodym derivative of the joint law µ⊗W ∗ w.r.t. the
product of its marginals satisfies
d(µ⊗W ∗)










c(x,u)µ(dx) ≤ 1, ∀u ∈ U, (3.25)
and −s is the slope of a line tangent to the graph of Dµ(R; c) at R:
Dµ(R
′; c) + sR′ ≥ Dµ(R; c) + sR, ∀R′ ≥ 0. (3.26)
For any R ≥ R0, there exists a Markov kernel W ∗ ∈M(U|X) satisfying







and I(µ,W ∗) = R0. This Markov kernel is deterministic, and is implemented
by W ∗(du|x) = δu∗(x)(du), where u∗(x) is any minimizer of c(x, u) over u.
The structure of optimal straightforward observation kernel (3.24) has an
appealing geometric interpretation. In (D.2), u0 denotes the action that a
Bayesian decision-maker takes just based on the prior µ ∈ P(X). The critical
rate R0 denotes the value of information revealing enough about the realized
state for the decision-maker to take the optimal action corresponding to the
current state of the world, u∗(x), which is a deterministic function of the
state. Beyond these extreme cases, the optimal posterior joint state-action
distribution for static RIDM is obtained by “tilting” the prior state-optimal
action distribution with a coefficient of α(x)e−
1
s
c(x,u). This coefficient gives
higher weights to the points where the cost of joint state-action is lower.
Moreover, the intensity of tilting is inversely proportional to the size of s,
which is inversely proportional to the constraint R. This means that, given
each realized state, the decision-maker is more likely to pick actions that give
lower costs together with the relevant state.
Upon substituting (3.24) back into (3.23) and using (3.25) and (3.26), we
get the following variational representation of the DRF:
Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Prop. 1, the DRF Dµ(R; c) can be
expressed as

















In the literature of information theory, the kernel which achieves the infi-
mum in distortion-rate function is known as the induced channel. If the trans-
mission channel matches the induced channel, communication can reach the
respective distortion (see Definition 5.2.7 in [34] and Example 5.2.1 therein).
The Bayesian interpretation of induced channel in Bayesian learning is ex-
plained more clearly in the specific case below.
3.3.3 Square Difference Cost with Gaussian Prior
In this section, we provide a solution for (3.23) in the case where µ = N(0, σ2X)
is the prior distribution according to which the state X is distributed, and
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we have the cost function to be c(x, u) = (u − x)2. We remind ourselves of
the results of Section 2.4 for Bayesian decision-making with Gaussian prior
and quadratic cost.




−2R, the optimal observation kernel W
∗
that achieves the infi-





u; (1− e−2R)x, (1− e−2R)e−2Rσ2x
)
du, (3.27)
where γ(x; a, b) denotes probability density function of normally distributed
random variable X with mean a and variance b. Moreover, it achieves the
information constraint with equality, I(µ,W
∗
) = R, and can be realized as
with stochastic linear observation kernel
Z∗ = (1− e−2R)X + e−R
√
1− e−2Rε, (3.28)
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2X) is independent of X. This observation kernel is employed
together with the identity policy induced by U∗ = Z.
As mentioned earlier, an important property of straightforward observation
kernels is that minimum attainable Bayes risk may not be improved upon, if
the recommended policy is utilized as a Bayesian signal to drive the optimal
action. We verify that identity policy is truly the optimal action kernel here.
Notice that, in such a case of joint Gaussian distribution, the optimal action










Notice that straightforward observation kernel (3.28) and identity policy
are not the only optimal kernels that achieve the optimal value. There might
be several others; a trivial example is
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U∗ = (1− e−2R)X + e−R
√
1− e−2Rε.
3.3.4 Static Model with Side Information and Connection to
Context-Dependent Conditional Distortion Rate
There are two information variables about the state here, Z1 and Z2. After
observing Z1 through a fixed given information structure and in a similar vein
as in static RIDM, the decision-maker chooses an observation kernel from a
convex subset through which he has the option to obtain extra information
Z2. He makes his decision U based on Z1, Z2, intended to minimize the
expected value of c ∈M(U× Z1 × X).
In accordance with what we had for decision-making in probabilistic mod-
els in (2.18), the probabilistic model set M can be identified through the
steps in Definition 3 as:
1. Order of variables:
X,Z1, Z2, U,
where system set includes X and Z1 and decision set includes observa-
tion Z2 and action U .
2. System specification:
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PX = µ ∈ P(X)
PZ1|X = W1(·|X).
3. Information pattern and constraint:
PZ2|Z1,X = W2(·|Z1, X)
PU |Z1,Z2,X = Φ(·|Z1, Z2).
Furthermore, there is a constraint on observation kernel W2, according
to which we have Iµ,W1,W2(X;Z2|Z1) ≤ R.
The intention then becomes to find
min 〈µ⊗W1 ⊗W2 ⊗ Φ, c〉 , (3.30)
subject to Iµ,W1,W2(X;Z2|Z1) ≤ R.
We use an argument similar to that for the static case in Section 3.3.2.12
We show that one can restrict to the class of identity policy functions, which
means to have Φ induced by the function ψ(z1, z2) = z2. The problem of find-
ing the optimal observation kernel then converts to the problem of context-
dependent conditional distortion-rate problem, which is given by
Dµ⊗W (R, d |Z) , inf 〈µ⊗W ⊗ Φ, c〉 , (3.31)
subject to IP(X, Y |Z) ≤ R,
where Φ ∈M(Y|X,Z) and P = µ⊗W ⊗Φ. Here, the constraint set includes
all Markov kernels with X and Z-valued inputs and Y-valued output, such
that, whenever the side information Z (or context) about the input X ∼ µ
is conveyed through W ∈ M(Z|X), the resulting conditional mutual infor-
mation between the input X and the action Y given Z is not more than R
12We will rigorously prove this in Chapter 4.
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nats. Note that the distortion function c depends not only on the input X
and on the action Y , but also on the context Z.
Consider Gaussian prior µ = N(0, σ2X) as the distribution of the state X,
and cost function to be c(x, u) = (u − x)2. Side information is provided
through the kernel W1, which represents the Gaussian kernel, induced by
Z1 = X + ε1, ε1 ∼ N(0, σ2ε1). The solution for the conditional distortion-
rate problem (3.31) which gives the optimal observation kernel in this case
is provided by [104], which extends [105].
For the solution, given the side information Z1, the posterior distribution
of the source given Z1 can be considered as the new source:























Therefore, we apply the results of Section 3.3.3 to X − Cov(X,Z1)
Cov(Z1)
Z1, which is
a zero-mean Gaussian source, as the new source. We have









































where ε2 ∼ N(0, 1). The observation kernels are employed together with
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identity policy U∗(Z1, Z2) = Z2 to attain the optimal solution.
We verify that the identity policy is truly optimal. Consider the general
formula for optimal action given two signals when we have quadratic cost [25],
which is
U∗ = E[X|Z1, Z2] = E[X|Z1] + E[X|Z2 − E[Z2|Z1]]− E[X].
We have


















Z2 − E[Z2|Z1] =









































E[X|Z2 − E[Z2|Z1]] =
Cov(X,Z2 − E[Z2|Z1])
Cov(Z2 − E[Z2|Z1])
(Z2 − E[Z2|Z1]) = (1)Z2 − E[Z2|Z1],
which finally gives
E[X|Z2 − E[Z2|Z1]] + E[X|Z1] = Z2.
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By definition, it can also be verified that I(X;Z2|Z1) = H(Z2|Z1)−H(Z2|X,Z1) =
R.










This is similar to the case when Z1 is the only source of information to which
we have access. Furthermore, if R =∞ , Z∗2 = X, which means we no longer




DECISION PROCESS OVER A FINITE
HORIZON
In this chapter, we formulate and tackle the problem of rationally inatten-
tive Markov decision process (RIMDP) over a finite horizon. This problem
extends the static models of rationally inattentive decision-making (Section
3.3) to a sequential setup with feedback. As before, we formulate the problem
and identify the relevant system through the probabilistic modeling approach
introduced in Section 2.2, utilizing the information theoretic tools in Section
3.1.
For the sequential structure, we stick to the common assumption of con-
trolled Markov decision problems, where next state depends stochastically on
the current state and the current action. We assume the most general form
for observation and decision kernels: The decision-maker may collect the
history of the past observations, and take the action based on all the obser-
vations collected and actions taken.1 The problem here can be thought of as
an extension of partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to
the case when the observation kernel that governs the information-gathering
process is decided upon by the decision-maker as well. In this chapter, we
show the following:
1. If the structure of the problem is such that the optimal decision policy
is a one-to-one function of the observation history (i.e., if the history of
observations up to time t can be recovered from the history of actions
up to time t), the space of admissible observation kernels over which
the problem is to be solved can be significantly reduced, while still
attaining the same optimal value. A counter-example shows that the
1Intuitively, compared to Sims’ initial formulation, we allow memory for the decision-
maker. The intuition behind why this is optimal compared to Markov kernels is clear: as in
any dynamical system, states are correlated across time. We can thus use the information
collected about past states to infer the current state, and hence the optimal action which
must be taken.
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assumption of having a decision policy induced by a one-to-one function
is crucial. This property is akin to the famous revelation principle in
games with asymmetric information [92] (also see [106]).
2. Over this restricted set of admissible observation kernels and policies,
a necessary condition can be derived in the form of an information-
constrained Bellman equation that must be satisfied by the optimal
observation kernel.
3. The information-constrained Bellman equation, and thus the optimal
solution for rationally inattentive Markov decision processes, is con-
nected to the concept of context-dependent conditional distortion-rate
function [107].
This chapter is organized as follows. After formulating the problem in Sec-
tion 4.1, we take the first steps towards solving the problem by showing how
to reduce the space of admissible observation kernels and decision policies
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains our main results. Some of the proofs
and intermediate technical propositions needed for the theorems are given in
Appendix B.
4.1 Problem Formulation
We adopt the probabilistic modeling approach, as explained in Section 2.2.
As mentioned there, the system is a collection of inter-related random vari-
ables, whose joint probability measure is referred to as the probabilistic
model. On its own terms, the probabilistic model can be uniquely identi-
fied through its constituent Markov kernels.
Fix the time horizon T ∈ N, and let [T ] denote the set {1, 2, . . . T}. Given
the state space X and control (or action) space U, we consider a controlled
stochastic system with initial state distribution µ ∈ P(X) and controlled
Markov transition kernels Qt ∈ M(X|X × U), t ∈ [T ]. At each time step
t ∈ [T ], a random observation Zt is obtained from the history of states X[t]
given the history of observations collected Z[t−1] according to an observation
kernel, and an action Ut is taken based on the history of observations Z[t]
according to a decision policy kernel. Together, Ut and Xt determine the next
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state through the transition kernel Qt. The overall evolution of the system is
described by the X-valued state processX[T ], the Z-valued observation process
Z[T ], and the U-valued control process U[T ]. These processes are defined on
a common probability space (Ω,F ,P). Specifically, the main elements of
probabilistic model are:
1. Causal (time) ordering of variables:
X1, Z1, U1, X2, Z2, U2 . . . , XT , ZT , UT ,
where the system set includes Xt ∈ X and the decision set includes
sequence of observations and actions (Zt, Ut) ∈ (Z× U) .
2. System specification:
• P(X1 ∈ A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ B(X),
• P(Xt ∈ A |X[t−1], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = Qt(A|Xt−1, Ut−1) for all A ∈
B(X).
3. Information pattern and constraints:
• P(Zt ∈ B|X[t], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = Wt(B|X[t], Z[t−1]) for all B ∈ B(Z),
• P(Ut ∈ C|X[t], Z[t], U[t−1]) = Φt(C|Z[t]) for all C ∈ B(U).
Furthermore, there is an additional constraint on observation kernels
that will be explained in the sequel.
This specification ensures that, for each t, the next state Xt is conditionally
independent of X[t−2], U[t−2], Z[t−1] given Xt−1, Ut−1 (which is the usual case of
a controlled Markov processes). Moreover, the observation Zt is conditionally
independent of U[t−1] given X[t], Z[t−1], and the control Ut is conditionally
independent of (X[t], U[t−1]) given Z[t].
Referring to Definition 2, we denote directed observation kernel PZ[T ]|X[T ],U[T−1]
by W ∈ −→M(Z[T ]|X[T ]) and directed policy kernels PU[T ]|X[T ],Z[T ] by Φ ∈−→M(U[T ]|Z[T ]). Any resulting joint probability measure of states, observations
and actions, so-called probabilistic model or strategic measure, is denoted
with PΦW ∈M, and can be constructed from the above kernels.
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In the spirit of the general problem of rationally inattentive decision-
making, the decision-maker chooses the observation kernels subject to a se-
quence of information constraints at each time: IP(Zt;X[t]|Z[t−1]) ≤ Rt, t ∈
[T ]. For notational convenience, we define the set
−→I (U, R[T ]) =
{
W : IP(Zt;X[t]|Z[t−1]) ≤ Rt,∀t ≤ T
}
of observation kernels satisfying the information constraints. This completes
the specification of the decision information pattern and the constraints of
the probabilistic model.
Given a sequence of step-wise cost functions ct ∈ M(X × U), t ∈ [T ], the
cumulative cost over the horizon of T is given by
c(x[T ], u[T ]) =
∑
t∈[T ]
ct(xt, ut) ∈M(X[T ] × U[T ]).
In line with the general decision-making framework of Section 2.3, given
the directed observation kernel W and the directed policy kernel Φ, we
denote the expected value of the additive cost when taken with respect to
the resulting P by J(W,Φ):
J(W,Φ) , 〈P, c〉 ≡
∫




The familiar framework of partially observed Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) corresponds to the case when the sequence W of observation
kernels is given, and the decision-maker wishes to minimize the expected




On the other hand, for rationally inattentive Markov decision processes
(RIMDPs) we have
J∗(Z, R[T ]) ,min J(W,Φ), (4.3)
subject to IP(Zt;X[t]|Z[t−1]) ≤ Rt, t ∈ [T ].
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Furthermore, letting the decision-maker choose the optimal observation space
as well, we assume the decision-maker intends to find
J∗(R[T ]) , min
Z
J∗(Z, R[T ]). (4.4)
Trying to find a solution for RIMDP here, we face the same problem as
the one encountered in Section 3.3.1. In general, the objective in (4.3) is
non-convex in W, which makes the problem intractable. This is on top
of the typical problem of the curse of dimensionality faced when solving
POMDPs [25].
In the next section, along the same lines as in Section 3.3.2, we show that,
under certain regularity conditions, we can limit our search to policies with
specific form (identity policies), which enables us later to analytically solve
our problem via methods of convex optimization.
4.2 Problem Simplification
In this section, we take the first step towards solving the problem of RIMDP
(4.3)–(4.4). In particular, we show that the decision-maker does not need to
consider all observation and decision policy kernels to solve (4.3). In fact,
he can restrict to a certain subset of decision policy kernels, over which the
problem takes a convenient form. As mentioned in Section 2.3, probabilistic
modeling enables us to reduce the probabilistic model set without losing
optimality. We restrict to the smallest set of joint probability measures, over
which the optimal solution can be sought, leading to the same value as when
it is sought over the original set.
First, we have the following definition:
Definition 8. Policy kernel Φ is induced by a sequence of deterministic
measurable mappings ψt : Z[t] → U, t ∈ [T ], if
Φt(dut|z[t]) = δψt(z[t])(dut), t ∈ [T ],
where δu denotes a Dirac measure centered at u. In particular, if Z = U and
ψt(z[t]) = zt for each t, we denote the resulting policy by id and refer to it as
the identity policy.
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As the main contribution of this section, we show that, under a certain
invertibility condition, the optimal solution for (4.4) can be sought over a
restricted set of observation and decision policy kernels, where observation
kernels are a sequence of Markov kernels Wt ∈ M(U|Xt,U[t−1]), with the
identity policy.
Theorem 1. Suppose that, for any fixed W, the optimal policy for the
POMDP (4.2) is induced by a sequence of deterministic mappings ψt, t ∈ [T ],
and that, for each t ∈ [T ], the mapping ψ[t] : Z[t] → U[t] given by
ψ(z[t]) , (ψ1(z1), ψ2(z[2]), . . . , ψ[t](z[t])),
is invertible. Then
J∗(R[T ]) = J






Proof. Refer to the Appendix B.
Theorem 1 can be compared to the classic result in stochastic control about
the sufficiency of Markov policies in Markov decision processes with perfect
state information (see Example 2 in Section 2.3). Here, however, the DM
chooses both observation kernels and the policy kernels and the observation
kernel is subject to an information constraint. Theorem 1 entails two main
implications for the general problem of rationally inattentive Markov decision
processes. The first one is that, under the invertibility condition of the theo-
rem, the optimal observation space is essentially the action space U, and one
can seek the optimal observation kernels among U-valued kernels with the
structural form mentioned in the theorem. However, this pushes the complex-
ity of the problem into choosing the observation kernel properly. This way,
our non-convex problem turns into one of seeking an optimal information-
constrained observation kernel through solving an ordinary Markov decision
process with a convex constraint on the randomized policy. In other words,
after making sure that for any observation kernel the optimal policy satisfies
the invertibility condition of the theorem, we may completely neglect the
observation variable and consider just the sequences of actions and states.
The invertibility condition is crucial for the conclusion of the theorem to
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hold. The counter-example below shows that the result of Theorem 1 does
not hold for general policies.
Example 7. Let the time horizon T = 2 be fixed. Let the probabilistic
model be characterized as below: system specification induces X1 = X2 = X
with uniform distribution on [−2, 2]. We use notation η(a, b) to denote the
uniform distribution on [a, b]. DM intends to minimize
J(W,Φ) , EP
[






and R1 = R2 = 1.
Let the observation kernel W = (W1,W2) be chosen to induce
Z1 = (−1)1{[−2,0]}(X) + 1{[0,2]}(X),
Z2 = (−1)1{[−2,−1]∪[0,1]} + 1{[−1,0]∪[1,2]}(X),
and the decision policy kernel Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) induces the mappings
U1 = ψ1(Z1) = 1,
U2 = ψ2(Z1, Z2) = 2Z1 + Z2.
Intuitively, W1 divides the interval [−2, 2] into two equally sized sub-intervals
and reveals which interval includes the realization of the state X. On the
other hand, W2 divides each of the indicated sub-intervals into two finer
equally divided subdivisions and indicates whether the state lies within the
lower subdivision or the upper one within each sub-interval. Therefore and
together, W1 and W2 induce four equally divided subdivisions over [−2, 2] and
indicate which one includes it.
Given such observation and policy kernels, we have
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h(X|Z1 = 1, Z2 = 1) +
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h(X|Z1 = −1, Z2 = 1) +
1
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I(Z1;X1) = I(Z1;X) = h(X)− h(X|Z1) = 1.
I(Z2;X[2]|Z1) = I(Z2;X|Z1) = h(X|Z1)− h(X|Z1, Z2) = 1.
Notice that applying these policies derives non-negative objective to zero,
which is J(W,Φ) = 0. Therefore, 0 ≤ J∗µ({1, 1}) ≤ J(W,Φ) = 0, which
implies J∗(R[2]) = J
∗({1, 1}) = 0.




J(W, id) be denoted by J̄∗µ(R[2]) = J̄
∗
µ({1, 1}).
We show that J̄∗µ({1, 1}) > 0. For this, notice that J̄∗µ({1, 1}) = 0 implies
that W ∗1 must induce the mapping
Z1 = 1,
according to which
I(X1;Z1) = I(X1;U1) = I(X,Z1) = h(X)− h(X|Z1) = 0 < 1.
Together with the definition of identity policy, we have
I(X[2];Z2|Z1) = I(X[2];U2|U1) = I(X;U2|U1) = h(X|U1)− h(X|U1, U2).
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Therefore, if we want to keep the step-wise information constrained by 1, we
will have
h(X|U1)− h(X|U1, U2) = h(η(−2, 2))− h(X|U1, U2) = 2− h(X|U1, U2) ≤ 1,
which implies h(X|U1, U2) > 1. However, we have J̄∗µ({1, 1}) = 0 only if W ∗2
induces the mapping
Z2 = U2 = (−3)1{[−2,−1]} + (−1)1{[−1,0]} + 1{[0,1]} + (3)1{[1,2]},
for which we would have h(X|U1, U2) = 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore
J̄∗µ({1, 1}) > 0.
The intuition behind this counter-example, which confirms the necessity
of assumption in Theorem 1, is as follows. The state interval [−2, 2] can be
divided into four sub-intervals, over each of which the DM’s optimal action
(thus straightforward observation kernel) uniformly takes the same value
which is how we find J̄∗µ({1, 1}). This means that the signal does not provide
any information about the value of state X. At the second step, though, the
optimal action must take different values over each subinterval, which means
all the information in Z1 and Z2 is consumed through the action taken at
this step.
This must be compared with the observation kernels Z1 and Z2. In this
situation, Z1 and Z2 provide the information sequentially and it is the optimal
policy kernel that takes the same value over all signal realizations at the first
step, and utilizes the whole information contained in both observations at
the second step.
The above counter-example conveys another important implication. A
similar notion as data processing inequality in Section 3.3.4 (Lemma 4) can
be shown to hold for two sets of variables or two sequences of variables.
However, in sequential setup, step-wise data processing inequality fails to
hold between individual variables.
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4.3 Main Results
In this section, armed with the simplifications provided in Section 4.2, we
address the problem of RIMDP (4.4). According to Proposition 1, we can
consider Eq. (4.1), where P is the joint probability measure induced by the
U-valued observation kernel sequence W together with the identity decision
policy kernel id. We can now employ a dynamic programming argument to
arrive at an information-constrained form of Bellman’s equation:
Theorem 2. Suppose that the sequence of kernels W ∗t ∈M(U|Xt,U[t−1]), t ∈
[T ] provides a solution for (4.3)-(4.4). There exists a sequence of value func-
tions Jt ∈M(Xt,U[t−1]) and joint distributions µt ∈ P(Xt×U[t−1]), such that
W ∗t ’s satisfy the information constrained Bellman recursion
〈µt, Jt〉 = min
Wt
〈µt ⊗Wt, ct + (Qt ⊗ δU[t])Jt+1〉, (4.5)
subject to IP(Xt;Ut|U[t−1]) ≤ Rt t ∈ [T ],
where JT+1 = 0, µ0 ∈ P(X) is the initial state distribution, and µt+1 =
(µt ⊗Wt)⊗Qt ∈ P(Xt+1 × U[t]).
Proof. The proof is constructive, and proceeds by defining appropriate value
functions Jt ∈M(Xt,U[t−1]) and joint measures µt ∈ P(Xt×U[t−1]) for t ∈ [T ]
by backward induction.
First, let us disintegrate the overall probability law P = PX[T ],U[T ] in (4.1)
as
P = µ⊗W1 ⊗Q1 ⊗W2 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗WT ∈ P(U[T ] × X[T ]).
At each time t ∈ [T ], suppose the sequence of decision kernels taken by that
time is fixed at {Ws}t−1s=1. Define µt ∈ P(Xt,U[t−1]) as the probability measure
according to which the history of states and actions is distributed, i.e.,
µt = µ⊗W1 ⊗Q1 ⊗W2 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗Wt−1 ⊗Qt−1,
with µ0 = µ. By construction, we have µt+1 = (µt ⊗Wt)⊗Qt.
Moreover, given the optimal decision kernels {W ∗s }Ts=t+1, define the value
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functions Jt ∈M(Xt × U[t−1]) via
Jt ,
〈





for t ∈ [T ], where JT = 0. We now prove via backward induction that, by con-
sidering the value functions and joint measures constructed above, {W ∗t }Tt=1
provide a solution for the information-constrained Bellman recursion (4.5).
As the basis of induction at time T , notice that, since P = µT ⊗ WT ,
Eq. (4.3) reduces to picking WT ∈ P(U|XT ,U[T−1]) so as to
minimize 〈µT ⊗WT , cT 〉 (4.6)
subject to I(UT ;XT |U[T−1]) ≤ RT , for which W ∗T provides a solution by
assumption. Considering JT = 0 and by definition of JT , W
∗
T provides a
solution for the information-constrained Bellman Eq. (4.5) at time T .
Now, in order to complete the induction, consider time t ≤ T for which
the induction hypothesis for the sequence of observation kernels {W ∗s }Ts=t+1
holds, which is to satisfy the information-constrained Bellman equation when
{Js}Ts=t+1 and {µs}Ts=t+1 are defined as mentioned before. We prove that W ∗t
provides a solution for the information-constrained Bellman equation when
Jt and µt are defined in the same way. By the Bellman principle of optimality,
Eq. (4.3) reduces to choosing {Ws}Ts=t so as to minimize
〈






subject to I(Xs;Us|U[s−1]) ≤ Rs, s ∈ [T ]. We use the definition of Jt and
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〈µt ⊗Wt, ct〉+ min
{Ws}Ts=t+1
〈











µt ⊗Wt ⊗Qt ⊗ffiU[t] ,
〈













〈µt ⊗Wt, ct + (Qt ⊗ffiU[t])Jt+1〉,
where (a) follows from the construction, (b) from the principle of optimal-
ity, and (c) and (d) from the induction hypothesis. The fact that Jt ∈
M(Xt,U[t−1]) is concluded by construction of Jt and sufficiency of identity
kernels.
Upon inspecting the right-hand side of the information-constrained Bell-
man equation (4.5), we notice that the Bellman recursion of Theorem 1 can
be interpreted as a sequence of context-dependent conditional distortion-rate
problems. At each time t, the input is the current state Xt, the action is Ut,
and the side information (or context) is provided by the history of past ac-
tions U[t−1]. More precisely, using the notations introduced in Section 3.3.4,
the following is immediate:
Theorem 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, there exists a sequence of
context-dependent conditional distortion-rate problems, such that
〈µt, Jt〉 = Dµt(Rt+1, ct + (Qt ⊗ δU[t])Jt+1|U[t−1]). (4.8)
Theorem 3 establishes a basic connection between rationally inattentive Markov
decision processes and context-dependent conditional rate-distortion the-
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ory. In fact, it first implies that, when facing uncertainty and information-
processing constraints at each step, the actions taken by the decision-maker in
the past guide his action in the current step, which is the same notion behind
the well-known anchor and adjustment theorized by Kahneman and Tversky
in their evaluation of human biases in behavior under uncertainty [108]. Fur-
ther, any information about the current state is collected on top of what can
be inferred from past actions in such a way as to minimize the sum of the
current cost and the optimal future value function, which is what we expect
by the principle of optimality.
4.4 Rationally Inattentive Tracking of a Gauss-Markov
Source
We solve the problem of sequential tracking of the state of a system whose
dynamics follow a Gauss-Markov process over time. In accordance with what
we had for decision-making in probabilistic models in (2.18), the probabilistic
model set M can be identified through the steps outlined in Definition 3:
1. Order of variables:
X1, Z1, U1, X2, Z2, U2, . . . ,
where the system set includes Xt and the decision set includes obser-
vation Zt and actions Ut.
2. System specification:
PXt|X[t−1],Z[t−1],U[t−1] = µt ∈M(X|X)
induced by Xt = at−1Xt−1 +Wt−1, where Wt−1 ∼ N(0,M2t−1) are inde-
pendent across time.
3. Information pattern and constraint:
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PZt|X[t],Z[t−1],U[t−1] = Wt(·|X[t], Z[t−1])
PU |X[t],Z[t],U[t−1] = Φt(·|Z[t]).
Furthermore, there is a constraint on observation kernel W, according
to which we have Iµ,W (X[t];Zt|Z[t−1]) ≤ Rt.
For the cost function, we assume ct(xt, ut) = (ut − xt)2.
Given the results of this chapter, we may restrict ourselves to the identity
policy. Moreover, we can restrict to observation kernels of the form Wt ∈
M(Z|X,Z[t−1]).
Theorem 4. Optimal observation kernel for tracking a Gauss-Markov pro-
cess given by probabilistic model set M is induced by
Z∗t = (1− e−2Rt)Xt + e−2Rtat−1Zt−1 + e−Rt
√
1− e−2Rt , εt (4.9)
in which εt ∼ N(0, Nt), t = 0, . . . , T are independent across time, and N[T ] is
constructed recursively in such a way that N0 = σ
2
X0




Mt−1 , t = 1, . . . , T .
Proof. At each time t, we treat the posterior distribution of the source Xt
given Z[t−1] as the new source (which is X̃t). In fact, we treat Z[t−1] as side
information about Xt and try to find the optimal observation kernel Zt that
provides Rt bits of information given this side information. By induction, we
prove that X̃t follows a Gaussian distribution N(at−1Zt−1, Nt), and the form
of optimal observation kernel (4.9) emerges from the optimum kernel for the
distortion-rate problem in Section 3.3.3. As the basis for induction, notice
that X0 ∼ N(0, σ2X0). For the induction step, suppose the assumption holds
at time t. We will need to show that, after choosing an optimal observation
kernel Zt, the posterior distribution of the source Xt+1 given Z[t], which is
X̃t+1, follows N(atZt, Nt+1). Based on the assumption and applying what we
have in Section 3.3.3, Z∗t follows (4.9) at time t. We represent the random
variable whose distribution follows the posterior of Xt given Z[t] withXt+1|Z[t]
(which is the general rule for all posteriors), and we have
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Xt+1|Z[t] = at(Xt|Z[t]) +Wt. (4.10)
Since (Xt, Z[t]) is jointly Gaussian, the posterior distribution of Xt given Z[t]




and variance. We use a simplifying trick here from the construction of Zt.








are, respectively, the op-





by construction of Zt as a straightforward kernel, the above problem reduces
to a distortion-rate problem. The expected value and attainable values are,
respectively, Zt and e
−2RtNt (see Section 3.3.3). Then (4.10) becomes a sum
of two independent Gaussian random variables, which is a new Gaussian [91]
with mean of atZt and variance of a
2
t e
−2RtNt +Mt, or Nt+1.
Remark 9. Notice that if Rt = 0, no new information is collected, and DM
just adjusts his past action with coefficient of at. On the other extreme, in
the case Rt =∞, the state is perfectly observed and followed by DM.





























−2R4 (1 + . . .)
))
+ . . . ,
which means the total cost incurred by the system is the sum of variances of
variables propagated over the time horizon and diminished through ingesting
new information at each step. It is worth inspecting what happens if Rt = 0
for all t ∈ [T ] and Rt =∞ at some t ∈ [T ] as extreme cases.
Again, we emphasize that this is just one of optimal solutions, which in-
cludes identity policy as the optimal policy. Through comparing the structure
of (4.9) with Kalman filtering, there must be other combinations of observa-





, can provide optimal solution to the above problem. Ref. [109]
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uses semi-definite programming to find variances of εt in an observation ker-




CONTROL OF A MARKOV CHAIN OVER
INFINITE HORIZON
In this chapter, we consider the problem of rationally inattentive ergodic
control of a Markov chain over infinite horizon.1 The structure of observation
and decision policy kernels adopted in this chapter is very similar to those
taken in the seminal work of Sims [2]. We consider the problem over infinite
horizon, and minimize the time average of the cost function over the sample
paths. This is in contrast to the expected cost which is minimized according
to expected utility theorem.2 In particular, in this chapter, we address the
following:
1. Give existence results for optimal information-constrained observation
kernels. We also describe the structure of such policies. We show that,
if the optimal decision policy is restricted to Markov policies—those
policies that just utilize the most recent observation for taking the
decision—the space of admissible observation kernels over which the
problem is to be solved can also be reduced to Markov ones. Moreover,
decision policy kernels can be restricted to identity policies, while still
attaining the same optimal value.
2. Over this restricted set of admissible observation and policy kernels,
a necessary condition can be derived in the form of an information-
constrained average-cost optimality equation (ACOE) that must be
satisfied by the optimal stationary observation kernel.
3. The information-constrained average-cost optimality equation, and thus
the optimal solution for rationally inattentive ergodic control of a Markov
1The content of this chapter is presented in [110], whose results have also appeared
in [111], and [112].
2Notice that this is a stronger criterion than expected cost. The connection is explained
in the sequel.
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chain, is connected to the well-known concept of distortion-rate func-
tion.
4. We will illustrate the general theory through the specific example of
information-constrained linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control. We
derive an upper bound and corresponding stationary optimal observa-
tion kernel that achieve this upper bound.
5. We will outline an extension of our approach to the more difficult
infinite-horizon discounted-cost case.
This chapter is organized as follows: After formulating the problem in
Section 5.1, we show how to simplify the problem by reducing the space of
observation and decision policy kernels in Section 5.2. Later, in Section 5.3,
we tackle the problem through convex-analytic approach. In Section 5.4, the
case of control of an LQG setup is solved with the approach introduced in
Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.5 introduces and takes some steps towards
solving the problem under the infinite-horizon discounted cost. We postpone
some of the proofs to Appendix C.
5.1 Problem Formulation
The framework in this section deviates from the one introduced in Section
3.3 in some aspects that will be illuminated in the following. Specifically, in
this section, we tackle the problem over the infinite horizon, which means
T → ∞. Moreover, in contrast to the general model in Section 3.3, the
objective is not the expected cost, but the long-term average cost, which
turns out to be a stronger criterion. The relation will be explained more in
the sequel.
For now, fix the time horizon T ∈ N, and let [T ] denote the set {1, 2, . . . T}.
Given the state space X and control (or action) space U, we consider a con-
trolled stochastic system with initial state distribution µ ∈ P(X) and time-
invariant controlled Markov transition kernel Q ∈M(X|X×U). At each time
step t ∈ [T ], a random observation Zt is obtained from the history of states
X[t] given the history of observations Z[t−1] according to a time-invariant ob-
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servation kernel.3 Then, an action Ut is taken only based on the most recent
observation Zt according to a policy which, like the observation kernel, is
stationaty over time (i.e., the information structure is amnesic in the termi-
nology of [113] — the controller is forced to “forget” Z1, . . . , Zt−1 by time t).
Together, Ut and Xt determine the next state through the transition kernel
Q. The overall evolution of the system is described by the X-valued state
process X[T ], the Z-valued observation process Z[T ], and the U-valued control
process U[T ]. These processes are defined on a common probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Following the general framework laid out in Section 2.2, we iden-
tify the elements of probabilistic model set out in Definition 3. Specifically:
1. Causal (time) ordering of variables:
X1, Z1, U1, X2, Z2, U2 . . . , XT , ZT , UT ,
where system set includes Xt ∈ X and decision set includes sequence of
observations and actions (Zt, Ut) ∈ (Z× U) .
2. System specification:
• P(X1 ∈ A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ B(X) ,
• P(Xt ∈ A |X[t−1], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = Q(A|Xt−1, Ut−1) for all A ∈
B(X).
3. Information pattern and constraints:
• P(Zt ∈ B|X[t], Z[t−1], U[t−1]) = W (B|X[t], Z[t−1]) for all B ∈ B(Z).
• P(Ut ∈ C|X[t], Z[t], U[t−1]) = Φ(C|Zt) for all C ∈ B(U).
Furthermore, there is a constraint on observation kernels that will be
explained in the sequel.
Notice that all elements of the system are defined to be time-invariant here.
As before, a directed observation kernel is denoted by W ∈ −→M(Z[T ]|X[T ],Z[T ])
and can be decomposed as the product of T stochastic kernels over the hori-
zon of T .
3So the first important assumption here is that the observation kernel is stationary over
time.
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In the general spirit of rationally inattentive decision-making, the directed
observation kernel must be picked from an information-constrained set, as in
(3.20). In line with different nature of this problem, which is ergodic control
over an infinite horizon, we impose an information constraint as
lim sup
t→∞
I(Xt;Zt) ≤ R, (5.1)
which, given µt = PΦµ (Xt ∈ ·) as the distribution of the state at time t, can
also be re-written as
lim sup
t→∞
I(µt,Wt) ≤ R. (5.2)
Given a state-action cost function c : X × U → R+, the objective here is to
minimize the pathwise long-term average cost given by







Here, the limit supremum in (5.3) is a random variable that depends on
the entire path {(Xt, Ut)}∞t=1, and the precise meaning of the rationally inat-
tentive ergodic control is as follows: we say that an observation kernel and
control law pair (Φ∗,W∗) satisfying the information constraint (5.2) is opti-





















is the long-term expected average cost of (observation kernel, control law)
pair (Φ,W) with initial state distribution µ, and the infimum on the right-
hand side of Eq. (5.4) is over all (observation kernel, control law) pairs (Φ,W)
satisfying the information constraint (5.2) (see, e.g., [114, p. 116] for the def-
83
inition of pathwise average-cost optimality in the information-unconstrained
setting). However, we will see that, under general conditions, Jµ(Φ
∗,W∗) is
deterministic and independent of the initial condition.
In the next section, we show that, given the structure of the cost and
Markov property of the transition kernel, and the fact that the optimal deci-
sion kernel is also sought among Markov ones, the decision-maker may restrict
to observation kernels with Markov structure and identity policy kernels, and
still attain the same value. This means that, for the information pattern of
observation kernel P(dzt|x[t], z[t−1], u[t−1]), restricting to xt is general enough
for the sake of optimality.
5.2 Problem Simplification
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the probabilistic model is restricted to the case
when the action is taken only based on the most recent observation, which
means the decision-maker is memoryless. In what follows, we show that
given this restriction, the decision-maker may restrict the observation kernel
and decision policy kernels further. In fact, he can restrict to memoryless
observation kernels. Moreover, in the same fashion as other problems of
RIDM we have had so far, we can restrict the policy to be induced by an
identity kernel, which was defined in Definition 8. The way we prove this
result here is different from what we did in Section 4.2 and is based on the
principle of irrelevant information, as explained in the sequel.
We consider a finite-horizon variant of the control problem. Thus, the
DM’s problem is to pick up appropriate observation kernel W and decision
kernel Φ to minimize the expected total cost over T <∞ time steps subject








subject to I(Xt;Zt) ≤ R, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (5.6b)
As mentioned, the facts that (a) both the controlled system and the controller
are Markov, and (b) the cost function at each stage depends only on the
current state-action pair, permit a drastic simplification — at each time t,
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we can limit our search to memoryless channels Wt(dzt|xt) without impacting
either the expected cost in (5.6a) or the information constraint in (5.6b):
Theorem 5. Corresponding to any decision and observation kernel pair
(Φ,W), there exists another channel specification W ′ which factorizes to


















t) = I(Xt;Zt), t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
where {(Xt, Ut, Zt)} is the original process with (µ,Q,W ,Φ), while {(X ′t, U ′t , Z ′t)}
is the one with (µ,Q,W ′, id).
Proof. To prove the theorem, we follow the approach used by Wistenhausen
in [115]. We start with the following simple observation that can be regarded
as an instance of the Shannon–Mori–Zwanzig Markov model [116]. We prove
the theorem by backward induction and grouping of variables and using
Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 in Appendix C. Fix any T . By the two-stage Lemma
8 (See Appendix C), we may assume that WT is memoryless, i.e., ZT is
conditionally independent of X[T−1], Z[T−1], U[T−1] given XT . Now we apply
the three-stage Lemma 9 (see Appendix C) to
∣∣∣X[T−3], Z[T−3], U[T−3], XT−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
state
, ZT−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
observation




∣∣∣ XT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
state
, ZT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
observation













to replace WT−1(dzT−1|x[T−1], z[T−2], u[T−2]) with W ′T−1(dzT−1|xT−1) without
affecting the expected cost or the mutual information between the state and
the observation at time T−1. We proceed inductively by merging the second
and the third stages in (5.7), splitting the first stage in (5.7) into two, and
then applying the Three-Stage Lemma to replace the original observation
kernel WT−2 with a memoryless one.
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Since both decision policy and observation kernels are stationary Markov,
the same argument as the one in Section 3.3.2 holds to ensure that we may
simply limit to identity policy id = δZ(du).
Hereafter, in order to keep the notations consistent with the original paper
of ours where this problem has been solved [110], we use the term Markov
randomized stationary (MRS) control law, denoted with Φ ∈ M(U|X) for
stationary Markov observation kernel. It is also satisfying the information
constraint (5.2). We therefore re-write the general problem:







subject to lim sup
t→∞
I(µt,Φ) ≤ R. (5.8b)
5.3 Main Results
We now turn to the analysis of the average-cost control problem (5.8a) with
the information constraint (5.8b). It turns out that the solution would be
reduced to distortion-rate function again, with the cost modified to account
for the effect of the control action on future costs. As we will see, this modi-
fication leads to a certain stochastic generalization of the Bellman Equation.
5.3.1 Reduction to Single-stage Optimization
We begin by reducing the dynamic optimization problem (5.8) to a particular
static (single-stage) problem. Once this has been carried out, we will be able
to take advantage of the results of Section 3.3.2. The reduction is based on
the so-called convex-analytic approach to controlled Markov processes [117]
(see also [27,118–120]), which we briefly summarize here.
Suppose that we have a Markov control problem with initial state distri-
bution µ ∈ P(X) and controlled transition kernel Q ∈ M(X|X × U). Any






Q(A|x, u)Φ(du|x), ∀A ∈ B(X).
We wish to find an MRS control law Φ∗ ∈M(U|X) that would minimize the







where J̄µ(Φ) is the long-term expected average cost defined in Eq. (5.5).
Under certain regularity conditions, we can guarantee the existence of an
MRS control law Φ∗, such that Jµ(Φ
∗) = J∗ PΦ∗µ -a.s. for all µ ∈ P(X).
Moreover, this optimizing control law is stable in the following sense:
Definition 9. An MRS control law Φ ∈M(U|X) is called stable if:
• There exists at least one probability measure π ∈ P(X), which is invari-
ant w.r.t. QΦ: π = πQΦ.
• The average cost J̄π(Φ) is finite, and moreover
J̄π(Φ) = 〈ΓΦ, c〉 =
∫
X×U
c(x, u)ΓΦ(dx, du), where ΓΦ , π ⊗ Φ.
The subset ofM(U|X) consisting of all such stable control laws will be denoted
by K.
Then we have the following [114, Thm. 5.7.9]:
Theorem 6. Suppose that the following assumptions are satisfied:
(A.1) The cost function c is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous, and coercive.
(A.2) The cost function c is inf-compact, i.e., for every x ∈ X and every
r ∈ R, the set {u ∈ U : c(x, u) ≤ r} is compact.
(A.3) The kernel Q is weakly continuous, i.e., Qf ∈ Cb(X × U) for any f ∈
Cb(X).
(A.4) There exist an MRS control law Φ and an initial state x ∈ X, such that
Jδx(Φ) <∞.
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where π∗ = π∗QΦ∗. Moreover, if Φ
∗ is such that the induced kernel Q∗ = QΦ∗
is Harris-recurrent, then Jµ(Φ
∗) = J∗ PΦ∗µ -a.s. for all µ ∈ P(X).
One important consequence of the above theorem is that, if Φ∗ ∈ K
achieves the infimum on the rightmost side of (5.9) and if π∗ is the unique
invariant distribution of the Harris-recurrent Markov kernel QΦ∗ , then the
state distributions µt induced by Φ
∗ converge weakly to π∗ regardless of the
initial condition µ1 = µ. Moreover, the theorem allows us to focus on the
static optimization problem given by the right-hand side of Eq. (5.9).
Our next step is to introduce a steady-state form of the information con-
straint (5.8b) and then to use ideas from rate-distortion theory to attack the
resulting optimization problem. The main obstacle to direct application of
the results from Section 3.3.2 is that the state distribution and the control
policy in (5.9) are coupled through the invariance condition πΦ = πΦQΦ.
However, as we show next, it is possible to decouple the information and the
invariance constraints by introducing a function-valued Lagrange multiplier
to take care of the latter.
5.3.2 Bellman Error Minimization via Marginal
Decomposition
We begin by decomposing the infimum over Φ in (5.9) by first fixing the
marginal state distribution π ∈ P(X). To that end, for a given π ∈ P(X),
we consider the set of all stable control laws that leave it invariant (this
set might very well be empty): Kπ , {Φ ∈ K : π = πQΦ}. In addition,
for a given value R ≥ 0 of the information constraint, we consider the set
Iπ(R) = {Φ ∈M(U|X) : I(π,Φ) ≤ R}.
Assuming that the conditions of Theorem 6 are satisfied, we can rewrite
the expected ergodic cost (5.9) (in the absence of information constraints) as
J∗ = inf
Φ∈K




〈π ⊗ Φ, c〉. (5.10)
In the same spirit, we can now introduce the following steady-state form of
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〈π ⊗ Φ, c〉, (5.11)
where the feasible set Kπ(R) , Kπ ∩ Iπ(R) accounts for both the invariance
constraint and the information constraint.
As a first step to understanding solutions to (5.11), we consider each can-
didate invariant distribution π ∈ P(X) separately and define
J∗π(R) , inf
Φ∈Kπ(R)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c〉 (5.12)
(we set the infimum to +∞ if Kπ = ∅). Now we follow the usual route in the
theory of average-cost optimal control [27, Ch. 9] and eliminate the invariance
condition Φ ∈ Kπ by introducing a function-valued Lagrange multiplier:





〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h⊗ 1〉. (5.13)
Remark 11. Both in (5.13) and elsewhere, we can extend the supremum
over h ∈ Cb(X) to all h ∈ L1(π) without affecting the value of J∗π(R) (see,
e.g., the discussion of abstract minimax duality in [121, App. 1.3]).
Remark 12. Upon setting λπ = J
∗
π(R), we can recognize the function c +
Qh− h⊗ 1− λπ as the Bellman error associated with h; this object plays a
central role in approximate dynamic programming.
Proof. Let ιπ(Φ) take the value 0 if Φ ∈ Kπ and +∞ otherwise. Then
J∗π(R) = inf
Φ∈Iπ(R)




[〈πQΦ, h〉 − 〈π, h〉] . (5.15)
Indeed, if Φ ∈ Kπ, then the right-hand side of (5.15) is zero. On the other
hand, suppose that Φ 6∈ Kπ. Since X is standard Borel, any two probability
measures µ, ν ∈ P(X) are equal if and only if 〈µ, h〉 = 〈ν, h〉 for all h ∈ Cb(X).
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Consequently, 〈π, h0〉 6= 〈πQΦ, h0〉 for some h0 ∈ Cb(X). There is no loss of
generality if we assume that 〈πQΦ, h0〉 − 〈π, h0〉 > 0. Then by considering
functions hn0 = nh0 for all n = 1, 2, . . . and taking the limit as n → ∞, we
can make the right-hand side of (5.15) grow without bound. This proves
(5.15). Substituting it into (5.14), we get (5.13).
Armed with this proposition, we can express (5.11) in the form of an






〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h⊗ 1〉. (5.16)
Proposition 4. Suppose that assumption (A.1) above is satisfied, and that
J∗π(R) < ∞. Then the primal value J∗π(R) and the dual value J∗,π(R) are
equal.
Proof. Let P0π,c(R) ⊂ P(X×U) be the closure, in the weak topology, of the set
of all Γ ∈ P(X×U), such that Γ(·×U) = π(·), I(Γ) ≤ R, and 〈Γ, c〉 ≤ J∗π(R).











〈Γ, c+Qh− h⊗ 1〉. (5.18)
Because c is coercive and nonnegative, and J∗π(R) < ∞, the set {Γ ∈
P(X × U) : 〈Γ, c〉 ≤ J∗π(R)} is tight [122, Proposition 1.4.15], so its clo-
sure is weakly sequentially compact by Prohorov’s theorem. Moreover, be-
cause the function Γ 7→ I(Γ) is weakly lower semicontinuous [123], the set
{Γ : I(Γ) ≤ R} is closed. Therefore, the set P0π,c(R) is closed and tight, hence
weakly sequentially compact. Moreover, the sets P0π,c(R) and Cb(X) are both
convex, and the objective function on the right-hand side of (5.17) is affine in
Γ and linear in h. Therefore, by Sion’s minimax theorem [124] we may inter-
change the supremum and the infimum to conclude that J∗π(R) = J∗,π(R).
We are now in a position to relate the optimal value J∗π(R) = J∗,π(R) to
a suitable rate-distortion problem. Recalling the definition in Eq. (3.23), for
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any h ∈ Cb(X) we consider the DRF of π w.r.t. the distortion function c+Qh:
Dπ(R; c+Qh) , inf
Φ∈Iπ(R)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh〉. (5.19)
We can now give the following structural result:
Theorem 7. Suppose that Assumptions (A.1)–(A.3) of Theorem 6 are in
force. Consider a probability measure π ∈ P(X) such that J∗π(R) < ∞, and








[c(·, u) +Qhπ(·, u)]
〉}
.
If R < R0,π, then there exists an MRS control law Φ
∗ ∈ M(U|X) such that
I(π,Φ∗) = R, and the Radon–Nikodym derivative of π ⊗ Φ∗ w.r.t. π ⊗ πΦ∗
takes the form
d(π ⊗ Φ∗)












where d(x, u) , c(x, u) +Qhπ(x, u), and s ≥ 0 satisfies
Dπ(R
′; c+Qhπ) + sR
′ ≥ Dπ(R; c+Qhπ) + sR, ∀R′ ≥ 0. (5.21)
If R ≥ R0,π, then the deterministic Markov policy Φ∗(du|x) = δu∗π(x)(du),
where u∗π(x) is any minimizer of c(x, u)+Qhπ(x, u) over u, satisfies I(π,Φ
∗) =
R0,π. In both cases, we have
J∗π(R) + 〈π, hπ〉 = 〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c+Qhπ〉 = Dπ(R; c+Qhπ). (5.22)
























Proof. Using Proposition 4 and the definition (5.16) of the dual value J∗,π(R),
we can express J∗π(R) as a pointwise supremum of a family of DRFs:
J∗π(R) = sup
h∈Cb(X)
[Dπ(R; c+Qh)− 〈π, h〉] . (5.24)
Since J∗π(R) <∞, we can apply Proposition 1 separately for each h ∈ Cb(X).
Since Q is weakly continuous by hypothesis, Qh ∈ Cb(X × U) for any h ∈
Cb(X). In light of these observations, and owing to our hypotheses, we can
ensure that Assumptions (D.1) and (D.2) of Proposition 1 are satisfied. In
particular, we can take hπ ∈ Cb(X) that achieves the supremum in (5.24)
(such an hπ exists by hypothesis) to deduce the existence of an MRS control
law Φ∗ that satisfies the information constraint with equality and achieves









we obtain (5.20). In the same way, (5.21) follows from (3.26) in Proposition 1.
Finally, the variational formula (5.23) for the optimal value can be obtained
immediately from (5.24) and Proposition 2.
Note that the control law Φ∗ ∈M(U|X) characterized by Theorem 7 is not
guaranteed to be feasible (let alone optimal) for the optimization problem in
Eq. (5.12). However, if we add the invariance condition Φ∗ ∈ Kπ, then (5.22)
provides a sufficient condition for optimality:
Theorem 8. Fix a candidate invariant distribution π ∈ P(X). Suppose there
exist hπ ∈ L1(π), λπ <∞, and a stochastic kernel Φ∗ ∈ Kπ(R) such that
〈π, hπ〉+ λπ = 〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c+Qhπ〉 = Dπ(R; c+Qhπ). (5.25)
Then Φ∗ ∈ M(U|X) achieves the infimum in (5.12), and J∗π(R) = J∗,π(R) =
λπ.
Proof. First of all, using the fact that Φ∗ ∈ Kπ together with (5.25), we can
write
〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c〉 = 〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c+Qhπ − hπ ⊗ 1〉 = λπ. (5.26)
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〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h〉
≥ inf
Φ∈Iπ(R)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qhπ − hπ〉
= Dπ(R; c+Qhπ)− 〈π, hπ〉
= λπ.





〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h〉
≤ sup
h∈L1(π)
〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c+Qh− h〉
= 〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c〉
= λπ,
where the last step follows from (5.26). This shows that 〈π ⊗ Φ∗, c〉 = λπ =
J∗π(R), and the optimality of Φ
∗ follows.
To complete the computation of the optimal steady-state value J∗(R)
defined in (5.11), we need to consider all candidate invariant distributions
π ∈ P(X) for which Kπ(R) is nonempty, and then choose among them any π
that attains the smallest value of J∗π(R) (assuming this value is finite). On
the other hand, if J∗π(R) <∞ for some π, then Theorem 7 ensures that there
exists a suboptimal control law satisfying the information constraint in the
steady state.
5.3.3 Information-Constrained Bellman Equation
The function hπ that appears in Theorems 7 and 8 arises as a Lagrange
multiplier for the invariance constraint Φ ∈ Kπ. For a given invariant measure
π ∈ P(X), it solves the fixed-point equation
〈π, h〉+ λπ = inf
Φ∈Iπ(R)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh〉 (5.27)
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with λπ = J
∗
π(R).
In the limit R → ∞ (i.e., as the information constraint is relaxed), while
also minimizing over the invariant distribution π, the optimization problem
(5.11) reduces to the usual average-cost optimal control problem (5.10). Un-
der appropriate conditions on the model and the cost function, it is known
that the solution to (5.10) is obtained through the associated average-cost
optimality equation (ACOE), or Bellman equation (BE)
h(x) + λ = inf
u∈U
[c(x, u) +Qh(x, u)] , (5.28)
with λ = J∗. The function h is known as the relative value function, and has
the same interpretation as a Lagrange multiplier.
Based on the similarity between (5.27) and (5.28), we refer to the former
as the information-constrained Bellman equation (or IC-BE). However, while
the BE (5.28) gives a fixed-point equation for the relative value function h,
the existence of a solution pair (hπ, λπ) for the IC-BE (5.27) is only a sufficient
condition for optimality. By Theorem 8, the Markov kernel Φ∗ that achieves
the infimum on the right-hand side of (5.27) must also satisfy the invariance
condition Φ∗ ∈ Kπ(R), which must be verified separately.
In spite of this technicality, the standard BE can be formally recovered in
the limit R→∞. To demonstrate this, first observe that J∗π(R) is the value














≥ λ+ sR, ∀ν ∈ P(U)
λ ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, h ∈ L1(π).
This follows from (5.23). From the fact that the DRF is convex and nonin-
creasing in R, and from (5.21), taking R→∞ is equivalent to taking s→ 0
(with the convention that sR→ 0 as R→∞). Now, Laplace’s principle [125]
states that, for any ν ∈ P(U) and any measurable function F : U→ R such




















[c(·, u) +Qh(·, u)]− h
〉
≥ λ, λ ≥ 0, h ∈ L1(π).
Performing now the minimization over π ∈ P(X) as well, we see that the




[c(·, u) +Qh(·, u)]− h ≥ λ, λ ≥ 0, h ∈ C(X)
which recovers the BE (5.28) (the restriction to continuous h is justified by
the fact that continuous functions are dense in L1(π) for any finite Borel
measure π). We emphasize again that this derivation is purely formal, and
is intended to illustrate the conceptual relation between the information-
constrained control problem and the limiting case as R→∞.
5.3.4 Convergence of Mutual Information
So far, we have analyzed the steady-state problem (5.11) and provided suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of a pair (π,Φ∗) ∈ P(X)×K, such that
Jπ(Φ




µ -a.s. and I(π,Φ
∗) = R, (5.29)
where, R is a given value of the information constraint. Turning to the
average-cost problem posed in Section 5.1, we can conclude from (5.29) that
Φ∗ solves (5.8) in the special case µ = π. In fact, in that case the state
process {Xt} is stationary Markov with µt = Law(Xt) = π for all t, so we
have I(µt,Φ
∗) = I(π,Φ∗) = R for all t. However, what if the initial state
distribution µ is different from π?
For example, suppose that the induced Markov kernel QΦ∗ ∈ M(X|X) is
weakly ergodic, i.e., µt converges to π weakly for any initial state distribution
µ. In that case, µt ⊗ Φ∗ t→∞−−−→ π ⊗ Φ∗ weakly as well.
Here, we need to review some limit properties of mutual information func-
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tional. The functional I(µ,K) is weakly lower semicontinuous in the joint
law µ⊗K: for any two sequences {µn}∞n=1 ⊂ P(X) and {Kn}∞n=1 ⊂M(Y|X)
such that µn ⊗Kn n→∞−−−→ µ⊗K weakly, we have
lim inf
n→∞
I(µn, Kn) ≥ I(µ,K). (5.30)
(Indeed, if µn ⊗ Kn converges to µ ⊗ K weakly, then, by considering test
functions in Cb(X) and Cb(Y), we see that µn → µ and µnKn → µK weakly
as well; Eq. (5.30) then follows from the fact that the relative entropy is
weakly lower-semicontinuous in both of its arguments.)
Since the mutual information functional is only lower semicontinuous in




∗) ≥ I(π,Φ∗) = R.
That is, while it is reasonably easy to arrange things so that Jµ(Φ
∗) = J∗π(R)
a.s., the information constraint (5.8b) will not necessarily be satisfied. The
following theorem gives one sufficient condition:
Theorem 9. Fix a probability measure µ ∈ P(X) and a stable MRS control
law Φ ∈ M(U|X), and let {(Xt, Ut)}∞t=1 be the corresponding state-action
Markov process with X1 ∼ µ. Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:
(I.1) The induced transition kernel QΦ is aperiodic and positive Harris recur-
rent (and thus has a unique invariant probability measure π = πQΦ).
(I.2) The sequence of information densities
ıt(x, u) , log
d(µt ⊗ Φ)
d(µt ⊗ µtΦ)
(x, u), t ≥ 1












Proof. Since QΦ is aperiodic and positive Harris recurrent, the sequence µt
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converges to π in total variation (see [126, Thm. 13.0.1] or [122, Thm. 4.3.4]):
‖µt − π‖TV, sup
A∈B(X)
|µt(A)− π(A)| t→∞−−−→ 0.
By the properties of the total variation distance, ‖µt⊗Φ−π⊗Φ‖TV t→∞−−−→ 0 as
well. This, together with the uniform integrability assumption (5.31), implies
that I(µt,Φ
∗) converges to I(π,Φ∗) by a result of Dobrushin [127].
While it is relatively easy to verify the strong ergodicity condition (I.1),
the uniform integrability requirement (I.2) is fairly stringent, and is unlikely
to hold except in very special cases:
Example 8. Suppose that there exist nonnegative σ-finite measures λ on




(x), f(u|x) = dΦ
dρ
(u|x), g(y|x) = dQΦ
dλ
(y|x) (5.32)
exist, and there are constants c, C > 0, such that c ≤ f(u|x) ≤ C for all x ∈
X, u ∈ U. (This boundedness condition will hold only if each of the conditional
probability measures Φ(·|x), x ∈ X, is supported on a compact subset Sx of U,
and ρ(Sx) is uniformly bounded.) Then the uniform integrability hypothesis
(I.2) is fulfilled.
To see this, we first note that, for each t, both µt ⊗ Φ and µt ⊗ µtΦ are
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the product measure λ⊗ ρ, with
d(µt ⊗ Φ)
d(λ⊗ ρ) (x, u) = pt(x)f(u|x) and
d(µt ⊗ µtΦ)
d(λ⊗ ρ) (x, u) = pt(x)qt(u),
















This implies that we can express the information densities ıt as
ıt(x, u) = log
f(u|x)
qt(u)
, (x, u) ∈ X× U, t = 1, 2, . . . .
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≤ ıt(x, u) ≤ log f(u|x)−
∫
X






where in the upper bound we have used Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, the
sequence of random variables {ıt(Xt, Ut)}∞t=1 is uniformly bounded, hence uni-
formly integrable.
In certain situations, we can dispense with both the strong ergodicity and
the uniform integrability requirements of Theorem 9:
Example 9. Let X = U = R. Suppose that the control law Φ can be
realized as a time-invariant linear system
Ut = kXt +Wt, t = 1, 2, . . . , (5.33)
where k ∈ R is the gain, and where {Wt}∞t=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. real-valued
random variables independent of X1, such that ν = Law(W1) has finite mean
m and variance σ2 and satisfies
D(ν‖N(m,σ2)) <∞, (5.34)
where N(m,σ2) denotes a Gaussian probability measure with mean m and
variance σ2. Suppose also that the induced state transition kernel QΦ with










i.e., the variance of the state converges to its value under the steady-state
distribution π. Then I(µt,Φ) → I(π,Φ) as an immediate consequence of
Theorem 8 in [128].
5.4 Information-Constrained LQG Problem
We now illustrate the general theory presented in the preceding section in
the context of an information-constrained version of the well-known linear
quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problem. Consider the linear stochastic
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system
Xt+1 = aXt + b Ut +Wt, t ≥ 1 (5.35)
where a, b 6= 0 are the system coefficients, {Xt}∞t=1 is a real-valued state
process, {Ut}∞t=1 is a real-valued control process, and {Wt}∞t=1 is a sequence
of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and variance σ2. The ini-
tial state X1 has some given distribution µ. Here, X = U = R, and the
controlled transition kernel Q ∈ M(X|X × U) corresponding to (5.35) is
Q(dy|x, u) = γ(y; ax+ bu, σ2) dy, where γ(·;m,σ2) is the probability density
of the Gaussian distribution N(m,σ2), and dy is the Lebesgue measure. We
are interested in solving the information-constrained control problem (5.8)
with the quadratic cost c(x, u) = px2 + qu2 for some given p, q > 0.
Theorem 10. Suppose that the system (5.35) is open-loop stable, i.e., a2 < 1.
Fix an information constraint R > 0. Let m1 = m1(R) be the unique positive
root of the information-constrained discrete algebraic Riccati equation (IC-
DARE)
p+m(a2 − 1) + (mab)
2
q +mb2
(e−2R − 1) = 0, (5.36)
and let m2 be the unique positive root of the standard DARE










































u; (1− e−2R)kix, (1− e−2R)e−2Rkiσ2i
)
, (5.41)
and let πi = N(0, σ
2
i ) for i = 1, 2. Then the first term on the right-hand
side of (5.40) is achieved by Φ1, the second term is achieved by Φ2, and
Φi ∈ Kπi(R) for i = 1, 2. In each case the information constraint is met with
equality: I(πi,Φi) = R, i = 1, 2.
To gain some insight into the conclusions of Theorem 10, let us consider
some of its implications, and particularly the cases of no information (R = 0)
and perfect information (R = +∞). First, when R = 0, the quadratic IC-
DARE (5.36) reduces to the linear Lyapunov equation [129] p+m(a2−1) = 0,
so the first term on the right-hand side of (5.40) is m1(0)σ
2 = pσ
2
1−a2 . On the
other hand, using Eqs. (5.37) and (5.38), we can show that the second term
is equal to the first term, so from (5.40)
J∗(0) ≤ pσ
2
1− a2 . (5.42)
Since this is also the minimal average cost in the open-loop case, we have
equality in (5.42). Also, both controllers Φ1 and Φ2 are realized by the
deterministic open-loop law Ut ≡ 0 for all t, as expected. Finally, the steady-




1−a2 , and π1 = π2 = N(0, σ
2/(1 − a2)),
which is the unique invariant distribution of the system (5.35) with zero
control (recall the stability assumption a2 < 1). Second, in the limit R→∞
the IC-DARE (5.36) reduces to the usual DARE (5.37). Hence, m1(∞) = m2,
and both terms on the right-hand side of (5.40) are equal to m2σ
2:
J∗(∞) ≤ m2σ2. (5.43)
Since this is the minimal average cost attainable in the scalar LQG con-
trol problem with perfect information, we have equality in (5.43), as ex-
pected. The controllers Φ1 and Φ2 are again both deterministic and have
the usual linear structure Ut = k2Xt for all t. The steady-state variance
σ21(∞) = σ22(∞) = σ
2
1−(a+bk2)2 is equal to the steady-state variance induced
by the optimal controller in the standard (information-unconstrained) LQG
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problem.
When 0 < R <∞, the two control laws Φ1 and Φ2 are no longer the same.
However, they are both stochastic and have the form
Ut = ki
[









2 , . . . are i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
i ) random variables independent of {Wt}∞t=1
















2 , . . . are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables with vari-
ance
σ̄2i = e
−2R(1− e−2R) (bki)2 σ2i + σ2.
Theorem 10 implies that, for each i = 1, 2, this system is stable and has the
invariant distribution πi = N(0, σ
2
i ). Moreover, this invariant distribution
is unique, and the closed-loop transition kernels QΦi , i = 1, 2, are ergodic.
We also note that the two controllers in (5.44) can be realized as a cascade






t = (1− e−2R)Xt + e−R
√
1− e−2RV (i)t .
We can view the stochastic mapping from Xt to X̂
(i)
t as a noisy sensor or
state observation channel that adds just enough noise to the state to satisfy
the information constraint in the steady state, while introducing a minimum
amount of distortion. The difference between the two control laws Φ1 and Φ2
is due to the fact that, for 0 < R <∞, k1(R) 6= k2 and σ21(R) 6= σ22(R). Note
also that the deterministic (linear gain) part of Φ2 is exactly the same as in
the standard LQG problem with perfect information, with or without noise.
In particular, the gain k2 is independent of the information constraint R.
Hence, Φ2 as a certainty-equivalent control law which treats the output X̂
(2)
t
of the AWGN channel as the best representation of the state Xt given the
information constraint. A control law with this structure was proposed by
Sims [2] on heuristic grounds for the information-constrained LQG problem
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with discounted cost. On the other hand, for Φ1 both the noise variance σ
2
1 in
the channel Xt → X̂(1)t and the gain k1 depend on the information constraint
R. Numerical simulations show that Φ1 attains smaller steady-state cost for
all sufficiently small values of R (see Figure 5.1), whereas Φ2 outperforms
Φ1 when R is large. As shown above, the two controllers are exactly the
same (and optimal) in the no-information (R → 0) and perfect-information
(R→∞) regimes.










































Figure 5.1: Comparison of Φ1 and Φ2 at low information rates and the
difference Φ2 − Φ1 (dashed line). System parameters:
a = 0.995, b = 1, σ2 = 1, cost parameters: p = q = 1.
In the unstable case (a2 > 1), a simple sufficient condition for the existence






a2 − (a+ bk2)2
1− (a+ bk2)2
, (5.46)
where k2 is given by (5.38). Indeed, if R satisfies (5.46), then the steady-
state variance σ22 is well-defined, so the closed-loop system (5.45) with i = 2
is stable.
5.5 Infinite-Horizon Discounted-Cost Problem
We now consider the problem of rationally inattentive control subject to
the infinite-horizon discounted-cost criterion. This is the setting originally
considered by Sims [1, 2]. The approach followed in that work was to select,
for each time t, an observation channel that would provide the best estimate
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X̂t of the state Xt under the information constraint, and then invoke the
principle of certainty equivalence to pick a control law that would map the
estimated state to the control Ut, such that the joint process {(Xt, X̂t, Ut)}
would be stationary. On the other hand, the discounted-cost criterion by its
very nature places more emphasis on the transient behavior of the controlled
process, since the costs incurred at initial stages contribute the most to the
overall expected cost. Thus, even though the optimal control law may be
stationary, the state process will not be. With this in mind, we propose
an alternative methodology that builds on the convex-analytic approach and
results in control laws that perform well not only in the long term but also
in the transient regime.
In this section only, for ease of bookkeeping, we will start the time index
at t = 0 instead of t = 1. As before, we consider a controlled Markov
chain with transition kernel Q ∈ M(X|X,U) and initial state distribution
µ ∈ P(X) of X0. However, we now allow time-varying control strategies
and refer to any sequence Φ = {Φt}∞t=0 of Markov kernels Φt ∈M(U|X) as a
Markov randomized (MR) control law. We let PΦµ denote the resulting process
distribution of {(Xt, Ut)}∞t=0, with the corresponding expectation denoted by
EΦµ . Given a measurable one-step state-action cost c : X × U → R and a
discount factor 0 < β < 1, we can now define the infinite-horizon discounted
cost as







Any MRS control law Φ ∈ M(U|X) corresponds to having Φt = Φ for all
t, and in that case we will abuse the notation a bit and write PΦµ , EΦµ , and
Jβµ (Φ). In addition, we say that a control law Φ is Markov randomized
quasistationary (MRQ) if there exist two Markov kernels Φ(0),Φ(1) ∈M(U|X)
and a deterministic time t0 ∈ Z+, such that Φt is equal to Φ(0) for t < t0 and
Φ(1) for t ≥ t0.
We can now formulate the following information-constrained control prob-
lem:
minimize Jβµ (Φ) (5.47a)
subject to I(µt,Φt) ≤ R, ∀t ≥ 0. (5.47b)
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Here, as before, µt = PΦµ [Xt ∈ ·] is the distribution of the state at time t,
and the minimization is over all MRQ control laws Φ.
5.5.1 Reduction to Single-stage Optimization
In order to follow the convex-analytic approach as in Section 5.3.1, we need to
write (5.47) as an expected value of the cost c with respect to an appropriately
defined probability measure on X× U. In contrast to what we had for (5.8),
the optimal solution here will depend on the initial state distribution µ. We
impose the following assumptions:
(D.1) The state space X and the action space U are compact.
(D.2) The transition kernel Q is weakly continuous.
(D.3) The cost function c is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous, and bounded.
The essence of the convex-analytic approach to infinite-horizon discounted-
cost optimal control is in the following result [117]:






where Γβµ,Φ ∈ P(X× U) is the discounted occupation measure, defined by






, ∀f ∈ Cb(X× U). (5.48)
This measure can be disintegrated as Γβµ,Φ = π ⊗ Φ, where π ∈ P(X) is the
unique solution of the equation
π = (1− β)µ+ βπQΦ. (5.49)
It is well-known that, in the absence of information constraints, the mini-
mum of Jβµ (Φ) is achieved by an MRS policy. Thus, if we define the set
Gβµ ,
{











and if Γ∗ = π∗ ⊗ Φ∗ achieves the infimum, then Φ∗ gives the optimal MRS
control law. We will also need the following approximation result:
Proposition 6. For any MRS control law Φ ∈M(U|X) and any ε > 0, there
exists an MRQ control law Φε, such that
Jβµ (Φ






(1− β)2εI(π,Φ), t = 0, 1, . . . , (5.52)
where µεt = PΦ
ε










Φ(du|x), t < t∗





t ∈ N : Cβ
t
1− β ≤ ε
}
, (5.53)
and u0 is an arbitrary point in U. For each t, let µt = µQ
t
Φ = PΦµ (Xt ∈ ·).


















≤ Jβµ (Φ) + ε,
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which proves (5.51). To prove (5.52), we note that (5.48) implies that








Therefore, since the mutual information I(ν,K) is concave in ν, we have
























where we have also used the fact that the mutual information is nonnegative,








For t ≥ t∗, I(µεt ,Φεt) = 0, since at those time steps the control Ut is indepen-
dent of the state Xt by construction of Φ
ε.




1− β 〈Γ, c〉 (5.54a)
subject to Γ ∈ Gβµ , I(Γ) ≤ R̄ (5.54b)
(The information constraint R̄ will be related to the original value R later.)
We will denote the value of this optimization problem by Jβ∗µ (R̄).
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5.5.2 Marginal Decomposition
We now follow more or less the same route as we did in Section 5.3.2 for the
average-cost case. Given π ∈ P(X), let us define the set
Kβµ,π ,
{
Φ ∈M(U|X) : π = (1− β)µ+ βπQΦ
}
.
(This set may very well be empty, but, for example, Kβµ,µ = Kµ.) We can




〈Γ, c〉 = 1
1− β infπ∈P(X) infΦ∈Kβµ,π
〈π ⊗ Φ, c〉. (5.55)
If we further defineKβµ,π(R̄) , Kβµ,π∩Iπ(R̄), then the value of the optimization
problem (5.54) will be given by







〈π ⊗ Φ, c〉.
(5.56)
From here onward, the progress is very similar to what we had in Section
5.3.2, so we omit the proofs for the sake of brevity. We first decouple the
condition Φ ∈ Kβµ,π from the information constraint Φ ∈ Iπ(R̄) by introducing
a Lagrange multiplier:






[〈π ⊗ Φ, c+ βQh− h⊗ 1〉+ (1− β)〈µ, h〉] .
(5.57)
Since the cost c is bounded, Jβ∗µ,π(R̄) < ∞, and we may interchange the







[〈π ⊗ Φ, c+ βQh− h⊗ 1〉+ (1− β)〈µ, h〉] .
(5.58)
At this point, we have reduced our problem to the form that can be handled
using rate-distortion theory:
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Theorem 11. Consider a probability measure π ∈ P(X), and suppose that
the supremum over h ∈ Cb(X) in (5.16) is attained by some hβµ,π. Then there




1− β 〈π, h
β
µ,π〉 − 〈µ, hβµ,π〉
=
1




1− βDπ(R̄; c+ βQh
β
µ,π). (5.59)
Conversely, if there exist a function hβµ,π ∈ L1(π), a constant λβµ,π > 0, and
a Markov kernel Φ∗ ∈ Kβµ,π(R̄), such that
1
1− β 〈π, h
β
µ,π〉 − 〈µ, hβµ,π〉+ λβµ,π
=
1




1− βDπ(R̄; c+ βQh
β
µ,π), (5.60)
then Jβ∗µ,π(R̄) = λ
β
µ,π, and this value is achieved by Γ
∗ = π ⊗ Φ∗.
The gist of Theorem 11 is that the original dynamic control problem is
reduced to a static rate-distortion problem, where the distortion function is
obtained by perturbing the one-step cost c(x, u) by the discounted value of
the state-action pair (x, u).
Theorem 12. Given R ≥ 0 and ε > 0, suppose that Eq. (5.60) admits a








Let Qµ(R) denote the set of all MRQ control laws Φ satisfying the informa-











+ 〈µ, hβµ,π〉+ ε.
(5.61)
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Proof. Given Φ∗ and ε > 0, Proposition 6 guarantees the existence of a MRQ
control strategy Φε∗, such that
Jβµ (Φ
ε∗) ≤ Jβµ (Φ∗) + ε = λβµ,π + ε
and I(µt,Φ
ε∗
t ) ≤ R for all t ≥ 0. Thus, Φε∗ ∈ Qµ(R). Taking the infimum




COORDINATION UNDER AN OUTPUT
ENTROPY CONSTRAINT
In this chapter, Bayesian decision-making with information selection arises
within a communication setup, in which a sender and a collection of receivers
are involved. Within the context of compressed representations in networked
control systems, this situation is known as empirical coordination under com-
munication constraints. The problem of coordination, first introduced in the
information theory literature by Cuff et al. [130] (see also [131]), can be
stated as follows: Consider a finite collection of decision-makers (or DMs,
for short), who wish to generate actions in response to a random state vari-
able according to some prescribed policy, but can only receive information
about the state over finite-capacity noiseless digital links. Suppose that we
have a large number of i.i.d. copies of the state, and let the DMs generate
a sequence of actions based on the information they receive about this state
sequence. What are the minimal communication requirements (in bits per
copy), to guarantee that the long-term empirical frequencies of realized states
and actions approximate, to the desired accuracy, the ideal joint probability
law of states and actions induced by the marginal law of the state and the
policy?
Cuff et al. [130] assume that both the state and the actions take values in
finite sets, and measure the quality of approximation by the total variation
distance between the empirical distribution of states and actions and the tar-
get joint distribution. However, this criterion is inapplicable to continuous-
valued states and/or actions with nonatomic probability laws because the
total variation distance between any nonatomic probability measure and any
discrete probability measure attains its maximal value. To resolve this issue,
Raginsky [132] proposed a relaxed approximation criterion: Fix a suitable
class of bounded real-valued test functions on the space of all state-action
pairs and consider the worst-case deviation between their empirical averages
and their expectations with respect to the target measure. Under the regu-
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larity assumption that the class of test functions has the so-called universal
Glivenko–Cantelli property (cf. [133] and references therein, as well as Sec-
tion 6.1 for definitions), Raginsky [132] obtained a full information-theoretic
characterization of the minimal communication requirements for empirical
coordination. Since any uniformly bounded class of real-valued functions on
a finite set is universal Glivenko–Cantelli, the framework of [130] emerges as
a special case.
In this chapter, we present an extension of the empirical coordination
framework of [132] to the sequential setting: We consider a two-terminal net-
work consisting of a sender and a decision-maker (DM). The sender observes
N independent copies of a discrete-time state process of fixed finite duration
T . It is useful to think of each copy as input data for a task, which involves
taking T actions contingent on the states. Completion of the task involves
implementing a fixed causal policy on the state process corresponding to that
task. However, the DM has no direct access to the state process. Instead, the
sender can communicate with the DM over a finite capacity noiseless digital
channel, and the idea is to exploit statistical regularity across tasks to reduce
the amount of communication needed to guarantee that, on average, the per-
formance of the DM on all the tasks resembles the ideal joint distribution of
states and actions prescribed by the policy. Thus, we are interested in the
communication complexity of coordination, i.e., the minimal amount of com-
munication needed to guarantee that, in the limit as N →∞, the empirical
distribution of states and actions at each time t ∈ [T ] can approximate the
state-action distribution induced by the state process law and by the policy
specification. The coding scheme employed by the sender must satisfy the
sequentiality constraint: The signal transmitted by the sender to the DM at
time t may only depend on the realizations of the state processes up to time
t. Following Tatikonda [34], we quantify the communication resources by the
Shannon entropy of the signal process. Entropy constraints on the quantizer
output are commonly used in causal source coding problems, where the com-
pressed representation of the source at time t may depend on the present
and on the past source samples, but not on the future ones [134]. Moreover,
under our assumption, mutual information reduces to output entropy.
It is worth mentioning that, like other setups that include the interplay
between information acquisition and decision-making, the sequential coordi-
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nation problem considered here can also be interpreted in the framework of
economics. It arises when a finite number of economic agents (or sectors)
with constrained cognitive (or communication) resources [2] are subject to
idiosyncratic economic shocks. A better-informed information sender – such
as a central bank or monetary authorities – wishes to recommend optimal ac-
tions to all the agents through a common public signal. On average, though,
the sender’s optimal signaling strategy must take into account the limits on
information-processing. Our chapter addresses several features of this setup
as well; however, we do not consider situations involving strategic motives, in
which different players involved in the information exchange have biased or
opposing objectives. Strategic considerations have been addressed recently,
both in economics [90,135,136] and in information theory [137].
In this chapter:1:
• We provide full information-theoretic characterization of the fundamen-
tal limit on the amount of communication from the sender to the DM
in the setting of sequential empirical coordination. We refer to this fun-
damental limit as the sequential rate-distortion function for empirical
coordination.
• We show that, for all large enough N , this fundamental limit can be
achieved by means of tree-structured codes of the kind employed by
Tatikonda [34].
1As a point of reference for the community of economics, our work can be compared to
the work of Al-Najjar [138], who analyzes the quality of forecasts or policy decisions made
on the basis of estimating the probabilities of a whole class of events simultaneously from
observed empirical frequencies. In fact, our use of uGC classes in an operational criterion
for coordination is inspired by Al-Najjar. His work amounts to evaluating the uniform
deviation between the empirical probabilities and the ‘true’ probabilities over a class A
of measurable sets. In order for the estimate to be consistent, the class of all indicator
functions of the sets in A must be a uGC class (which is equivalent to A being a so-called
Vapnik–Chervonenkis class of sets). Al-Najjar considers the case when the decision-makers
have direct observation of all the relevant data. We are extending Al-Najjar’s framework
in three key ways
• We are considering arbitrary uGC classes, not just classes of indicator functions.
• We are imposing an information constraint (i.e., the state processes must be com-
municated to the DM over a finite-capacity channel).
• We are considering the sequential set-up, where, for each n, one must make T > 1
decisions, contingent on previously made decisions and the history of states.
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• We show that no sequential scheme for empirical coordination can beat
the fundamental limit achieved by sequential rate-distortion function
for empirical coordination.2 While we do not make any structural as-
sumptions on the state process (e.g., it is not assumed to be mem-
oryless, Markov, ergodic, etc.), we assume that the target policy is
feedforward (i.e., there is no functional dependence of future states on
current and past actions).
• We discuss the implication of our results for Kolmogorov-Smirnov cri-
terion for one-step cost as well as weak convergence and Wasserstein
distances.
• We provide and prove fairly general source coding lemma in the ap-
pendix for general alphabet sources in a sequential setup.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. We introduce the notation
and basic concepts (in particular, Glivenko–Cantelli classes and the corre-
sponding notion of typicality) in Section 6.1. The precise formulation of the
sequential empirical coordination problem is given in Section 6.2. The main
results are presented in Section 6.3, with some implications discussed in Sec-
tion 6.4. Appendix D contains some technical lemmas needed in the proof of
the main theorem.
6.1 Some Notions and Relevant Notations
The notion of a universal Glivenko-Cantelli class [133] (or uGC class for
short) plays a central role in this chapter. The main reason for adopting this
notion is that it leads to a fruitful extension of the notion of typical sequences
in standard Borel spaces [132]. We briefly summarize the key concepts here.
2The reference policy for generating actions contingent on the states may be random-
ized. However, we restrict the sequential encoder used by the sender and the sequential
decoder used by the DM to be deterministic. The reason for this is that, when random-
ized strategies are used in the absence of a noiseless feedback channel from the DM to
the sender, the sender has to form beliefs about the actions taken by the DM, who will in
turn form beliefs about the beliefs by the sender about the actions taken by the DM, and
so on, leading to the so-called infinite regress of expectations (see, e.g., [139]). This lack
of precise knowledge on the part of the sender will accumulate over time. Restricting to
deterministic strategies removes this problem: at any time t, the sender is strictly better
informed than the receiver and can perfectly reconstruct the actions taken by the receiver.
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First, given a space (X,B(X)), we define the following additional spaces:
1. S(X) is the space of all finite signed Borel measures on X.
2. P(X) ⊂ S(X) is the space of all Borel probability measures on X.
3. M(X) is the space of all measurable functions f : X→ R.
4. Mb(X) ⊂ M(X) is the normed space of all bounded measurable func-




and M1b (X) , {f ∈ Mb(X) : ||f ||∞≤ 1}.
5. Cb(X) ⊂Mb(X) is the space of all bounded continuous functions on X.






When ν is a probability measure, we will also use the standard expectation
notation Eν [f(X)].
Let [N ] , {1, . . . , N}, for N ∈ N, and let x[N ] = (x1, . . . , xN) denote an








where δx is the Dirac measure centered at x. If X1, . . . , XN are i.i.d. random
elements of X with common marginal law µ, then for any f ∈ M1b (X) the
empirical means





f(Xn), N ∈ N
converge to the mean 〈µ, f〉 almost surely, by the Strong Law of Large Num-
bers (SLLN), which is









n→∞−−−→ 0, µ-a.s. (6.1)
We introduce some notation which will help us state our result succinctly.









By the union bound, (6.1) carries over to any finite family of functions.
Thus, for any F ⊂M1b (X) with |F|<∞,
∥∥∥PX[N ] − µ
∥∥∥
F
N→∞−−−→ 0, µ-a.s. (6.3)
In general, (6.3) is referred to as the Uniform Law of Large Numbers
(ULLN) over F – that is, the worst-case absolute deviation between em-
pirical and true means converges to zero uniformly over the function class
F . However, ULLN may not hold for an arbitrary infinite class of functions
F on a general Borel space, despite (6.1). Specifically, it fails to hold on
F ≡M1b (X) if µ has a density.
This observation shows that properly defining the notion of a typical se-
quence over an abstract Borel alphabet requires some care.
Let us recall the usual definition:
Definition 10. Given a finite set X and a probability distribution µ ∈ P(X)
on it, the typical set T (N)∆ (µ), for ∆ > 0, is the set of all N-tuples x[N ] ∈ X[N ]
whose empirical distributions PX[N ] are ∆-close to µ in the total variation
norm:
T (N)∆ (µ) ,
{
x[N ] ∈ X[N ] :






In this case, we have the following implication of (6.3) with F = M1b (X): If








where P is induced by N i.i.d. µ’s. In order to extend the intuitive notion of
typicality to general Borel alphabets, we restrict the class F to be a universal
Glivenko–Cantelli class:
Definition 11. A function class F ⊂M1b (X) is a universal Glivenko–Cantelli
class (or a uGC class, for short) if




for any µ ∈ P(X), where X1, X2, . . . is stationary memoryless random process
with marginal distribution µ.
Now, typical sequences on general Borel spaces can be defined in the spirit
of Definition 10:
Definition 12. Fix a uGC function class F on X. Given a probability mea-
sure µ ∈ P(X), the typical set T (N)∆,F (µ), for ∆ > 0, is the set of all N-tuples
x[N ] ∈ X[N ] whose empirical distributions PX[N ] are ∆-close to µ in the ‖·‖F
seminorm:
T (N)∆,F (µ) ,
{
x[N ] ∈ X[N ] :






In other words, the typical set T
(N)
∆,F(µ) consists of all x[N ], whose empirical




fz = 1(−∞,z] : z ∈ R
}
of indicator functions of semi-infinite intervals is a uGC class (this is the
well-known Glivenko–Cantelli theorem, which explains the origin of the name
“universal Glivenko–Cantelli”). We then have the following counterpart of
(6.4):
Proposition 8. Consider a Borel space X and a uGC class F ⊂ M1b (X). If
X1, X2, . . . is a sequence of i.i.d. random elements of X with common law µ,
then for any ∆ > 0
P(X[N ] /∈ T (N)∆,F (µ))
N→∞−−−→ 0. (6.5)
Proof. Immediate from Definitions 11 and 12.
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6.2 Problem Formulation
We now provide the precise formulation of the problem of sequential empirical
coordination.
Fix the state space X, the action space U, and the time horizon T . For
each t ∈ [T ], introduce the copies Xt and Ut of X and U, respectively. Let µ ∈
P(X[T ]) denote the probability law of the state process X[T ] = (X1, . . . , XT ),





Furthermore, let π ∈ −→M(U[T ]|X[T ]) denote the directed stochastic kernel4
whose factors π(t) ∈M(U|X[t]×U[t−1]) prescribe the causal policy, according
to which the DM takes target actions in U based on the past history of states
and actions. The resulting joint probability law of states and actions, the
so-called strategic measure Pπµ ∈ P(X[T ] × U[T ]), is given by









The marginal law of Xt under P
π
µ will be denoted by µt ∈ P(X), and the
marginal conditional law of Ut given Xt by πt ∈M(U|X).
Let X[T ],[N ] , {Xt,n : t ∈ [T ], n ∈ [N ]} be a T×N array of random elements
of X, where t ∈ [T ] denotes the time index, while n ∈ [N ] enumerates the
copies of µ. For all A ⊂ [T ] and B ⊂ [N ], we will denote by XA,B the sub-
array (Xt,n : t ∈ A;n ∈ B). For each n ∈ [N ] the columns X[T ],n = (Xt,n)t∈[T ]
are i.i.d. copies of the state process with law µ. Similarly, let {Ut,n : t ∈
[T ];n ∈ [N ]}, denoted with U[T ],[N ], be an array of random elements of U
such that for n ∈ [N ] the pair process (X[T ],n, U[T ],n) are i.i.d. copies of the
state-action process with law Pπµ. Notice that both arrays X[T ],[N ] and U[T ],[N ]
are independent across [N ] while correlated across [T ].
We now consider the following sequential coding problem as observation
4For reviewing the concept of directed stochastic kernel, refer to Section 3.3.2.
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kernel5 involving an information sender (IS) and a decision-maker (DM). The
IS can transmit messages to the DM over a finite-capacity channel. At each
time t, the IS observes the state realizations X[t],[N ] and sends a message to
the DM who will use this message and all previously received messages to
generate the new N -tuple of actions Ut,[N ] using a deterministic policy.
6
Definition 13. A sequential N-code is a collection γ = (γt)t∈[T ] of measurable
mappings
γt : X[t],[N ] → Ut,[N ]
with countable ranges7.
Like before, we follow the general framework laid out in Section 2.2, and
characterize elements of probabilistic model set as in Definition 3. In this
situation, though, there are two decision-makers: IS and DM. Our focus is
IS’s probabilistic model set, as DM just follows the observation he receives.
Specifically and for IS:
1. Causal (time) ordering of variables:
X1,[N ], U1,[N ], X2,[N ], U2,[N ], . . . , XT,[N ], UT,[N ],
where system set includes Xt,[N ] ∈ X[N ] and decision set includes se-
quence of observations Ut,[N ] ∈ U[N ] .
2. System specification:
• Pγµ(dxt,[N ]|x[t−1],[N ]) =
⊗
n∈[N ]
µ(dxt,n|x[t−1],n) for all t ∈ [T ]
3. Information pattern and constraints:
• Pγµ(dut,[N ]|u[t−1],[N ], x[t],[N ]) = δγt(x[t],[N ])(dut,[N ])
Further, there is a constraint on observation kernels that will be ex-
plained in the sequel.
5Or signaling strategy within this communication framework.
6More precisely, the signal at time t is an N -tuple of actions, where the nth coordinate
gives the action to be implemented by the nth DM.
7Equivalently and based upon the communication feature we have in this setup, se-
quential N-code is also referred to as joint coarse signal since it induces a partition on the
joint state space.
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Together, the induced strategic measure, i.e., joint probability law of the
states observed by the IS and the actions generated by the DM:






δγt(x[t],[N ])(dut,[N ]). (6.7)
In the general spirit of rationally inattentive decision-making, we want the
per-DM per-time mutual information between the joint states and actions to
be constrained. Since the observation kernel has a finite range, the average




Defining the cost function in this problem requires some care. As men-
tioned, π ∈ −→M(U[T ]|X[T ]) denotes the directed stochastic kernel whose factors
π(t) ∈ M(U|X[t] × U[t−1]) prescribe the causal policy, according to which the
DM takes target actions in U. This means that DMs just want to follow π,
no matter what their cost function is. Based on this, the objective for IS is
defined as to facilitate this. In fact, if all DMs’ cost functions are equal to
the same f , the average cost incurred across all DMs when the joint state
is x[N ] and actions taken are u[N ] must be compared with the expected cost







f(Xt,n, Ut,n)− 〈µt ⊗ π̃t, f〉
∣∣∣∣∣ , (6.8)
We now consider the case when each DM can choose an arbitrary f ∈ F .
The empirical distribution of state-action pairs at time t is given by






If all the DMs have perfect information, we expect the realized frequencies
of shocks and actions to closely match the joint distribution (6.6). Then Eq.




P(Xt,[N ],Ut,[N ]) − µt ⊗ πt, f
〉∣∣∣ . (6.10)
Since we have a class of DMs whose collective cost functions constitute uGC
8Notice that, given the target policy, DM’s decision policy is going to be randomized,
even with perfect information.
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class F ⊂M1b (X× U), we take supremum over f ∈ F in (6.10).
First, notice that, by the uGC property,
∥∥∥PXt,[N ],Ut,[N ] − µt ⊗ πt
∥∥∥
F
Pπµ a.s.−−−−−→ 0 as N →∞, (6.11)





∥∥∥PXt,[N ],Ut,[N ] − µt ⊗ πt
∥∥∥
F
Pπµ a.s.−−−−−→ 0 as N →∞. (6.12)
That is,9 the realized empirical distributions of states and actions will be
asymptotically consistent with the strategic measure Pπµ, uniformly over F .
This motivates us to define the cost function for IS as:










We can think of this cost function as a specific form of consistency condition
between the empirical distribution generated by state-action pairs and the
desired model. It gives the worst-case bias over the class of criteria F in the
realized sequence of shocks and actions at time t relative to desired policy
µt ⊗ πt.
In this section, in order to keep the notations consistent, we solve the
dual problem of decision-making with information selection. We constrain
the cost and seek the minimum information transmission rate needed by
an observation kernel (sequential N -code here) in order to ensure that the
realized sequence of states observed by the sender and actions taken by the
decision-maker is ∆-consistent (in expectation) with the target measure Pπµ
9Naturally, this implies ε-consistency of empirical distribution of joint state-action re-












by having N sufficiently large, which, when combined with boundedness assumption on
F , implies that the expected cost goes to zero as well.
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on a fixed but arbitrary uGC class F ⊂ M1b (X × U). That is, we wish to










while minimizing the total Shannon entropy of the messages


















be the set of all sequential N -codes that meet the criterion in (6.14). With







where H(U[T ],[N ]) is the joint Shannon entropy of the actions generated by
the IR using γ.
In the next section, we present the main results concerning the solution of
(6.16).
6.3 Main Results
Our main result addresses two questions pertaining to the operational rate-
distortion function defined in (6.16):
1. What is the minimum information transmission rate needed for IS to
induce an empirical state-action distribution that is ∆-consistent (in
expectation) with the target measure Pπµ?
2. Can this minimum rate can be achieved by sequential N -codes?
In order to address these questions, we first introduce an information-theoretic
counterpart of (6.16), which we refer to as the sequential rate-distortion func-
tion for empirical coordination. In fact, we pose an auxiliary problem, whose
solution provides a fundamental limit to the solution for (6.16).
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Consider the subset of
−→M(U[T ]|X[T ]) consisting of those directed stochastic
kernels whose induced marginal distributions of (Xt, Ut) at each t ∈ [T ] are
∆-consistent with Pπµ, on average:
Πµ,π(∆) ,
{





‖µt ⊗ π̃t − µt ⊗ πt‖F ≤ ∆
}
;
here, given some π̃ ∈ −→M(U[T ]|X[T ]), π̃t ∈ M(U|X) denotes the induced con-
ditional distribution of Ut given Xt. It replaces the joint observation kernel
constructed by sequential N -code with a general kernel intended for a sin-
gle DM, and the average per-agent mutual information (which reduces to
entropy, as mentioned) with conditional mutual information.
The sequential rate-distortion function for empirical coordination is defined
as





Remark 13. For any π̃ ∈ −→M(U[T ]|X[T ]), Ut and (Xt+1, . . . , XT ) are condi-
tionally independent given (X[t], U[t−1]) for each t ∈ [T ]. Using this fact and
the chain rule for mutual information (Lemma 3), we can write








where the quantity in (6.18) is the directed information Iµ,π̃(X[T ] → U[T ]) (see
Definition 7). Thus, we can express the rate-distortion function in (6.17) as
RT (∆) inf
π̃∈Πµ,π(∆)
Iµ,π̃(X[T ] → U[T ])
T
. (6.19)
Thus, RT (∆) is the empirical coordination counterpart of the sequential rate-
distortion function [34]. Eq. (6.19) conveys an important intuitive concept,
beyond the common information content embodied in the concept of mutual
information. In a stochastic dynamical system, past states and actions con-
vey information about the current state. Each of the terms Iµ,π̃(X[t];Ut|U[t−1])
denotes the amount of information that needs to be conveyed about the state
history X[t] beyond what is contained in U[t−1] in order to pin down the cur-
122
rent action Ut. 
The rate-distortion function RT (∆) gives the smallest amount of informa-
tion that any causal policy must convey about the sequence of states, on aver-
age per unit time, in order for the resulting joint measure to be ∆-consistent
(in expectation) with the postulated target measure Pπµ on the class F . The-
orems 13 and 14 below state that the sequential rate-distortion function for
empirical coordination defined in (6.17) is the asymptotic fundamental limit
of the empirical coordination problem formulated in Section 6.2. Note that
the operational performance criterion in (6.14) is non-additive in n. Never-
theless, as evident from the two theorems below, the information-theoretic
expression for the fundamental limit of sequential empirical coordination does
not involve any limit as N →∞.
Theorem 13 (Achievability). Suppose RT (∆) < ∞. Then, for each ε > 0,
there exists N(ε) ∈ N, such that
R̂T,N(∆ + ε) ≤ RT (∆) + ε.
In other words, under the conditions of the theorem, for each sufficiently large
N , we can find a sequential N-code in ΓNµ,π(∆ + ε), whose output entropy
(normalized by NT ) is approximately bounded by RT (∆).
Proof. All of the heavy lifting needed in the proof is contained in two tech-
nical lemmas presented in Appendix D. The key step is taken care of
by Lemma 13, which extends the so-called piggyback coding lemma [132,
Lemma A.1] to the sequential case. This lemma, in turn, relies on Lemma 14,
which provides a random coding argument along the lines of [140, Lemma 9.3.1]
for tree codes (a natural choice in the presence of causality constraints). With
these two lemmas at hand, the achievability proof is conceptually transpar-
ent.
Since RT (∆) <∞, there exists some π̃ ∈ Πµ,π(∆ + ε2) such that
1
T




For each t, define the function
ψt,N(xt,[N ];ut,[N ]) ,













ψt,N(Xt,[N ], Ut,[N ])
]
= 0.









Iµ,π̃(X[T ];U[T ]) +
ε
2
< RT (∆) + ε.






















‖µt ⊗ π̃t − µt ⊗ πt‖F
≤ ∆ + ε.
Thus, γ ∈ ΓNµ,π(∆+ε), and therefore, from the definition of R̂T,N(·), it follows
that
R̂T,N(∆ + ε) ≤
H(U[T ],[N ])
NT
≤ RT (∆) + ε.
Theorem 14 (Converse). For any N , T and ∆,
R̂T,N(∆) ≥ RT (∆).
In other words, the average output entropy of any N-code γ ∈ ΓNµ,π(∆) must
be at least as large as RT (∆).
Proof. The proof uses the techniques from [132]. Fix an arbitrary sequential
N -code γ ∈ ΓNµ,π(∆), and let (X[T ],[N ], U[T ],[N ]) the state-action process with
process law Pγµ. Let J be a random variable uniformly distributed on [N ], in-
dependently of (X[T ],[N ], U[T ],[N ]). Consider the random couple (X[T ],J , U[T ],J).
From symmetry and independence, it follows that the marginal distribution
of X[T ],J is equal to µ. For each t ∈ [T ], let π̃(t) ∈ M(U |X[t] × U[t−1]) be the
induced conditional law of Ut,J given (X[t],J , U[t−1],J), and let π̃t ∈ M(U|X)
denote the induced conditional law of Ut,J given Xt,J . Then we have the
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=NI(X[T ],J ;U[T ],J |J)
(d)
=NI(X[T ],J ;U[T ],J , J)
≥NIµ,π̃(X[T ], U[T ]),
where:
• (a) follows from the fact that the map X[T ],[N ] → U[T ],[N ] is determinis-
tic;
• (b) is a standard information-theoretic fact: if X[N ] is a sequence of
independent random variables, then for any sequence Y[N ] of random
variables jointly distributed with the Xn’s,
∑
n∈[N ]
I(Xn;Yn) ≤ I(X[N ];Y[N ]);
• (c) follows from the construction of J ;
• (d) follows from the fact that, since {X[T ],1, . . . , X[T ],N} are i.i.d., J and
X[T ],J are independent (see Appendix B in [132]), and from chain rule
for mutual information (Lemma (3)).
The remaining steps are consequences of definitions and of standard information-









Now, for each t ∈ [T ], Xt,J is independent of J , and has the same law as
Xt,1, namely µt. Moreover, (cf. Appendix B in [132]), the expected empirical
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Figure 6.1: Convexifying the problem of sequential information
transmission through coarse kernel.
distribution EγµPXt,[N ],Ut,[N ] is equal to µt ⊗ π̃t. Then we have
∑
t∈[T ]















where the first inequality is by convexity, while the second inequality is by














by definition. Since this holds for every γ ∈ ΠNµ,π(∆), it follows that RT (∆) ≤
R̂T,N(∆).
Theorems 13 and 14 contain the main conclusions of this section, in terms
of providing connection between (6.16) and (6.17). Their main message is
shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The two theorems address the main questions
raised: The collective behavior of (6.16) can be approximately mimicked by
(6.17), provided that the message is (on average) within the information-









Figure 6.2: Limit of sequential information transmission through coarse
kernel.
to-desired behavior.
Given the uGC class of F and target value ∆, minimum required mutual
information of an arbitrary observation kernel in (6.17) provides an asymp-
totic limit to the per-DM output entropy of the joint deterministic policy
which needs to transmit information to the body of decision-makers to at-
tain the same target value ∆. On the other hand, as N grows large, the
per-DM informativeness of the optimal joint deterministic policy approaches
the fundamental limit imposed by the mutual information. Intuitively, infor-
mation sender can exploit statistical regularities in time and across agents
in such a way that the collective empirical behavior of the heterogeneous
agents can get close to the outcome of the postulated representative agent’s
full-information benchmark. As the number of DMs grows large, this sta-
tistical regularity can be employed to compare the informativeness of the
selected optimal strategy with the fundamental limit imposed by the mu-
tual information, which is what we originally consider for a single rationally
inattentive decision-maker with no constraint on the signal structure.
Demonstrating through Figure 6.2, consider the shaded region that in-
cludes all pairs (∆, R), corresponding to which there exists an average rate-
R jointly deterministic observation kernel achieving the objective in (6.16).
The direct part of the theorem states that the information-theoretic rate-
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distortion function RT (∆) in (6.17) provides a lower boundary for this region
and basically R̂T,N(∆) approaches this boundary RT (∆) as N → ∞. The
converse part of the theorem states that no pair (∆, R) outside the shaded
region is achievable by any signaling strategy.
6.4 Implications
Although Theorems 13 and 14 provide a full characterization of the funda-
mental limits on the minimal rate of communication for sequential empiri-
cal coordination, the computation of the sequential rate distortion function
RT (∆) is a complicated infinite-dimensional optimization problem already in
the static (T = 1) case, which was addressed in [132]. Below, we provide two
examples that illustrate the difficulty of explicitly computing RT (∆) even for
T = 1. We also show that, in some cases, one can upper-bound RT (∆) by a
simpler information-theoretic quantity related to remote lossy source coding.
6.4.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterion for one-step costs
While we have remained silent on the nature of the target strategic measure
Pπµ, it may have been selected based on considerations of expected cost. Thus,
suppose that we have a function c ∈ M(X × U), such that c(x, u) gives the
cost of taking action u in response to state x. Let F be the class of indicator
functions of the level sets of c:
f(x, u) , 1{c(x, u) ≤ a}, a ∈ R. (6.20)
Then we have the following:
Proposition 9. Let F denote the class of all f of the form (6.20). Then for
any two P,Q ∈ P(X× U),
‖P −Q‖F = dKS(FP◦c−1 , FQ◦c−1), (6.21)
where Fµ denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a Borel prob-
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|F (a)− F ′(a)| (6.22)
is the Kolomogorov-Smirnov distance between cdf’s F and F
′
. The class F
is a universal Glivenko-Cantelli class.
Proof. Fix any pair P,Q ∈ P(X× U). Then the chain of equalities
‖P −Q‖F = sup
a∈R





follows from definitions. By the classical Glivenko-Cantelli theorem [14,
Prop. 4.24], the class of all indicator functions r 7→ 1{r ≤ a}, a ∈ R, is a
uGC class on (R,B(R)). Therefore, since {P ◦ c−1 : P ∈ P(X×U)} ⊂ P(R),
F is a uGC class of functions on X× U.
The following is immediate from the above proposition:
Theorem 15.














In other words, RT (∆) is the smallest mutual information between the state
process X[T ] with law µ ∈ P(X[T ]) and any action process U[T ] generated from
X[T ] by a causal policy π̃, such that the time average of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distances between the state-action costs under π̃ and the target
policy π is bounded from above by ∆. Evaluating this quantity exactly is
difficult even for T = 1.
6.4.2 Weak convergence and Wasserstein distances
Another example concerns approximation of the target strategic measure
Pπµ in a certain metric that metricizes the topology of weak convergence of
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probability measures. Suppose that X × U is a Polish space with a given
metric d. For any f ∈Mb(X× U), define the Lipschitz norm
‖f‖Lip , sup
(x,u),(y,v)∈X×U
|f(x, u)− f(y, v)|
d((x, u), (y, v))
(6.24)
and the bounded Lipschitz norm
‖f‖BL , ‖f‖∞ + ‖f‖Lip . (6.25)
Proposition 10. Consider the function class F = {f ∈ M1b (X × U) :
‖f‖BL ≤ 1}. Then, for any two P,Q ∈ P(X× U),
||P −Q||F= dBL(P,Q), (6.26)
the bounded Lipschitz metric on P(X×U) that metricizes the topology of weak
convergence of probability measures. The class F is a universal Glivenko-
Cantelli class.
Proof. Eq. (6.26) is the definition of the bounded Lipschitz metric [141,
Sec. 11.3], which metricizes the topology of weak convergence of probability
measures [141, Thm. 11.3.3]. Now, let (X1, U1), (X2, U2), ... be a sequence of
i.i.d. random elements of X× U with common marginal law P . Then
dBL(P(X[n],U[n]),P)
n→∞−−−→ P, a.s. (6.27)
by Varadarajan’s theorem [141, Thm. 11.4.1]. Since this holds for any P ∈
P(X), and in light of (6.26), we conclude that F is a uGC class.
Under an additional moment condition, the bounded Lipschitz metric can
be upper-bounded by the so-called Wasserstein metric. Let P0(X × U) ⊂
P(X×U) be the set of all probability measures P for which there exists some
(x0, u0) ∈ X × U, such that 〈P, d(·, (x0, u0))〉 < ∞. The Wasserstein metric
between any two P,Q ∈ P0(X× U) is
Wd(P,Q) , sup
‖f‖Lip≤1
|〈P, f〉 − 〈Q, f〉|. (6.28)
We can now give the following upper bound on the sequential rate-distortion
function RT (∆) w.r.t. F :
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Theorem 16. Suppose that Pπµ ∈ P0(X× U). Then















Again, despite the clean conceptual interpretation of RT (∆) in terms of
approximating strategic measures by empirical distributions of state-action
pairs under the bounded Lipschitz metric, it does not admit closed-form
expressions even for T = 1.
6.4.3 Upper bounds on the sequential rate-distortion function
While the exact computation of RT (∆) is a difficult task, it is possible to
obtain computable upper bounds under some additional regularity assump-
tions. One example is given in the theorem below. To keep things simple,
we consider the case of T = 1.
Theorem 17. Suppose that there exists a metric d on the action space U,
such that the elements of F satisfy the following uniform Lipschitz condition:
For all u, u′ ∈ U and all f ∈ F ,
sup
x∈X
|f(x, u)− f(x, u′)|≤ d(u, u′). (6.30)






Remark 14. The function defined in (6.31) has been introduced in a recent
paper of Kochman, Ordentlich, and Polyanskiy [142] in the context of con-
verse bounds for multiple-description source coding and joint source-channel
broadcasting of a common source.
Proof. Disintegrate the joint probability law of (X,U) as µ ⊗ π, where µ ∈
P(X) and π ∈ M(U|X). Fix a Markov kernel PÛ |U ∈ M(U|U) satisfying
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Then X and Û are conditionally independent given U . Using this fact and
the uniform Lipschitz property (6.30), we have for any f ∈ F
〈µ⊗ π, f〉 − 〈µ⊗ π̃, f〉
= E[E[f(X,U)− f(X, Û)|X,U ]]
≤ E[E[d(U, Û)|X,U ]]
= E[d(U, Û)]
≤ ∆.
Interchanging the roles of π and π̃, we obtain
|〈µ⊗ π, f〉 − 〈µ⊗ π̃, f〉|≤ ∆.
Taking the supremum over all f ∈ F , we see that ‖µ ⊗ π − µ ⊗ π̃‖F≤ ∆.
Optimizing over all such PÛ |U , we get the bound R1(∆) ≤ R(∆).
As an illustration, consider the case when X and µ are arbitrary, U = R,
and the policy π is deterministic: π(du|x) = δg(x)(du) for some Borel function
g : X→ R. Suppose, furthermore, that the uniform Lipschitz condition (6.30)
is satisfied with d(u, u′) = |u− u′|. Then we have the following:
• If
√







where, for s ≥ 0,
Cav(s) , sup








is the Shannon capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel under the average power constraint (the additive noise Z is a
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standard normal random variable independent of Y ).













is the Shannon capacity of the AWGN channel under the peak power
constraint.
To derive both of these bounds, the natural choice of PÛ |U is given by the
additive Gaussian noise channel Û = U + ∆Z = g(X) + ∆Z. Then the
Markov kernel π̃ defined in (6.32) evidently satisfies
‖µ⊗ π − µ⊗ π̃‖F≤ ∆,
and
R(∆) ≤ I(X;U + ∆Z) = I(X; g(X) + ∆Z).
Since X and Û = g(X)+∆Z are conditionally independent given U = g(X),
we have
I(X; g(X) + ∆Z) = I(g(X); g(X) + ∆Z) = I(U ;U + ∆Z).
Thus, in the case m2 = EU2 <∞,
I(X; Û) = I(U ;U + ∆Z)
≤ sup
U : var[U ]≤m2







Similarly, if |U |≤ m a.s., then
I(X; Û) = I(U ;U + ∆Z)
≤ sup
U∈[−m,m] a.s.








DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we tackled the problem of Bayesian decision-making where
decision-makers have the option to choose the structure through which to col-
lect further information in static and sequential setups under various assump-
tions. We identified the constraint set from which the information structure
was chosen by limiting the average of Kullback-Leibler divergence between
prior and posterior, or putting various constraints on the mutual information
between observation and state variables. An immediate extension is to in-
vestigate operational achievability for closed-loop systems, i.e. to construct
a coding scheme to achieve empirical coordination. Furthermore, as far as
decision-making goes, there can be several other constraints on information
collection, leading to various options for information structures to choose
from. Given the general applicability of sequential decision-making with in-
formation choice, these results could be of interest to both communities of
system engineering and decision-making in economics.
Beyond decision-making and optimization, the same situation of informa-
tion choice might arise in strategic communication. The main feature of the
models of strategic communication is that the decision-maker that selects
information structure is different from the decision-maker who chooses the
action.1 Information transmission in such scenarios can be considered under
various structural assumptions on the set of information structures.
The third area where our work can be extended is a setup where we have a
collection of homogeneous or heterogeneous decision-makers. Whether they
are connected through a network, or freely interact as a population with the
same objective, and whether they directly exchange information or take each
others action in their information set, the effect of having a constrained set
of information structures to choose from is worth investigating.
1Naturally, information sender tries to send information so as to tilt the receiver’s




We first provide the definition for absolute continuity [141]. Let P1 and P2
be two measures on the same measurable space (Y,B(Y)). We say P1 is
absolutely continuous with respect to P2, in symbols P1 ≺ P2, iff P1(A) = 0
whenever P2(A) = 0. We have Theorem 18.
Theorem 18. Let Y be a Polish space, and P1,P2,P3 ∈ P(Y) such that














= 1 − P3 a.e.
Proof. See [143], Proposition 3.9.
The Theorems 19 and 20 below establish the interconnection between the
joint probability measure for a collection of random variables, with the col-
lection of stochastic Markov kernels that describe how each of these variables
is distributed given the others.
The equation (A.1), which is a repetition of (2.7), turns out to hold almost
surely, which means when describing a joint probability distribution, one may
interchangeably use either of the descriptions:
PY[K] = PY1 ⊗ PY2|Y1 ⊗ . . .⊗ PYK |Y1,...,Y[K−1] . (A.1)
Theorem 19. Let Y1,Y2, . . .YK be a sequence of Polish spaces, and for k ∈
[K] define Xk = Y1 × . . . × Yk and X = Πk≥1Yik . Let PY1 be an arbitrary
measure on Y1, and for every k ∈ [K], let PYk+1|Xk be a stochastic kernel on
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Yk+1 given Xk. Then there exists a unique probability measure PY[K] on X
such that (A.1) holds for every measurable rectangle B1 × . . .×BK ∈ X.
Proof. See [85], Proposition 7.28.
Theorem 20. Under the assumptions of Theorem 19, and given a joint
probability measure PY[K] and {i1, . . . , iK} as a permutation of [K], there
exists a collection of stochastic kernels PYik |Xk , k ∈ [K] for which (A.1)
holds.
Proof. See [85], Corollary 7.27.2.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
In this Appendix, we present the proof of Theorem 1. The proof relies on
two intermediate results, stated below as Propositions 11 and 12. Proposi-
tion 11 can be thought of as an information-constrained form of the revelation
principle from the theory of games with asymmetric information [92].
Proposition 11. Consider a sequence W of observation kernels
Wt ∈ M(Z|X[t],Z[t−1]), t ∈ [T ], and a sequence Φ of decision policy kernels
Φt ∈ M(U|Z[t]), where W ∈
−→I (Φ, R[T ]) and Φt’s are induced by a sequence
deterministic mappings ψt : Z[t] → U, t ∈ [T ], satisfying the invertibility
condition of Theorem 2. Then there exists a sequence W of observation
kernels W t ∈M(U|X[t],U[t−1]) such that W ∈
−→I (id, R[T ]) and
J(W,Φ) = J(W, id),
where J(W,Φ) is as in (4.1).
Proof. Since Φ satisfies the invertibility condition of Theorem 2, for each
observation sequence z[T ] ∈ Z[T ] there is a unique action sequence u[T ] ∈ U[T ]
such that ψt(z[t]) = ut, t ∈ [T ]. Thus, using the identity policy id, one may
come up with a joint probability measure P ∈ P(X[T ] × Z[T ] × U[T ]) that
assigns the same marginal law to (X[T ], U[T ]) as P, which implies J(W,Φ) =









where (a) and (c) hold by the chain rule for the mutual information (see
Lemma 3 Chapter 3), and (b) holds by the invariance of the mutual informa-
tion invariance under one-to-one mappings [123]. Notice that, in general, by
the data processing inequality we always have IP(X[t];U[t]) ≤ IP(X[t];Z[t]) and
IP(X[t];U[t−1]) ≤ IP(X[t];Z[t−1]). Therefore, direct comparison between two
sides of (b) would have been impossible without the invertibility assumption
of Theorem 2.
The next proposition implies that we can essentially restrict the space
of observation kernels and decision policy kernels further and still attain
the same value in (4.1) with the same information constraint. It crucially
depends on the Markov structure of the transition kernel PXt|U[t−1],U[t−1] and
the additive structure of the cost:
Proposition 12. For any sequence W of observation kernels
W t ∈ M(U|X[t],U[t−1]), t ∈ [T ], such that W ∈
−→I (id, R[T ]), there exists a
sequence W
s
of observation kernels W
s
t ∈ M(U|X,U[t−1]), t ∈ [T ], such that
W
s ∈ −→I (id, R[T ]) and J(W
s
, id) = J(W, id).
Proof. Let P ∈ P(X[T ],U[T ]) denote the probability measure induced by the
controlled Markov transition kernel Q, the given observation kernel W, and
the identity policy kernel id. We show that an observation kernel W
s ∈
−→I (U, R[T ]) can be constructed in such a way that, for the induced probability
measure Ps ∈ P(X[T ],U[T ]), we have PXt,Ut = PsXt,Ut for each t ∈ [T ]. Given
the fact that the expectation in (4.1) is taken over a function which depends








t(Ut ∈ B|U[t−1], Xt) =
Wt(Ut ∈ B|U[t−1], Xt) for each B ∈ B(U). We then use induction to get
the result.
As the basis of the induction at time t = 1, we have




At each t < T , suppose P(dxt, du[t]) = Ps(dxt, du[t]). For time t+ 1, we have
P(dxt+1, du[t+1])




P(dx[t], du[t])⊗ P(dxt+1|x[t], u[t])
]
⊗ P(dut+1|xt+1, u[t]).
Because of the Markov property of the transition kernels, and by the inductive

















which completes the induction step. The equality of PXt,U[t] and PsXt,U[t]
implies equality of their marginals, i.e., PXt,Ut = PsXt,Ut .
It remains to show that IP(Ut;X[t]|U[t−1]) ≤ Rt implies IPs(Ut;X[t]|U[t−1]) =
IPs(Ut;Xt|U[t−1]) ≤ Rt, or that W ∈
−→I (U, R[T ]) implies W
s ∈ −→I (U, R[T ]).





= IPs(Ut;Xt, U[t−1])− IPs(Ut;U[t−1])
(c)
= IP(Ut;Xt, U[t−1])− IP(Ut;U[t−1])
(d)
≤ IP(Ut;X[t], U[t−1])− IP(Ut;U[t−1])
(e)
= IP(X[t];Ut|U[t−1]) ≤ Rt,
where (a) follows from the structure of W
s
, so that, at time t, given U[t−1], Ut
exclusively depends on the most recent state Xt; (b) and (e) follow from the
chain rule for total mutual information; (c) follows from the construction of
W
s
from the given W; and (d) follows from the simple fact that I(X, Y ;Z) ≥
I(X;Z).
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Together, Propositions 11 and 12 imply that, given any observation kernel
and decision kernel pair (W,Φ), where W ∈ −→I (Φ, R[T ]) consists of observa-
tion kernels Wt ∈ M(Z|X[t],Z[t−1]), t ∈ [T ], and Φ is induced by a sequence
of deterministic mappings satisfying the invertibility condition of Theorem 2,
one can come up with a sequence of observation kernels W t ∈M(U|Xt,U[t−1])
such that W ∈ −→I (id, R[T ]) and
J(W,Φ) = J(W, id).
Moreover, for a fixed observation space Z, let W
Z
denote a generic observa-
tion kernel obtained from a pair (W,Φ), where W is a Z-valued observation
kernel, and the policy Φ satisfies the invertibility condition of Theorem 1.
Proof. (of Theorem 1).First, we have




























where (a) and (c) follow from Proposition 11, and (b) follows from the fact
that the set of observation and decision policy kernel pairs in the form of
(W̄Z, id) is a subset of general (W,Φ)’s.





J(W, id) ≤ J∗(U, R[T ]) ≤ J∗(R[T ]). (B.1)
On the other hand, we have
J∗(R[T ])
(a)








where (a) holds by definition and (b) holds because identity decision policy
kernel is a subset of the set of all decision policy kernels over which the
infimum in LHS is taken.
Together, Eq. (B.1) and (B.2) complete the proof.
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APPENDIX C
TECHNICAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
We present some of the proofs in this section.
Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 7. [Principle of Irrelevant Information] Let Ξ,Θ,Ψ,Υ be four ran-
dom variables defined on a common probability space, such that Υ is condi-
tionally independent of (Θ,Ξ) given Ψ. Then there exist four random vari-
ables Ξ′,Θ′,Ψ′,Υ′ defined on the same spaces as the original tuple, such that





Proof. If we denote by M(dυ|ψ) the conditional distribution of Υ given Ψ
and by Λ(dψ|θ, ξ) be the conditional distribution of Ψ given (θ, ξ), then we
can disintegrate the joint distribution of Θ,Ξ,Ψ,Υ as
P (dθ, dξ, dψ, dυ) = P (dθ)P (dξ|θ)Λ(dψ|θ, ξ)M(dυ|ψ).
If we define Λ′(dψ|θ) by Λ′(·|θ) =
∫
Λ(·|θ, ξ)P (dξ|θ), and let the tuple
(Θ′,Ξ′,Ψ′,Υ′) have the joint distribution
P ′(dθ, dξ, dψ, dυ) = P (dθ)P (dξ|θ)Λ′(dψ|θ)M(dυ|ψ),
then it is easy to see that it has all of the desired properties.
Using this principle, we can prove the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 8. [Two-Stage Lemma] Suppose T = 2. Then the kernel
W2(dz2|x2, z1, u1) can be replaced by another kernel W ′2(dz2|x2), such that




t), t = 1, 2, satisfy
E[c(X ′1, U ′1) + c(X ′2, U ′2)] = E[c(X1, U1) + c(X2, U2)]
and I(X ′t;Z
′
t) = I(Xt;Zt), t = 1, 2.
Proof. Note that Z1 only depends on X1, and that only the second-stage
expected cost is affected by the choice of W2. We can therefore apply the
Principle of Irrelevant Information to Θ = X2, Ξ = (X1, Z1, U1), Ψ = Z2
and Υ = U2. Because both the expected cost E[c(Xt, Ut)] and the mutual
information I(Xt;Zt) depend only on the corresponding bivariate marginals,
the lemma is proved.
Lemma 9. [Three-Stage Lemma] Suppose T = 2, and Z3 is condition-
ally independent of (Xi, Zi, Ui), i = 1, 2, given X3. Then the kernel
W2(dz2|x2, z1, u1) can be replaced by another kernel W ′2(dz2|x2), such that





















t) = I(Xt;Zt) for t = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. Again, Z1 only depends on X1, and only the second- and the third-
stage expected costs are affected by the choice of W2. By the law of iterated
expectation,
E[c(X3, U3)] = E[E[c(X3, U3)|X2, U2]] = E[h(X2, U2)],
where the functional form of h(X2, U2) , E[c(X3, U3)|X2, U2] is independent









by hypothesis. Therefore, applying the Principle of Irrelevant Information to
Θ = X2, Ξ = (X1, Z1, U1), Ψ = Z2, and Υ = U2,
E[c(X ′2, U ′2) + c(X ′3, U ′3)] = E[c(X ′2, U ′2) + h(X ′2, U ′2)]
= E[c(X2, U2) + h(X2, U2)]
= E[c(X2, U2) + c(X3, U3)],




t) are obtained from the original ones by re-
placing W2(dz2|x2, z1, u1) by W ′2(dz2|x2).
Proof of Theorem 10
We will show that the pairs (hi, λi) with
h1(x) = m1x
2, λ1 = m1σ
2
h2(x) = m2x
2, λ2 = m2σ





both solve the IC-BE (5.27) for πi, i.e.,
〈πi, hi〉+ λi = Dπi(R; c+Qhi), (C.1)
and that the MRS control law Φi achieves the value of the distortion-rate
function in (C.1) and belongs to the set Kπi(R). Then the desired results
will follow from Theorem 8. We split the proof into several logical steps.
Step 1: Existence, uniqueness, and closed-loop stability We first
demonstrate that m1 = m1(R) indeed exists and is positive, and that the
steady-state variances σ21 and σ
2
2 are finite and positive. This will imply that
the closed-loop system (5.45) is stable and ergodic with the unique invariant
distribution πi. (Uniqueness and positivity of m2 follow from well-known
results on the standard LQG problem.)
Lemma 10. For all a, b 6= 0 and all p, q, R > 0, Eq. (5.36) has a unique
positive root m1 = m1(R).
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Proof. It is a straightforward exercise in calculus to prove that the function




is strictly increasing and concave for m > −q/b2. Therefore, the fixed-point
equation F (m) = m has a unique positive root m1(R). (See the proof of
Proposition 4.1 in [25] for a similar argument.)
Lemma 11. For all a, b 6= 0 with a2 < 1 and p, q, R > 0,
e−2Ra2 + (1− e−2R)(a+ bki)2 ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2. (C.2)
Thus, the steady-state variance σ2i = σ
2
i (R) defined in (5.39) is finite and
positive.
Proof. We write
e−2Ra2 + (1− e−2R)(a+ bki)2









where the second step uses (5.38) and the last step follows from the fact that
q > 0 and mi > 0 (cf. Lemma 10). We get (C.2) from open-loop stability
(a2 < 1).
Step 2: A quadratic ansatz for the relative value function Let




h(y)Q(dy|x, u) = m(ax+ bu)2 +mσ2, (C.3)
and








where we have set x̃ = − mab
q +mb2
x. Therefore, for any π ∈ P(X) and any
Φ ∈M(U|X), such that π and πΦ have finite second moments, we have
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h〉 = mσ2 +
(










Step 3: Reduction to a static Gaussian rate-distortion problem
Now we consider the Gaussian case π = N(0, υ) with an arbitrary υ > 0.
Then for any Φ ∈M(U|X)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h〉
= mσ2 +
(









We need to minimize the above over all Φ ∈ Iπ(R). If X is a random variable
with distribution π = N(0, υ), then its scaled version
X̃ = − mab
q +mb2
X ≡ kX (C.4)
has distribution π̃ = N(0, υ̃) with υ̃ = k2υ. Since the transformation X 7→
X̃ is one-to-one and the mutual information is invariant under one-to-one
transformations [123],
Dπ(R; c+Qh)− 〈π, h〉 = inf
Φ∈Iπ(R)
〈π ⊗ Φ, c+Qh− h〉 (C.5)
= mσ2 +
(











We recognize the infimum in (C.6) as the DRF for the Gaussian distribution
π̃ w.r.t. the squared-error distortion d(x̃, u) = (x̃ − u)2. (See Section 3.3.3
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for a summary of standard results on the Gaussian DRF.) Hence,
Dπ(R; c+Qh)− 〈π, h〉
= mσ2 +
(




υ + (q +mb2)υ̃e−2R
= mσ2 +
(












υ + (q +mb2)k2υe−2R, (C.8)
where Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8) are obtained by collecting appropriate terms and
using the definition of k from (C.4). We can now state the following result:
Lemma 12. Let πi = N(0, σ
2
i ), i = 1, 2. Then the pair (hi, λi) solves the
information-constrained ACOE (C.1). Moreover, for each i the controller Φi
defined in (5.41) achieves the DRF in (C.1) and belongs to the set Kπi(R).
Proof. If we let m = m1, then the second term in (C.7) is identically zero
for any υ. Similarly, if we let m = m2, then the second term in (C.8) is zero
for any υ. In each case, the choice υ = σ2i gives (C.1). From the results on
the Gaussian DRF (see Section 3.3.3), we know that, for a given υ > 0, the
infimum in (C.6) is achieved by
K∗i (du|x̃) = γ
(
u; (1− e−2R)x̃, e−2R(1− e−2R)υ̃
)
du.




i , we see that the
infimum over Φ in (C.5) in each case is achieved by composing the determin-
istic mapping




with K∗i . It is easy to see that this composition is precisely the stochastic
control law Φi defined in (5.41). Since the map (C.9) is one-to-one, we have
I(πi,Φi) = I(π̃i, K
∗
i ) = R. Therefore, Φi ∈ Iπi(R).
It remains to show that Φi ∈ Kπi , i.e., that πi is an invariant distribution
of QΦi . This follows immediately from the fact that QΦi is realized as




1− e−2RV (i) +W,
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where V (i) ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and W ∼ N(0, σ2) are independent of one another




2e−2R(1− e−2R)σ2i + σ2
=
[
e−2Ra2 + (1− e−2R) (a+ bki)2
]
σ2i + σ
2 = σ2i ,
where the last step follows from (5.39). This completes the proof of the
lemma.




TECHNICAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 6
Lemma 13 below is at the heart of the proof of Theorem 13. It states that, for
any sequence of functions on N -blocks of state-action pairs whose expected
values vanish asymptotically under a given strategic measure, one may con-
struct a sequence of sequential N -codes, under which the expected value of
the time-average of these functions can be made arbitrarily small, and whose
output entropy is upper-bounded by the mutual information of the source
and action under the given probability measure.
Lemma 13. Consider a pair (µ, π̃) ∈ P(X[T ]) ×
−→M(U[T ]|X[T ]), such that
Iµ,π̃(X[t];Ut|U[t−1]) < ∞ for each t ∈ [T ]. Let (X[T ],n, U[T ],n)n∈[N ] be N i.i.d.
copies of the state-action processes with process law Pπ̃µ. Let ψt,N be a sequence





ψt,N(Xt,[N ], Ut,[N ])
]
= 0.
Then, for any ε > 0, there exists N0 = N0(ε), such that, for every N > N0,





















Iµ,π̃(X[T ];U[T ]) + ε. (D.2)
Proof. Let δt,N := Eπ̃µ
[
ψt,N(Xt,[N ], Ut,[N ])
]
and define the set
At,N ,
{














This implies that, for each t ∈ [T ], the state-action tuple (Xt,[N ], Ut,[N ])
generated according to (µ, π̃) belongs to At,N with high probability. By
Lemma 14 below, for all large enough N , there exist measurable mappings
γt,[N ] : X[t],[N ] → Ut,[N ], t ∈ [T ], such that1
Mt ,
∣∣γt,[N ](X[t],[N ])
∣∣− 1 = eN(Rt+ε),





























is(x[s],[N ], u[s],[N ]) , log
dPµ,π̃Us,[N ]|(X[s],[N ],U[s−1],[N ])=(x[s],[N ],u[s−1],[N ])
dPµ,π̃Us,[N ]|U[s−1],[N ]=u[s−1],[N ]
(us,[N ]).
are the conditional information densities. Now, since ψt,N takes values in















For all sufficiently large N , the right-hand side of (D.4) can be made smaller
than ε. To see this, notice that max
t∈[T ]
δt,N → 0 as N → ∞ by assumption.
1By adjusting ε, we can ensure that Mt is an integer.
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Moreover, since
it(X[t],[N ], U[t],[N ]) , log
dPµ,π̃Ut,[N ]|X[t],[N ],U[t−1],[N ]
dPµ,π̃Ut,[N ]|U[t−1],[N ]






















it(X[t],[N ], U[t],[N ]) > N(Rt + ε/2)
]
can be made as small as desired for all large N , according to the law of
large numbers. Therefore, we can find a sufficiently large N0 = N(ε) and a
sequential code γ = (γt,N)t∈[T ], such that Eq. (D.1) holds.
Towards verifying Eq. (D.2), let Pγµ be the joint probability law of X ∼ µ
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Iµ,π̃(X[T ];U[T ]) + ε
where (a) is by the chain rule for entropy; (b) uses the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy and the fact that Ut,[N ] can take at most Mt + 1 values by
construction of γt,N ; (c) is by the choice of Mt’s; and (d) uses the chain rule
for mutual information.
Lemma 14. Let X and U be standard Borel spaces, and consider a pair
(µ, π̃) ∈ P(X[T ]) ×
−→M(U[T ]|X[T ]), such that Rt = Iµ,π̃(X[t];Ut|U[t−1]) < ∞
for all t ∈ [T ]. Let (X[T ],n, U[T ],n)n∈[N ] be N i.i.d. draws from the strategic
measure Pπ̃µ. Let At ∈ B(Xt,[N ]×Ut,[N ]), t ∈ [T ], be a collection of Borel sets.
Then, for a given ε > 0 and any sequence of positive integers Mt, there exist
measurable mappings gt : X[t],[N ] → Ut,[N ], t ∈ [T ], such that for each t ∈ [T ]
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and each x[t−1],[N ], gt(x[t−1],]N , ·) takes at most Mt + 1 values, and
Pµ
[




















is(x[s],[N ], u[s],[N ]) , log
dPµ,π̃Us,[N ]|(X[s],[N ],U[s−1],[N ])=(x[s],[N ],u[s−1],[N ])
dPµ,π̃Us,[N ]|U[s−1],[N ]=u[s−1],[N ]
(us,[N ])
are the conditional information densities.
Proof. We will use a random sequential selection procedure to construct the
sequence of mappings g1, g2, . . . , gT . The overall idea is a generalization of
the proof of the achievability part of the lossy source coding theorem (see,
e.g., [140] or [13]).
Given Pπ̃µ, let ν ∈ P(U[T ]) denote the marginal distribution of the action





For each t ∈ [T ], define the Markov kernel νt,[N ] ∈M(Ut,[N ] | U[t−1],[N ]) via




In order to construct the finite-range mappings gt(·) : X[t],[N ] → U[N ], we first
choose the elements of U[N ] to make up the range of gt and then specify how
to assign one of these elements to each x[t],[N ] in the domain X[t],[N ].
For the first step, pick an arbitrary tuple u[N ](0) ∈ U[N ]. Then
let u[N ](1), . . . , u[N ](M1) be i.i.d. draws from ν1,[N ], and take the set
{u[N ](0), . . . , u[N ](M1)} as the finite range of g1. For the second step and
for each i1 ∈ [M1], let u[N ](i1, 1), . . . , u[N ](i1,M2) be M2 i.i.d. draws from
ν2,[N ](·|u[N ](i1)), and take the set
{u[N ](i1, i2)}i1∈[M1],i2∈[M2] ∪ {u[N ](0)}
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as the range of g2. This process is continued inductively at each t: for each
(i1, . . . , it−1), we let
u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1, 1), . . . , u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1,Mt)
be Mt i.i.d. draws from νt,[N ](·|u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1)), and take
{u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1, it)}i1∈[M1],...,it∈[Mt] ∪ {u[N ](0)}
as the range of gt. Evidently, the range of each gt is selected at random
conditionally on the realizations of the ranges of g1, . . . , gt−1. The resulting
collection of elements of U[N ] can be arranged on a rooted tree of depth T ,
where the root has M1 children, each depth-1 node has M2 children, etc.
Following Tatikonda [34], we refer to this construction as a tree code.
We now complete the construction of the gt’s. To that end, we use the fol-
lowing recursive procedure. For t ∈ [T ] and x[t],[N ], suppose that g1, . . . , gt−1
have already been specified. Given x[t],[N ], if gt−1(x[t−1],[N ]) = u[N ](0), then
we let gt(x[t],[N ]) = u[N ](0). Otherwise, if gt−1(x[t−1],[N ]) = u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1),
consider the set
Gt(x[t],[N ]) , {u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1, j) : (xt,[N ], u[N ](i1, . . . , it, j)) /∈ At}.
If it is empty, then let gt(x[t],[N ]) = u[N ](0); otherwise, let
gt(x[t],[N ]) = u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1, j
∗),
where j∗ ∈ [Mt] is the smallest index j of all u[N ](i1, . . . , it−1, j) ∈ G(x[t],[N ]).
For each t, let Et denote the event that gt(X[t],[N ]) = u[N ](0). We upper-
bound the probability of Et, with respect to both µ and the random choice of
the ranges of g1, . . . , gT . By construction of gt’s, Et will occur if either Et−1
has occurred or if Gt(x[t],[N ]) = ∅ and none of E1, . . . , Et−1 have occurred.
Therefore,
P[Et] ≤ P[Et−1] + P[{Gt(X[t],[N ]) = ∅} ∩ Ec1 ∩ . . . ∩ Ect−1]. (D.6)
By symmetry and independence in the generation of the ranges of gt, we can
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estimate the second term on the right-hand side of (D.6) by
P[{Gt(X[t],[N ]) = ∅} ∩ Ec1 ∩ . . . ∩ Ect−1]
≤
∫
Pπ̃µ(dx[t],[N ])Pπ̃µ(du[t−1],[N ])(1− νt,[N ]((xt,[N ], Ut,[N ]) ∈ Act | u[t−1],[N ]))Mt .
(D.7)
Moreover, if we define the sets
At(xt,[N ]) ,
{
ut,[N ] : (xt,[N ], ut,[N ]) ∈ At
}
,
Bt(x[t],[N ], u[t−1],[N ]) ,
{
ut,[N ] : it(x[t],[N ], u[t],[N ]) > N(Rt + ε)
}
,
then, performing a change of measure, we get
νt,[N ]((xt,[N ], Ut,[N ]) ∈ Act | u[t−1],[N ])
≥ νt,[N ](Act(xt,[N ]) ∩Bct (x[t],[N ], u[t−1],[N ]) | u[t−1],[N ])
=
∫
PUt,[N ]|X[t],[N ],U[t−1],[N ](dut,[N ]|x[t],[N ], u[t−1],[N ]))
1{ut,[N ]∈(Act (xt,[N ])∩Bct (x[t],[N ],u[t−1],[N ])} exp[−it(x[t],[N ], u[t],[N ])]
≥ e−N(Rt+ε)
∫
PUt,[N ]|X[t],[N ],U[t−1],[N ](dut,[N ]|X[t],[N ], U[t−1],[N ]))
1{ut,[N ]∈(Act (xt,[N ])∩Bct (x[t],[N ],u[t−1],[N ])}.
Using the inequality (1−ab)M ≤ 1−b+e−Ma for a, b ∈ [0, 1] , we can estimate
(
1− νt,[N ]((xt,[N ], Ut,[N ]) ∈ At | u[t−1],[N ])
)Mt







From Eqs. (D.6)–(D.8), it therefore follows that
P[Et] ≤ P[Et−1] + Pπ̃µ
[





























for every t ∈ [T ]. By construction,
P[(Xt,[N ], gt(X[t],[N ])) ∈ At] ≤ P[Et], t ∈ [T ],
where the probability is w.r.t. the joint law of X and the random selections of
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[67] F. Matějka, “Rationally inattentive seller: Sales and discrete pricing,”
The Review of Economic Studies, p. rdv049, 2015.
[68] P. Bolton, M. K. Brunnermeier, and L. Veldkamp, “Leadership, co-
ordination, and corporate culture,” The Review of Economic Studies,
vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 512–537, 2013.
[69] W. Dessein, “Why a group needs a leader: Decisionmaking and debate
in committees,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6168, 2007.
162
[70] S. Van Nieuwerburgh and L. Veldkamp, “Information acquisition and
under-diversification,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 2,
pp. 779–805, 2010.
[71] ——, “Information immobility and the home bias puzzle,” The Journal
of Finance, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1187–1215, 2009.
[72] Y. Luo et al., Rational Inattention, Portfolio Choice, and the Equity
Premium. School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong,
2006.
[73] L. Huang and H. Liu, “Rational inattention and portfolio selection,”
The Journal of Finance, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 1999–2040, 2007.
[74] L. Peng and W. Xiong, “Investor attention, overconfidence and cat-
egory learning,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 80, no. 3, pp.
563–602, 2006.
[75] H. Touchette and S. Lloyd, “Information-theoretic limits of control,”
Physical Review Letters, vol. 84, no. 6, p. 1156, 2000.
[76] ——, “Information-theoretic approach to the study of control systems,”
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 331, no. 1,
pp. 140–172, 2004.
[77] H. S. Witsenhausen, “Separation of estimation and control for discrete
time systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 59, no. 11, pp. 1557–1566,
1971.
[78] R. Dobrushin, “General statement of Shannon main theorem in the
information theory,” Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR, vol. 126, no. 3,
pp. 474–477, 1959.
[79] ——, “Mathematical problems in the Shannon theory of optimal coding
of information,” in Proc. 4th Berkeley Symp. Mathematics, Statistics,
and Probability, vol. 1, 1961, pp. 211–252.
[80] M. Kárnỳ, “Towards fully probabilistic control design,” Automatica,
vol. 32, no. 12, pp. 1719–1722, 1996.
[81] F. V. Jensen, An Introduction to Bayesian Networks. UCL press
London, 1996, vol. 210.
[82] C. M. Bishop, “Pattern recognition,” Machine Learning, vol. 128, pp.
1–58, 2006.
[83] J. Pearl, Causality. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
163
[84] R. E. Kalman et al., “A new approach to linear filtering and prediction
problems,” Journal of Basic Engineering, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 35–45,
1960.
[85] D. P. Bertsekas and S. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The
Discrete-Time Case, 2004.
[86] D. G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods. John Wiley
& Sons, 1997.
[87] C. Striebel, “Sufficient statistics in the optimum control of stochastic
systems,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol. 12,
no. 3, pp. 576–592, 1965.
[88] D. Blackwell et al., “Equivalent comparisons of experiments,” The an-
nals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 265–272, 1953.
[89] L. Le, “Sufficiency and approximate sufficiency,” The Annals of Math-
ematical Statistics, pp. 1419–1455, 1964.
[90] M. Gentzkow and E. Kamenica, “Bayesian persuasion,” American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 101, no. 6, pp. 2590–2615, 2011.
[91] B. Hajek, Random Processes for Engineers. Cambridge University
Press, 2015.
[92] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of Operations
Research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
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